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Summary
This thesis considers the scientific status of  linguistics and the historical and contemporary 
attempts to view linguistics as closely aligned to, or one of, the natural sciences. Such 
attempts share certain common features that make up what is identified here as the 
‘Formalist Attitude’. The question ‘what is a language?’ is central to the discussion of  the 
scientific status of  linguistics, so a central task of  the thesis is to show how answers to this 
question display the features of  the Formalist Attitude. In particular it is shown that 
attempts to constrict the theoretical purview of  linguistics around a view of  language that 
sustains claims to natural scientific status fail to account for the social ontology of  language 
and the role of  speakers within the creation and reproduction of  language. A consequence 
of  this failure is an inability to explain important language phenomena such as language 
change, arbitrariness and knowledge of  language, which the alternative conception of  
language defended here successfully accounts for. ‘Language’ is best seen as a power of  
speakers to communicate with one another, a view which emphasises the motivated, social, 
reproductive and transformative aspects of  actual speech.  The negative and positive 
arguments jointly defended, support the view that linguistics, considered with respect to its 
object of  knowledge, methodology and ability to offer explanations and predictions, is not 
akin to natural science but should be considered a social science. 
Besides historical contextualisation of  the problem, the thesis looks at current 
trends, such as cognitive and integrationist linguistics, that are broadly consistent with its 
criticisms and conclusions. The purpose of  the thesis then is twofold; to identify, explain 
and criticise a problematic and influential tradition within linguistics and then to provide 
some Lockean underlabouring for contemporary linguistics that will be valuable to linguists 
and philosophers.   
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8Chapter 1 
The Formalist Attitude in linguistics
1.1 Introduction
In 1929, Edward Sapir saw the emerging science of  linguistics as providing a model to 
disciplines such as psychology and philosophy; ‘For all of  them’, he argues, ‘linguistics is of  
basic importance: its data and methods show better than those of  any other discipline 
dealing with socialized behaviour the possibility of  a truly scientific study of  society’ (Sapir
1929, p.207). The emphasis on the ‘truly scientific study of  society’ is indicative of  a 
persistent concern among linguists to establish the scientific status of  their work; a concern 
which marks the history of  modern linguistics, from its development in the early 
nineteenth century and on to contemporary schools of  thought. Wasow confirms this in 
his paper ‘The Wizards of  Ling’, where he claims, ‘The concern of  modern linguistics with 
being scientific is nothing short of  obsessive’ (Wasow 1985, p.486). He goes on to list 
prominent linguists and their accompanying claims for the scientific status of  linguistics: 
Lyons, Saussure, Bloch, Chomsky and others. This preoccupation is perhaps 
understandable given that linguistics seems to occupy a liminal place within the pantheon 
of  sciences, between the natural and the social sciences. For example, Koerner claims that, 
‘linguistics is a social and human (and not exclusively historical) science, by virtue of  its 
object of  investigation, and an exact (though not necessarily mathematical) science owning 
to its methodology’ (Koerner 1978, p.25). Sapir appears to concur:
It is precisely because language is as strictly socialized a type of  human behaviour 
as anything else in culture and yet betrays in its outlines and tendencies such 
regularities as only the natural scientist is in the habit of  formulating, that linguistics 
is of  strategic importance for the methodology of  social science (Sapir 1929, 
p.213). 
Lass makes this claim,
Linguistics up to now has been the descriptive human science par excellence, and the 
steady increase of  its descriptive and systematising power has been one of  its 
glories- as well as the envy of  other disciplines, and one of  the sources of  its 
influence on anthropology, sociology and other fields (Lass 1980, p.126).
9Indeed it would be fair to say that linguistics is seen as the most social of  the natural 
sciences and the most natural of the social sciences. 
However this consensus hides tensions concerning theoretical and methodological 
commitments. To begin with the distinction between the natural and social sciences 
requires developing an account of  them and cannot be taken for granted. Further, it is 
interesting why the scientific status of  linguistics is a live topic of  debate in a way that is 
not the case for paradigmatic disciplines within either the social or natural sciences, such as 
sociology or physics. In addition, it is worth pausing to consider the way linguistics is often 
seen by linguists as demonstrating to the social sciences how to be more ‘scientific’ (that is, 
more like the natural sciences). These features of  the debate about the scientific status of  
linguistics opens up in interesting ways the expectations raised when a discipline claims to 
be a science. To be a science can mean that a discipline has the ability to predict 
phenomena within its purview, to explain by reference to general laws, to employ a 
particular methodology or simply to be similar enough in its practices and procedures to a 
paradigmatic science to warrant the characterisation of  ‘scientific’. 
My aim in this chapter is to unpack assumptions about science that shape current 
debate within linguistics in order to show that there are a number of  pressing problems in 
associating linguistics with the natural sciences, especially with the desire to strongly delimit 
language as an object of  enquiry. I will examine both the history and the prevalent schools
of  linguistics in an attempt to throw light on the following questions: what sort of  a 
science is linguistics? What is it about the nature of language which makes the question of  
the scientificity of  linguistics a matter of  consistent attention for many linguists and 
philosophers? Why is it that the study of  language is seen as being particularly amenable to 
a natural-scientific approach?  Is this view justified?     
1.2 Linguistics as a natural science: An overview
To address these questions, it is helpful to begin by examining the motivation for the 
association of  linguistics with the natural sciences. This will allow me to evaluate claims 
about the status of  linguistics as a natural science. For a considerable number of  linguists 
throughout the discipline’s history, linguistics has been seen as one of  the natural sciences. 
As we will see, this has taken on a number of  manifestations, all with their particular 
emphases, but here I give several general factors that plausibly motivate this view. First,
10
language looks like a natural object as it appears to be universal among human beings.
Humans exist with or without systems of  currency, but not without language. Second, the 
desire for exactitude and systematic specification of  the discipline can lead to the adoption 
of  standards and procedures from other successful fields of  enquiry. Third, the successes 
of  the natural sciences make them an attractive model for conducting enquiry and such a 
model offers the possibility of  the kind of  predictions and explanations characteristic of  
the natural sciences. 
The order in which this adoption of  standards happens is not necessarily uniform 
as some linguists take on the procedures of  natural science simply because they see 
linguistics as a natural science. Others look to natural science as a way of  attaining scientific 
status for a discipline whose position qua scientificity is not yet sufficiently firm. As a result 
of  adopting these standards, a discipline can be given a degree of  intellectual respectability 
and it is indeed the case that the natural sciences have provided for linguists a standard 
upon which to judge something as ‘scientific’ and thus intellectually respectable.
In the first section, I examine major movements within the history of  linguistics 
and the claims made for the scientificity of  linguistics.
1
It is important to note that these 
views are not uniform and that different authors and schools have different emphases in 
pressing the claim that linguistics belongs with the natural sciences or is especially 
associated with the natural sciences. By looking at these views, a sense of  the history of  the 
question and the way this history influences current debate is discernable. I consider three 
major views: 
1.2.1 Language-as-organism: Schleicher and Organicism. 
1.2.2 The Neogrammarians.
1.2.3 Ferdinand de Saussure and early structuralism.    
Before examining these views, it is important that when we talk of  the natural sciences, we 
establish some common ground about the general features of  the natural sciences. While 
no list can be exhaustive or incontestable, a broadly accepted characterisation of  science 
can provide a useful heuristic to help with the comparative analysis of  the views that 
follow.
2
I adapt the following from Alexander Bird’s Philosophy of  Science (1998, p.3)
3
: 
                                                
1
This is not an attempt at a history or historiography of linguistics. For such works see Chomsky 
Cartesian Linguistics (1966), Koerner Toward a Historiography of Linguistics (1978), Itkonen 
Universal History of Linguistics (1991), Robins A Short History of Linguistics (1997) and Seuren
Western Linguistics: An Historical Introduction (1998). 
2
This is also apposite due to the varying conceptions of ‘science’. One commentator has it that; ‘For 
11
NSa) Nomically governed: governed by universal or natural laws.  
NSb) Explanatory: with reference to the laws proposed (NSa), the study has to be able to 
account for events within its theoretical purview. 
NSc) Predictive: a natural science should be able to form hypotheses suggesting the 
outcome of  a future event within its theoretical domain. 
NSd) Ability to empirically test hypotheses: For the natural sciences, the paradigm example 
is that of  the laboratory experiment where factors potentially interfering with the testing of  
a hypothesis can be systematically removed.  
NSe) Delimitation: The object of  knowledge studied should be well-defined and its 
borders explicit.                                                                                  
It will become clear that none of  the three dominant views of  linguistics cited above fits 
these features of  the natural sciences. On the basis of  this relatively uncontroversial list, it 
will be argued, we cannot conclude that linguistics is one of  the natural sciences. The 
negative conclusion is instructive both about the historical situation inherited by 
contemporary linguistics and about the need to probe more deeply into the relation 
between linguistics and science. 
1.2.1 Language as ‘Organism’
The first major example of  linguistics being explicitly compared to the natural sciences 
occurred in the middle of  the nineteenth century with the notion of  ‘language-as-
organism’(organicism hereafter) which had its foremost proponent in August Schleicher 
(1821-68). While not representative of  any one particular school, the idea, or metaphor as 
was sometimes maintained, held significant sway. Organicism emphasised the similarity of  
                                                                                                                                              
some (the most extreme), linguistics was a natural science; for others, (a more moderate group), 
linguistics was comparable with the natural sciences because of the method that it used and the 
solidity of the results that it achieved; for a third group, scientific, was synonymous with scholarly. In 
other words, the ‘scientificity’ of linguistics, though frequently referred to, underwent a continuous 
process of redefinition all through the [nineteenth] century’ Morpurgo-Davies (1998 p.18).
3
    A similar list is provided in Braybrooke (1987) Philosophy of Social Science.
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linguistics to biology both in the nature of  its object and in the rigour of  its method. As 
Schleicher put it in 1863:
Languages are natural organisms that came about independently of  the will of  
man, grew according to certain laws which also determine their development, 
ageing and death...the science of  language...is therefore a natural science...Its 
method is identical to that of  the other natural sciences. (Cited in Seuren 1998, 
p.85) 
The result of  the perceived methodological similarity to natural science was that for 
linguists, ‘language now becomes a real organism with a life of  its own independent from 
that speaker, and linguistics becomes a science with no historical content’ (Cited in Seuren
1998, p.88). The phrase ‘no historical content’ refers to the fact that linguistics had in its 
recent history been tied to philology and seen within the study of  the history of  literature,
as opposed to an autonomous discipline. However, Schleicher and organicism were in line 
with current orthodoxy in that they looked to the paradigm of  historical linguistics, heavily 
influenced by comparative philology, for data and approach to its object of  study. Though 
what was different for organicism’s diachronic
4
approach was that it saw languages as non-
human entities with natural longevity and laws independent of  humankind. It is within the 
scope of  this longevity that, as Robins puts it, languages are ‘natural objects that grow 
according to definite laws, go through the phases of  development and in the end perish’ 
(Robins 1997, p.205).
In line with this argument, Schleicher saw language as a supra-individual entity, not 
governed or influenced by speakers but rather, ‘Just as human individuals walk in virtue of  
their legs and feet and the whole biological machinery...in just that way humans possess a 
biological machinery that regulates acquisition and use of  language’ (Cited in Seuren 1998, 
p.84). This may appear similar to generativist notions of  the ‘language organ’, but the non-
individualist emphasis on language as an entity rather than a faculty suggests that similarities 
are superficial. Language was for organicism an entire sui generis organism, not a mere organ 
within an organism. 
Coeval with these ideas, Schleicher supported a Stammbaum, or ‘family tree’ 
metaphor of  linguistic evolution based on Darwin’s ideas of  evolution in the Origin of  
Species (1998 [1859]).
5
This gave an explanatory framework that accounted for the spread 
                                                
4
Though the terms synchronic and diachronic were coined by Saussure and so postdate both 
Organicism and the Neogrammarians, they are nevertheless useful in distinguishing methodological or 
theoretical differences. 
5
As is exemplified in his work, Die Darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenshaft (1863). 
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and diversification of  languages, again emphasising that languages had longevity and laws 
independent of  individuals. Languages were similar in existence to mammals, ‘represented 
today by coexistent species in our biological world’ (Robins 1997, p.205).    
We may list the main ideas of  organicism as follows:
O1) Languages are supra-individual entities that have an individual path of  development in 
terms of  change, growth and death.
O2) As with genetics for example, languages have their own characteristic set of  internal 
laws that put limitations on their individual development.
O3) Language and languages are amenable to and should be studied independently of  
other disciplines, for example history, as they are discrete entities. As Morpurgo-Davies 
puts it, ‘the organic metaphor offers a justification for the study of  language per se’ 
(Morpurgo-Davies 1998, p.87).
In summing up Schleicher’s and organicism’s contribution to nineteenth century linguistics, 
Kroener claims that,
[it] can hardly be over estimated. From his preconception of  linguistics as a natural 
science he drew important conclusions for the theory and methodology of  
linguistic investigation. The concept of  a language as an organism led to an 
emphasis on its systematic nature and law-governed development (Koerner 1978, 
p.34).
With organicism we can see evidence of  some of  the criteria for natural science outlined 
above. As organicism saw its object of  knowledge as being naturally delimited we can align 
it to (NSe). Second, due to the association of  linguistics with biology as well as the 
assumption of  there being law-like statements that were true of  language, we may grant
(NSa). However, Seuren (1998, p.85) suggests that the status of  the ‘laws’ proposed by 
organicism were not seen as the explicit and universal laws of  physics for example, so some 
caution is appropriate. Third, the direct link seen by the supporters of  organicism with
evolution gives it an explanatory framework (NSb) of  how language changes and develops. 
As for prediction (NSc) and empirical testing (NSd) the matter is less clear. Organicism, 
though proposing that there were laws governing language and linguistic development, was 
14
not explicit in stating what these were and so empirical testing of  such putative laws was 
not possible. Against the background of  what were seen as vagaries, a more ambitious view 
of  linguistics emerged with the neogrammarians.     
1.2.2 The Neogrammarians 
Before the emergence of  organicism, work by brothers Jacob (1785-1863) and Wilhelm 
Grimm (1786-1859) in comparative Indo-European philology gave rise to ‘Grimm’s Law’
6
,
the first principle in linguistics with applications for prediction. Grimm’s law looked at 
consonantal shift in Greek, Old Germanic and Modern German and claimed that a circular 
pattern (Kreislauf) existed which showed that phonetic change was law-governed and 
predictive. Here, the titular connotations of  ‘law’ should be treated with care, for the 
proposal of  Grimm’s law was antecedent to strong and explicit claims about the scientific 
status of  linguistics. According to Robins, Grimm, ‘did not make technical use of  the word 
law to describe what he referred to as sound shift’ (Robins 1997, p.199).
The background of  Grimm’s law is important to understanding the neogrammarian 
school. Although not conceived of  as a law in a natural scientific sense, Grimm’s law 
nevertheless provided grounding for such claims by the neogrammarians, which marked a 
turning point in the perceived scientific status of  linguistics with the publication in 1878 of  
Brugmann and Osthoff ’s Morphologische Untersuchungen (Morphological Investigations). The 
central theses of  the neogrammarian doctrine centred around two principles that language 
was governed,
1. by sound laws, which transform the old, [historically] transmitted linguistic stock 
and without changing it in its very foundation bring it into new form; and 2. by the 
essentially new creations, peculiar to the particular language, produced by the 
operation of  analogy (Janowsky cited and translated in Koerner 1978, p.198)
7
.
I will look at these two aspects of  neogrammarian thought separately, beginning with 
sound change. Famously, neogrammarians supported the absolute exceptionlessness of  
sound laws (‘die absolute Ausnahmlosigkeit der Lautgesetze’) which were deemed 
mechanical physical laws. As Robins describes, ‘whereas Schleicher had turned to biology, 
the neogrammarians looked to the exact physical sciences’ (Robins 1997, p.207).  Sound 
                                                
6
Also known as the Germanic Consonant Shift or ‘Rask's Law’. See Seuren (1998, p.83).
7
Citation from Jankowsky, The Neogrammarians: A Re-evaluation of their Place in the development of 
linguistic science (1972).
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laws were motivated by an uncompromising attitude that saw physics as the standard of  
scientificity. This uncompromising attitude is evident in the claim of  neogrammarian 
Leskien, ‘If  one admits optional, contingent, and unconnected changes, one is basically 
stating the object of  one’s research, language, is not amenable to scientific recognition’ 
(Cited in Robins 1997, p.208).
As well as the claims made of  sound laws, the neogrammarians were also keen to 
refine their object of  knowledge and shifted their emphasis of  study away from diachronic
comparative phonology towards what we would recognise today as a synchronic view. They 
wanted to distance themselves from what they saw as the empirically unsubstantiated 
speculations and constructions of  early Indo-European, the ‘ur-language’, which they 
deemed untestable. Adopting a synchronically-orientated perspective helped them to move 
away from an otiose linguistics as well as securing an accessible body of  empirical 
information from living languages. As Brugmann and Osthoff  put it, they wanted to ‘leave 
the hypothesis-laden atmosphere of  the workshop where the Indo-European root forms 
are wrought and enter the clear air of  tangible actual reality so as to gain insight into things 
that grey theory will never show’ (Cited in Seuren 1998, p.91).
8
   
This metaphysical and methodological caution was shown in the neogrammarian 
claim that language was an object of  knowledge resting solely within the individual. Partly 
in reaction to a speculative organicism, they denied the idea of  language as a supra-
individual object. For the neogrammarians, ‘linguistic changes were the changes in 
individual speech habits’ (Robins 1997, p.208). This point is important as it shows that
neogrammarians consistently saw sound laws as physical laws, which acted through the 
individual, requiring no mediating ‘entity’ as was the case with organicism.
Another important aspect of  Neogrammarian thought is analogy. Historically (in 
Aristotle, Port-Royal Grammar), analogy was cited to emphasise linguistic uniformity,
9
with 
analogists focussing on the rational and consistent deployment of  morphological 
terminations in grammatically equivalent words throughout a lexicon. This position was 
also representative of  the neogrammarians, though it was put to several explanatory uses. 
The neogrammarian Paul described analogical formulation in this way:
                                                
8
Brugmann and Osthoff, Morphologische Untersuchungen, Indogermanische Forschungen 11:1900:131-
132.
9
Classically, analogists opposed anomalists, who claimed that language was subject in large degree to 
unpredictable irregularity. Interestingly, analogy versus anomaly tended to represent positions on the 
arbitrary versus natural grounding for language, with analogists claiming language was arbitrary and 
maintained coherence by being governed by strict rules. In contrast, the anomalists claimed language 
as a natural, monogenetic derivation which was in some sense fallen from purity and so anomaly was 
unavoidable. For further discussion see 3.1.
16
It is an indubitable fact that a large quantity of  word forms and syntactic 
constructions that were never introduced into the soul from the outside can not 
just be generated with the help of  the paradigms but can be generated reliably, in 
such a way that the speaker never has the feeling of  leaving their solid ground (Paul
1891, p110).
For the neogrammarians analogy was central to the question of  linguistic creativity as it 
gave an explanation for how novel production could result from a finite ‘ground’ or 
‘paradigm’. Also analogy, being likened here with novelty, was called upon as a prophylactic 
against apparent exceptions to sound laws. This habit of  using analogy to explain away 
exceptions pointed out by their opponents lessened the persuasive power of  the 
neogrammarians’ claim for sound laws and was the main point of  attack by dissenters.
10
To summarise, the central ideas of  the neogrammarians are as follows:
N1) Linguistics studies ‘sound laws’ that are natural laws, no different in principle from 
those of  physics.
N2) Language is an object residing in the brains of  speakers and contra organicism, is an 
individual possession, not a supra-individual entity.
N3) New elements are introduced into language by analogy, which is a rational process that 
could on occasion overrule sound laws.
11
More than organicism, the neogrammarian approach displays an attachment to what would 
be recognised today as the tenets of  natural science. In their proposal of  mechanical sound 
laws they clearly see them as nomically governed, predictive and testable (NSa, c, d) as 
sound laws were modified, tested, re-stipulated and anomalies explained away as a feature 
of  analogy. Partly by means of  a synchronic perspective, the stipulation of  laws also 
required the strict delimitation of  the object of  knowledge. As Seuren argues, ‘If  the 
notion of  an exceptionless sound change is to make sense it must be limited to a well-
defined set of  rules within the bounds of  a well-defined set of  speakers’ (Seuren 1998, 
p.98). Here is a clear attempt to strictly delimit the object of  knowledge (NSe). What is 
absent from the literature on this period and apparently from the work of  the 
                                                
10
For example, Hugo Schuchardt (1842-1927). See (Seuren 1998, pp.96-7).
11
This is a partial description of how the neogrammarians saw analogy as attitudes varied. For more see 
(Seuren, 1998, p.92).
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neogrammarians themselves is an explanatory model (NSb) giving reasons for language 
change or an idea of  exactly how sound laws worked
12
. This may be explicable in terms of  
the metaphysical parsimony of  the neogrammarians, evident in their refusal to speculate on 
proto-Indo-European, their wariness of  the vagaries of  organicism in defining its object of  
study and their general adherence to grammatical description and building of  a body of  
empirical data. 
1.2.3 Saussure
With the work of  Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) we move into the twentieth century 
and to a thinker whose ideas still have influence in linguistics and beyond
13
. Like most 
linguists of  the nineteenth century, Saussure sought to make linguistics an autonomous 
science. For Saussure as with organicism and the neogrammarians, the natural sciences 
provided a model for linguistic science. Though Saussure’s approach in justifying linguistics 
as an autonomous science was novel in several respects. Firstly, Saussure made a distinction 
between the natural sciences and linguistics in a famous passage at the beginning of  the 
Course in General Linguistics (2006) [1922],
Other sciences are provided with objects of  study given in advance, which are then 
examined from different points of  view. Nothing like this is the case in 
linguistics...The object is not given in advance of  the viewpoint...it is the viewpoint 
adopted which creates the object (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.23).
14
And he contrasted linguistics with chemistry:
In chemistry, one can study the nature and composition of  bichromate of  potash 
without worrying for a moment whether it is a well defined object (Saussure 2006 
[1922], p.149).
From this, there are two consequences for Saussure’s view of  linguistics. On the one hand
this claim separates linguistics from the natural sciences, in contrast to the approaches of  
organicism or the neogrammarians. On the other hand, by demarcating his object of  
                                                
12
  One may argue that with the focus on analogy, there was an explanatory model that accounted for 
exceptions and linguistic change. While this is plausible, there is little consensus about the exact 
nature of analogy for the neogrammarians. As such it seems not to be overly important.
13
For evidence of Saussure’s influence on modern general linguistics, see Thibault (1997) and Harris 
(2003) and for structuralist and post-structuralist philosophy of language Barthes (1967) and Derrida 
(1998, 2002). 
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Page citations throughout are from the 1922 manuscript pagination. 
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knowledge in such a way as to be free from external constraint ‘the viewpoint adopted 
creates the object’, linguistics is able to meet a level of  object-specificity and delimitation 
common to the natural sciences, albeit one achieved by stipulation as opposed to the nature 
of  the object itself. Saussure considered that ‘The theoretically ideal form a science should 
take is not always the form imposed upon it by practical necessities. In linguistics, practical 
necessities are more demanding than in any other subject’ (Saussure 2006 [1916], p.139). 
The practical and theoretical convenience of  seeing linguistics as not being constrained by 
a pre-given object allowed Saussure to position linguistics as an autonomous discipline. 
Unsurprisingly, given the tenor of  nineteenth century linguistics and its concern 
with the scientificity of  linguistics, Saussure specified his object of  knowledge so as to be 
amenable to what he saw as proper scientific study. Partly, this was done by defining two 
ways in which language could be viewed and studied (the synchronic and diachronic) and 
then citing one of  these as the appropriate scientific method for linguistics. The diachronic 
perspective on language was the view taken by historical linguistics with its focus on 
language change over a time. For Saussure though, it was synchronic study that was 
deemed appropriate to the scientific study of  language. The synchronic perspective saw 
language as an abstract, static system of  interdependent elements which was a view that 
allowed Saussure to claim that, ‘each language constitutes a closed system’ (Saussure 2006 
[1922], p.139) and ‘language itself  is a system that admits no other order but its own’ 
(Saussure 2006 [1922], p.43). By first allowing that his object of  knowledge could be
stipulated and then seeing language as a static structure, Saussure was able to delimit the 
object of  study in a way consistent with the natural sciences. It was the neogrammarians 
who began a shift away from diachronic study; it was Saussure that formalised this shift 
within a more rigorous framework.
Saussure disagreed with the prevailing neogrammarian orthodoxy that language was 
not a social or supra-individual object but the sole possession of  the individual. He 
proposed the term langue for a synchronic system that was social but closed to the influence 
of  individual speakers through speech or parole. As Itkonen has put it, ‘the social aspect [of  
langue] is primary vis-à-vis the individual aspect and constitutes the genuine subject matter 
of  linguistics. There will be no scientific study of  language until this truth has been 
grasped’ (Itkonen 1991, p.297). Language for Saussure was neither an entity in its own right 
(as with organicism) nor a series of  individual possessions expressed in speech (as with the 
neogrammarians). Rather it was a supra-individual structure that was the property of  
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communities, irreducible to individual speakers
15
.  
Saussure also differed from the neogrammarians on the relevance of  laws within 
linguistic science and denied the existence of  phonetic laws as understood by the 
neogrammarians. Saussure took the view that,
Synchronic laws are general, but not imperative. It is true that a synchronic law is 
imposed upon speakers by the constraints of  communal usage. But we are not 
envisaging here an obligation relative to the language users. What we mean is that in 
the language there is nothing which guarantees the maintenance of  regularity at any 
given point. A synchronic law simply expresses an existing order. It registers a state 
of  affairs (2006 [1922], p.131). 
What Saussure saw as a law in the natural scientific sense was broadly in line with the 
positivist tradition, law as a regularity between events or a constant conjunction. However, 
it is clear that Saussure, despite using the term ‘law’ within the context of  his own theories, 
was not claiming them as laws in a natural scientific sense. Here, ‘general’ is akin to 
‘normative with a limited scope of  application’ or more plainly ‘set of  facts Y in area X’. 
‘Regularities’ are not the putatively immutable regularities of  natural law but rather salient 
frequent occurrences that correspond to a synchronic grammatical description (a 
description of  langue).  
Admittedly Saussure was not consistent in this view. This has led some 
commentators to justifiably read Saussure as more attached to the notion of  law held by 
the neogrammarians (Morpurgo-Davies in Sanders (ed.) 2004, p.25). For example, at the 
beginning of  the Course, Saussure makes it one of  aims of  linguistics ‘to determine the 
forces operating permanently and universally in all languages, and to formulate general laws 
which account for all particular linguistic phenomena’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.20). This 
position runs counter to the more qualified statements concerning synchronic laws.  As 
such, a definitive account of  Saussure’s opinion of  the character and place of  laws within 
linguistics is opaque, though it is clear he vacillated between a strongly natural-science 
orientated view of  linguistics and something more modest
16
.
To summarise, Saussure’s ideas (and those of  early structuralism) can be stated as 
follows:
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I discuss the idea of language as a social object irreducible to individuals in more detail in 2.3 and 4.1. 
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For my purposes this question does not need to be definitively settled. In passing, it is worth noting that 
this may be one of the vagaries often ascribed to the fact that the Course was compiled by Saussure’s 
students from his lecture notes. 
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S1) To be scientific, language should be studied from a synchronic perspective that allows 
for a well defined object of  knowledge.
S2) Language structure (langue) is a supra-individual entity outside of  the influence of
speakers. 
S3) Linguistics should aim to postulate the general and universal laws of  language, though 
this may not in practice be attainable as synchronic linguistic laws have only normative 
force or, minimally, are a description of  a state of  linguistic affairs.
Saussure was more circumspect than either organicism or the neogrammarians in his 
appropriation of  the natural sciences as a model for linguistics. Saussure is ambiguous with 
respect to (NSa), as he wishes to discover general and universal laws in linguistics on the 
model of  laws proposed by natural sciences, but is not convinced of  that possibility. As 
such, it is doubtful that Saussure saw linguistics as predictive in a sense relevant to the 
natural sciences though it is clear he depended on a rigorous delimitation of  his object of  
knowledge in order to justify linguistics as a science (NSe) and the model for this 
delimitation clearly has affinity with the natural sciences. Also, like the neogrammarians 
before him, Saussure’s synchronic emphasis allowed for the collection of  a stable body of  
evidence that could be used in the testing of  hypotheses (NSd). 
While structuralism differed in its approach to the scientific status of  linguistics 
from organicism and the neogrammarians, these two positions helped to inform the 
outlook and ambition of  structuralism. As Sapir claimed,
Many of  the formulations of  comparative Indo-European linguistics have a 
neatness and a regularity which recall the formulae, or the so-called laws, of  natural 
science. Historical and comparative linguistics has been built up chiefly on the basis 
of  the hypothesis that sound changes are regular and that most morphological 
readjustments in language follow as by-products in the wake of  these regular 
phonetic developments (Sapir 1929, p.209).
Throughout linguistics in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, there was a consistent 
emphasis on linguistics as a natural science and while the emphases changed, the drive to 
make linguistics ‘scientific’ was powerfully present. As Harris has claimed, the approach to 
linguistics ‘was part of  a more general movement throughout the nineteenth century to 
bring serious studies of  human behaviour into a new framework of  empirical investigation, 
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for which the natural sciences provided the exemplars’ (Harris 1981, p.37) and it is Robins’ 
opinion that throughout the twentieth century ‘the emotionally felt obligation shared by all 
participants [i.e. linguists] has been and remains conceiving and developing linguistics as a 
science’ (Robins 1997, p.241). 
1.2.4 The Formalist Attitude and initial problems 
As I have indicated, one possible motivation for allying linguistics to the natural sciences 
was the desire for respectability and recognition of  the discipline as a science. Such 
attitudes among linguists are understandable given the prevailing conception of  science and 
of  scientificity we have seen. Like other professionals engaged in a knowledge-generating 
enterprise, linguists wanted their endeavours to yield results that are interesting and 
intellectually credible and that would encourage further research. In seeking intellectual 
credibility linguists were influenced by these prevailing standards. As has been pointed out 
in terms of  the neogrammarians, ‘Their proposition...[of  sound laws] was in itself  only a 
culmination of  successively greater rigour applied to the material of  comparative-historical 
linguistics, but it fitted well with the nineteenth-century natural scientists’ belief  in the 
uniformity of  nature.’ (Robins in Parret (ed.) 1976, p.24).
While one can offer plausible sociological and historical explanations of how 
‘normal science’ functions and how it informs knowledge-generating activity at any 
particular time, this is a separate matter from a discipline’s ability to provide true insights 
into its object of  knowledge. No matter how inevitable or well explained a position may 
appear, it is still open to philosophical and scientific criticism of  its methods and 
presuppositions.  
The scientificity of  linguistics continues to be a matter of  concern (Wasow 1985,
Halle and Higginbotham 1986, Chomsky 1995, 2000, 2002, Seuren 2004) and one way in 
which a properly scientific linguistics is seen to be achieved is by having a clearly delimited 
object of  knowledge (Nse). As was seen with Saussure however, the justification for the 
delimitation contains a subjective element that potentially threatens the stability of  the 
delimitation. As Bugarski claims, for linguistics in the mid twentieth century,
The basis of  external limitations [on the boundaries of  linguistics] was in principle 
fairly simple...[however] there grew a feeling among linguists of  this period that the 
authentic object of  their science was language in itself. But...it is by no means easy 
to determine exactly what “language in itself ” might be as the subject matter of  
linguistics (Bugarski in Parret (ed.) 1976, p.2). 
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The problem that Bugarski identifies for linguistics is twofold. As is noted, it is not obvious 
how ‘language in itself ’ is to be identified in such a way as to justify the external limitations 
of  linguistics. Another problem is that if  one accepts a subjective element in the 
formulation of  the object of  knowledge, there is licence to change the object of  
knowledge arbitrarily. This problem is clear in Saussure’s attitude towards his object of  
study not being given in advance. 
Indeed the desire for scientific status manifests itself  in the conception of  the 
object of  knowledge and one does not have to adopt Saussure’s position to see that 
approaches motivated by the desire to make linguistics scientific are interestingly mutually 
implicated. As mentioned earlier, it can be the desire to be sufficiently ‘scientific’ that 
informs the object of  knowledge. For Saussure, the subjective specification of  the object 
allowed for the adoption of a properly scientific method, which made linguistics scientific. 
Though one need not see the object of  knowledge as subjectively specifiable, but may
rather identify the natural sciences as models of  successful enquiry and so adopt them. 
Here the result is similar: only an object of  knowledge amenable to these standards is 
admissible. Finally, one may desire a high level of  specificity and exactitude in the object of  
knowledge and turn to the natural sciences as a way in which to ensure this. Again the 
result is that language becomes defined in light of  the standards of  objects of  knowledge 
in the natural sciences.
As with organicism, the neogrammarians and Saussure, what language is deemed to 
be varies. Despite this, there is similarity in attitudes toward the scientificity of  linguistics, 
especially with the desire to strongly delimit language as an object of  enquiry; a similarity 
that I will call the Formalist Attitude. I call this an ‘attitude’ because it denotes underlying 
assumptions about the nature of  linguistics; assumptions that can be shared in spite of  
other substantial differences and disagreements. Identifying this attitude is important 
because its assumptions are at the root of  several abiding problems in linguistics; 
assumptions that continue to inform linguistics, as I will go on to show. By pointing out 
these problems it will be possible firstly to avoid them and secondly, through the lessons 
learned, to contribute to a positive account of  the scientific status of  linguistics and the 
nature of  language. 
Members of  the Formalist Attitude hold that linguistics is a natural science or that 
it is especially associated with the natural sciences. They also hold the following:  
23
A) If  linguistics is to be a science, it should attempt, as far as is possible, to model itself  
upon the natural sciences.
In addition, the Formalist Attitude can, but need not be, made stronger with the addition 
of  the following:
B) If  linguistics cannot meet a similarity of standards with the natural sciences, then 
linguistics is not a science.
Though B reflects the opinions of  some neogrammarians, it is a too negative and 
unrepresentative position to be of  use to the diagnostic and constructive programme that 
this thesis will engage in. In addition, there is the matter of  cashing out similarity of  
standards to the natural sciences that would be sufficient. A weaker corollary of  A is:
C) To the extent that linguistics fails to model itself  on the natural sciences, it becomes less 
scientific.
I will argue the Formalist Attitude consists of  A and C and the belief  that linguistics is a 
natural science or is especially related to the natural sciences. With organicism, the 
neogrammarians and Saussure, there is an explicit desire to associate linguistics with the 
natural sciences in line with the criteria for science put forward in 1.2. This justifies the 
proposal of  A as an informative generalisation. For C, we should remember claims by the 
likes of  Sapir: ‘[linguistics’] data and methods show better than those of  any other 
discipline dealing with socialized behaviour the possibility of  a truly scientific study of  
society’ (Sapir 1929, p.207) and of  Koerner that linguistics can act as a model for the social 
sciences. If  linguistics’ similarity to the natural sciences makes it a model for the social 
sciences, something like C is strongly suggested. As we will presently see with Chomsky, his 
scepticism about the scientificity of  the social sciences presupposes C.    
The immediate aim in identifying the Formalist Attitude is to foreground a 
particular understanding of  what constitutes a science and what it means for linguistics to 
be a science. Central to this understanding is the principle of  a strictly delimited object of  
knowledge (NSe) that allows for or is informed by, an adoption of  standards seen as 
appropriately scientific (see above and 1.2). In such cases the object of  knowledge is
shaped by perceived standards of  scientificity, not vice versa. 
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While it can be granted that this must to some extent be inevitable as objects of  
knowledge do not simply appear to the investigator ex nihilo, there is a worry that the 
shaping of  the object of  knowledge to meet with particular prescriptive standards leads to 
an unjustified exclusion of  facts about that object. The desire to maintain the delimitation 
of  the object (and therefore the scientific status of  the discipline) may lead to the unfruitful 
pursuit of  interesting questions or the uninteresting pursuit of  bad questions. For example, 
as is now widely acknowledged (Robins 1997, Morpurgo-Davies 1998, Seuren 1998) the 
neogrammarian insistence on the exceptionlessness of  sound laws was incorrect and led to 
implausible strategies, such as citing analogy to explain away counter-instances, in an effort 
to maintain this position. Recall Leskien: ‘If  one admits optional, contingent, and 
unconnected changes, one is basically stating the object of  one’s research, language, is not 
amenable to scientific recognition’ (Cited in Robins, 1997, p.208).   
An appropriate way of  investigating and analysing the claims of  the Formalist 
Attitude would be to ask the following questions:
1) What is the characterisation of  the object of  knowledge, O, for a theory T?
2) Is the characterisation O amenable to study in the manner which theory T claims 
for O? 
For both linguistics and the philosophy of  linguistics the question can be stated as follows: 
What is a language? And what is the best available characterisation of  the object of  
knowledge for linguistics? This is a challenge for the Formalist Attitude and to any position 
that would begin to offer a positive account in its place. 
I will argue that the Formalist Attitude fails to meet its own standards of  
scientificity and that its construal of  the object of  knowledge is doomed due to an over 
reliance on the tenets of  natural science. The rest of  this chapter focuses on two 
contemporary answers to the question ‘What is a language?’ that can be seen as 
manifestations of  the Formalist Attitude. First we examine Chomsky and generativism,
whose conception of  language and linguistics shares much with the examples so far 
labelled as representative of  the Formalist Attitude. Second, I look more closely at 
Saussure’s theory of  language, specifically how it is famously treated by Derrida, a 
philosopher whose approach to language and attitude towards linguistics is ostensibly 
opposed to the Formalist Attitude. By looking at such apparently dissimilar positions 
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concerning language and linguistics, it will be shown that there are common problems in
the way that language is conceived in both cases; problems which are the result of  an over-
reliance on the model of  the natural sciences (the A and C of  the Formalist Attitude). 
1.3 Chomsky and the attainment of  natural science
My argument in this section develops in four stages. In the first stage I delineate and 
explain two consistent and related aspects of  the Chomskian programme (hereafter ‘the 
programme’): (1) The conception of  linguistics as a science and (2) the nature and scope of  
the faculty of  language (FL) and universal grammar (UG). This will provide a platform in 
the second stage to draw out some of  the claims associated with 1 and 2; namely, a) that 
concepts are innate and b) that linguistics should be modelled on the natural sciences. In
the third stage I will argue that claim a) drawn from the background of  1 and 2 is 
problematic for the programme. In the fourth stage I will argue that claim b) drawn from 
the same background is likewise problematic.
To begin, an outline of  the programme which is a paradigmatic instance of  the 
Formalist Attitude is appropriate. Unlike Pieter Seuren’s Chomsky's Minimalism (2004), which 
approaches the minimalist programme as a practising linguist as well as a philosopher, my 
attention will focus on some important philosophical premises of  the programme and 
avoid talking specifically about the minimalist programme. Essentially, Chomsky’s 
minimalist programme proposes that all languages are unified in being derived from a 
single grammatical system and that this system is ‘perfect’ or near perfect; maximally simple 
for the functions required of  it (Chomsky 1995). As the propositions of  the minimalist 
programme are in keeping with the general tenor and claims of  the programme, I will not 
focus on the minimalist programme, though my references will be weighted towards 
Chomsky’s more recent work which will necessarily touch on the minimalist programme. 
As there is significant overlap between the programme and the minimalist programme, I 
will consider them as one.   
I shall put into question some of  the founding assumptions of  the programme, in 
particular its object of  knowledge and its conception of  linguistics as a science. These, I 
will show, are paradigmatic expressions of  the Formalist Attitude. I will show not only that 
the Chomskian programme fails to meet the standards of  natural science that it sets itself, 
but also that this failure shows that the core assumption of  what I called the Formalist 
Attitude is the source of  the problem. 
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1.3.1 Galilean Style and the Faculty of  Language
That theorists and scientists can and do set boundaries around their enquiries is 
uncontroversial. Boundary-setting is a methodological necessity in the sciences and evident 
throughout its history and is attested to in the keenness of  linguists to delimit their field of  
enquiry (1.1). In delimiting an object of  enquiry, it can sometimes be that arguments over 
the nature of  objects of  knowledge (‘language’, ‘matter’, ‘organ’, ‘recession’) rest in a 
difference in terminology and so are not interesting philosophically. Legitimate 
disagreement needs the respective parties to recognise what each other are (and are not) 
talking about. As such to engage with a theory T about object O, one must first accept the 
definition of  O offered by T. By ‘accept’ I do not mean agree upon, rather just see that 
one’s arguments address T’s account of  O, not some other object O*. Failure to do this 
may highlight only superficial issues that can be defused by rebranding O as O1, O2 and so 
on. For example, this occurs in Naming and Necessity (Kripke 1981, p.108), where Kripke 
invokes ‘schmidentity’ in place of  ‘identity’ in order to talk of  self-relational necessary 
predicates. The point is that it matters not what Kripke calls self-relational predicates, what 
matters is that he is clear how one account of  identity differs from another. 
In order to engage with Chomsky, it will be necessary to show where he sees 
linguistics within the framework of  the sciences, what he thinks of  as ‘language’ and to 
address problems with his understanding of  it. In his more recent writings (Chomsky 1995, 
2000, 2002) Chomsky has supported the ‘Galilean style’ (hereafter GS) of  scientific 
theorising
17
as an appropriate framework on which to base linguistics. GS emphasises a 
number of  things that Chomsky sees as valuable for scientific study in general and so too 
for the scientific study of  language. One emphasis of  GS is ‘The recognition that it is the 
abstract systems that you are constructing that are really the truth; the array of  phenomena 
is some distortion of  the truth because of  too many factors’ (Chomsky 2002, p.99). 
Accepting trans-phenomenality, GS refuses data at the expense of  preserving theory, 
claiming that counter-examples do not entail the abandonment of  a theory because even 
the most successful scientific theories have data which provides counter-examples.  
Another emphasis of  GS is its lack of  concern with intuitive or common sense 
ways in which we engage with and understand the world. For example in his essay
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‘Language as a Natural Object’, Chomsky argues that for GS, ‘the search for theoretical 
understanding pursues its own paths, leading to a completely different picture of  the world, 
which neither vindicates nor eliminates our ordinary ways of  talking and thinking’ 
(Chomsky 2002, p.115). This emphasis on counter-phenomenality has its paradigm case in 
the Galilean proposition of  a heliocentric view of  the universe which put into question the 
common-sense perception of  the sun ‘rising’ and ‘setting’, which conformed to a 
geocentric view. Chomsky sees GS as the orthodox position of  the natural sciences.
Chomsky also sees GS as applicable to linguistics and this is a principal way in 
which he casts his study within the mould of  the natural sciences. While GS does not 
necessarily lead to the Formalist Attitude, it is the case that Chomsky holds A and C and 
sees linguistics as a natural science. Informed by GS, Chomsky views his object of  
knowledge differently from a common-or-garden understanding, restricting ‘language’ to 
mean the ‘I-language’ of  an individual. As Chomsky puts it;
The language organ is the faculty of  language (FL); the theory of  the initial state of  
FL, an expression of  genes, is universal grammar (UG); theories of  states attained are 
particular grammars; the states themselves are internal languages, “languages” for 
short (Chomsky 2002, p.64). 
The faculty of  language then is a module that contains the universal grammar, a set of  
highly specified rules and parameters from which the stabilised state is attained. This 
stabilised state is the I-language, about which Chomsky makes the following claims,
[The I-language] resembles what is called “a language” in ordinary usage, but only 
partially: we are no longer surprised when notions of  common sense find no place 
in the effort to understand and explain the phenomena they deal with in their own 
ways, another achievement of  the Galilean revolution, now taken for granted in the 
hard sciences (Chomsky 2002, p.47).
Though not a concern for linguistics, Chomsky recognises the value of  common-sense 
language terms for what he terms ‘ethnoscience’ or ‘folk psychology’. Ethnoscience and 
folk psychology are another term for the social sciences. Common sense terms like the 
putatively supra-individual entities ‘English’, ‘Japanese’, which Chomsky refers to as E-
languages, implicitly opposing them to I-languages. Pateman has defined E-languages, with 
Chomsky’s approval, as ‘an (intentional) object of  (mutual) belief, appropriately studied 
hermeneutically within a sociology of  language’ (Pateman 1987, p.73). Chomsky claims in 
terms of  naturalistic enquiry, E-languages ‘are of  little interest for the effort to understand 
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what language is and how it is used’, and that ‘alleged community properties can only lead 
to confusion’ (Chomsky 2000, p.100). For Chomsky then the enquiry into language is a 
solely internalist one, E-languages being an inappropriate subject matter for linguistics.
In addition and also following GS, Chomsky sees the study of  linguistics as having 
little to do with speech as, ‘In natural language there is something in the head, which is the 
computational system. The generative system is something real, as real as the liver; the 
utterances generated are like an epiphenomenon’ (Chomsky 2002, p.111). Unsurprisingly, 
what goes for speech goes too for communication, as possession of  language ‘need not 
involve communication or even the attempt to communicate’ (Chomsky 1971, p.16). For 
linguistics the phenomena of  speech and communication are only useful insofar as they tell 
us about the generative mechanism(s) underlying the act itself, the generative mechanism 
being UG of  which the I-language is the realised steady state. As one prominent 
commentator has put it, for Chomsky ‘the central purpose of  linguistics is to construct a 
deductive theory of  the structure of  human language which is at once sufficiently general 
to apply to all languages’ (Lyons 1991, p.128).
This position motivates another aspect of  what Chomsky sees linguistics, informed 
by GS, doing; marking a formative distinction between descriptive adequacy and 
explanatory adequacy
18
. Descriptive adequacy is what a speaker knows when they know a 
language, that is, potentially all the possible sentences that the individual’s I-language could 
produce
19
. Explanatory adequacy is how they know this and it is this transcendentally
framed question that Chomsky is primarily interested in and answers with the proposal of  
UG, FL and I-language as putatively fulfilling explanatory adequacy.
It is clear that Chomsky claims that linguistics has several relations to the model of  
natural science that I outlined above (NSa-NSe) through his association of  the programme 
to GS. Firstly, what Chomsky sees as his ultimate object of  study, UG, is universal and as 
we have seen with the minimalist programme, all linguistic phenomena should optimally 
reduce to a universal set of  rules stipulated by UG. In this, Chomsky allies linguistics with 
NSa. Second, UG is the sole explanatory framework for I-languages and so NSb is met. 
Third, the claim for the Chomskian programme that ‘much of  the variability [of  languages] 
dissolves and we are left with a residue of  a few elementary parameters’ (Belletti and Rizzi 
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terminology as the Performance/Competence distinction.
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Chomsky has defined E-language as ‘a set of well-formed sentences’ (Chomsky 1986, p.29), though 
in more recent writings E-language is seen not only as a descriptive set, but also a social object. Here 
both understandings of E-language would be refused by Chomsky, though E-language-as-set is the 
target.
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in Chomsky 2002, p.20) suggests the ability to empirically test these claims, so there is an 
association with NSd (see 1.3.4 for more). Fourth, the disavowal of  the importance of  
communication and social accounts of  language as an object of  knowledge allows for a 
strict delimitation of  the object of  knowledge, one that is based solely on the universal 
structures of  the brain (NSe). As such, insofar as it was appropriate to see the 
neogrammarians and early structuralists subscribing to the Formalist Attitude, so too can 
Chomsky.
1.3.2 Problems with Chomskian linguistics
The task here is to show that problems confronted by Chomskian linguistics can be traced 
to claims A and C that characterise the Formalist Attitude. To offer substantive criticism of  
Chomsky and not merely to tinker with terminological issues we must examine Chomsky’s 
understanding of  language and how the scope of  his linguistics is motivated by a faulty 
philosophy of  science and language. 
Part of  the generativist argument for the existence of  FL is made by means of  a 
poverty of  stimulus argument. This is familiar to anyone versed with Chomsky but will 
bear repeating as it underpins how Chomsky sees the function of  explanatory adequacy in 
his theory. The poverty of  stimulus argument goes as follows; as children develop language 
with only minimal empirical exposure to speech, there must exist 1) a language acquisition 
device (LAD) from which the FL develops into a particular steady state (the I-language) 
and 2) there is a Universal Grammar (UG) that delimits the selection of  grammars or 
‘theories’ from the paucity of  available empirical data. Both 1 and 2 require that, at the very 
least, the ability to acquire a language is in some sense innate. In some sense, these are 
uncontroversial claims, as it is undeniable that there is something to be said about the fact 
that humans, not rocks, clouds or cordyceps fungi, have language. 
This is however a far weaker claim than those generally advanced by Chomsky. For 
example, the claim for UG 2) can be viewed as making two different claims, one harmless 
and the other possibly problematic:
2a) Due to the constitution of  the human brain, there are limits as to what a language 
could be. UG constitutes the set of  these limits and possibilities.
2b) UG is fixed in such a way that I-languages are in an interesting and substantive sense 
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identical. Mind-external and environmental factors should therefore not play a part in 
linguistics as language is a ‘biological object’ (Smith in Chomsky 2000, viii).   
If  Chomsky holds 2a) then this is uncontroversial. It is clear though that Chomsky holds 
2b) when he claims for example that, ‘knowledge of  these properties [lexical items with 
complex semantic structure] becomes available on very limited evidence and, accordingly, 
would be expected to be essentially uniform among languages’ (Chomsky 2002, p.86). This 
can also be seen in Chomsky’s thought experiment concerning Martians or Angels coming 
to earth and witnessing human language. Here, it is Chomsky’s contention that ‘from an 
angel’s point of  view, all languages would appear identical, apart from trivialities’ (in 
Martinich (ed.) 2008 p.687). This is clear evidence of  2b).
For Chomsky, a theory of  language aiming at EA should not admit assumptions 
other than those based on innateness and internal factors. This constitutes the scope of  
internalist enquiry that ‘aim[s] at exploring the mind rather than the environment’ (Cook 
and Newson 2007, p.21). The poverty of  stimulus argument is one motivation for this 
position, but there is another linked argument that supports the Formalist Attitude. This
concerns the question of  underdetermination of  theory by evidence. There are two strands 
I want to distinguish. Strand one concerns Chomsky’s dispute with Quine (1960, in Katz 
ed.) 1985) concerning extensionally equivalent grammars, grammars that characterise or 
generate the same set of  sentences. Here, the worry for Chomsky is that if  one accepts the 
conclusion that descriptively adequate grammars (DAGs) give us no reason to choose 
between grammars then ‘the question of  truth and falsity does not arise’ (Chomsky 1986, 
p.20). According to Quine, it is due to this that the linguist can only ‘turn to that last refuge 
of  all scientists, the appeal to internal simplicity of  his growing system’ (Quine in Katz 
(ed.) 1985, p.61). If  this is the case then Chomsky’s claim to be explaining real human 
faculties and brain structures would be in jeopardy. Against this, Chomsky argues that ‘in 
the absence of  such [innate] structure, observed behaviour will lead to no knowledge of  
language’ (Chomsky 2000, p.60). The idea is that if  there is no fact of  the matter about 
what humans have in their brains that allows them to acquire language, one cannot hope to 
explain the difference between humans and rocks, clouds or cordyceps fungi that would 
account for the one having language and the others not. This transcendental argument 
commits him to an understanding of  language that is not simply the result of  practical 
natural-scientific methodology, but something more metaphysically ambitious. I will return 
to this in section three. Therefore Chomsky argues that underdetermination of  a theory by 
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evidence is compatible with there being truth and falsity about theories: ‘Two distinct I-
languages might, in principle, have the same structure, though as a matter of  empirical fact, 
human language may happen not to permit this to happen’ (Chomsky 1995, p.15). 
The second strand concerning the issue of  underdetermination relates to 
Chomsky’s scepticism of  induction influenced by Hume (Chomsky 1975, pp.204-206). As 
we saw of  the minimalist program, Chomsky proposes UG as internal, universal and 
‘perfect’ (Chomsky 1995). This sits neatly with scepticism about induction and his derision 
of  the idea that children learn language and concepts ‘by “induction” or whatever’ 
(Chomsky, 2000, p.56). This is because there is no requirement of  induction in learning a 
language and so Chomsky is given grounds to propose (or presuppose) entities (FL, UG) 
that are given, following Hume’s phrase, by ‘the hand of  nature’ (Hume 1975 [1777], p.108) 
Here then, there is strong motivation for holding 2b and as well as this, Chomsky can 
maintain compatibility between underdetermination with true and false DAGs because 
there are facts to be explained about the human capacity for language, facts that imply 
certain DAGs but not others.  
Chomsky’s scepticism of  induction and his holding of  2b) are problematic and
showing this to be the case will both jeopardise his claims for the scientific status of  
linguistics and show these problems are linked to the holding of  the A and C of  the 
Formalist Attitude. In order to do this, I will look at Chomsky’s argument that concepts
and their accompanying semantic representation in FL are innate. 
1.3.2 Acquisition and innate concepts
The subject of  innate concepts is a notoriously controversial and arguably weak
20
aspect of  
Chomsky’s theory. One may then ask why I am not engaging with the claims about the 
nature syntactic phenomena, which are both more central to the generativist project and 
arguably more plausible. One reason is that my aim is to show the extent to which 
Chomsky wishes to preserve the scope of  his enquiry as a strictly internalist one, 
something that leads him to give support to his philosophically problematic belief  in innate 
concepts. If  it can be shown that the theoretical purview of  his project is problematic, then 
this affects the theory globally and thus puts into question Chomsky’s claims about the 
scientificity of  linguistics. That is, my focus concerns some presuppositions of  Chomsky’s 
theory and their philosophical credibility. As Chomsky’s syntactic theory is at least partly an 
                                                
20
Though a qualified version of it has been developed and defended by Steven Pinker in The Stuff of 
Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature (2007). 
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empirical matter, this is secondary to my concerns. 
Now, Chomsky makes a familiar claim about the process of  the development of  
the I-language:
FL attains state L [an I-language] with little if  any effect of  instruction, training, or 
decision, passing through characteristic stages and partially stabilizing at fixed 
periods. To borrow Hume’s phrase, “the operations of  the mind, which precede
reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it” (Chomsky 2000, p.170. Quote 
from Hume, 1975 [1777], p.178).     
He also sees the development of  the conceptual system, containing ‘I-concepts’, as 
essentially innate: 
This is the way we learn language. We simply learn the label that goes with the 
preexisting concept. So in other words, it is as if  the child, prior to any experience, 
has a long list of  concepts like “climb,” and then the child is looking at the world to 
figure out which sound goes with which concept (Chomsky 1988, p.191).
At peak periods of  language acquisition, children are acquiring (“learning”) many 
words a day...they are acquiring words on very few exposures, even just one. This 
would appear to indicate that the concepts are already available, with much or all of  
their intricacy and structure predetermined, and that the child's task is to assign 
labels to concepts, as might be done with limited evidence given sufficiently rich 
innate structure (Chomsky 2000, p.61).
Such is the intuitive implausibility of  his belief  in innate concepts, which Chomsky accepts 
has been seen as ‘completely unacceptable, even absurd’ (Chomsky 2000, p.65), I want to 
offer a few quotations to show that Chomsky does hold that concepts are innate. For 
example, when discussing Putnam’s argument against innate concepts that ‘evolution would 
have had to be able to anticipate all the contingencies of  future physical and cultural 
environments. Obviously it didn’t and can’t do this’ (Putnam 1988, p.15) Chomsky replies:
To suppose that, in the course of  evolution, humans had come to have an innate 
stock of  notions including carburettor and bureaucrat does not entail that evolution 
was able to anticipate every future physical and cultural contingency- only these 
contingencies (Chomsky 2000, p.65).
It is clear that Chomsky does believe that even complicated and historically specific
concepts are innate. To dispute that concepts are innate constitutes an attack that falls 
within the scope of  what Chomsky calls ‘language’ and would meet on Chomsky’s chosen 
ground. While I believe Putnam’s objection to innate ideas is a good one, Chomsky does 
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not and so I will pursue another line of  argument against innate ideas that does not rely on 
Chomsky’s rejection of  Putnam’s objection.
Now to my argument. Let us say that Johnny, a child at the height of  his language 
acquisition powers, lives in a family with an Alsatian dog. Johnny has, by means of  few or a 
single exposure, labelled this dog a ‘dog’; that is, matched up his I-concept with the 
phonetic representation [dɒg]. One day, Johnny is out in the park with his father and he 
comes across a Yorkshire Terrier with a skin problem. He says to his father ‘Look, a dog’, 
to which his father responds ‘That’s not a dog, it’s a rat.’ Here then is the dilemma. If  
Johnny has the I-concept ‘dog’, he should be able to understand that his father is speaking 
non-literally because the Yorkshire Terrier is indeed a dog. But of  course there is no 
guarantee that Johnny will understand this as both children and even adults can fail to 
understand sarcasm. This likelihood should already put us in doubt as to the viability of  I-
concepts.
But to press home the point let us continue. Let us say that Johnny does not 
understand the sarcasm but instead re-labels his I-concept ‘dog’ with the phonetic 
representation ‘rat’. This move keeps his I-concept uniform and only requires a small 
change in its phonetic representation. As he is walking home from the park however, he 
spots a large rat and asks his father what it is called. He is told ‘That is a rat’. Now again, if  
Johnny has the I-concept ‘dog’ phonetically represented as ‘rat’ he should understand that 
his father is being non-literal here, but of  course his father is being literal. Anyway, we 
might say, Johnny does not understand sarcasm in the first place. However, if  he does not 
take the comment on seeing the rat to be sarcastic, it is hard to know what Johnny should 
do. He cannot label his I-concept ‘rat’ with the phonetic representation [ræt], because the 
phonetic representation ‘rat’ is now joined with the I-concept ‘dog’ and his father has told 
him that a dog is not a rat. To reiterate, the only thing that Johnny can do now is to include 
the rat he saw as a member of  the I-concept ‘dog’. But he cannot do this because, on the 
conceptual level, he knows that a dog and a rat are different things. Given his I-concepts 
then, Johnny has nowhere to go and for this reason, I-concepts cannot exist. Moreover, 
even if  children did acquire a new word on a single exposure, it would have to be shown 
that they were in possession of  the concept, rather than a chance or very context-specific 
understanding of  when the term might be appropriate. For example, a child may say ‘bird’ 
when they see a bird in the sky, but if  they then say ‘bird’ when they see a kite, plane, 
helicopter or cloud, then they have not understood what a ‘bird’ is and cannot be ascribed 
as having the concept ‘bird’. Again the fact that such things happen speaks against I-
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concepts.
It appears that what Chomsky understands as I-concepts either do not exist or 
Chomsky has failed to adequately explain what they are. Part of  the problem is that we do 
not know what kind of  internalist criteria Johnny’s I-language has to meet for him to be 
said to have the I-concept ‘dog’. Hitherto, the use of  ‘I-concept’ although part of  a 
technical vocabulary, presumably seeks to explain what a ‘concept’ is, rather than to offer a 
prescriptive technical term that would have an arbitrary bearing on the matter. If  ‘I-
concept’ is just such a prescriptive specification, then this is dogma rather than 
investigation. These arguments against I-concepts suggest that having a concept is not an 
all or nothing thing. If  we allow that concepts can change and indeed can be corrected, 
then we accept that the attainment of  a concept relies on social, normative criteria without 
necessary or sufficient conditions about what will count as having a concept. For example, 
I can buy a pot of  hummus for lunch and wax lyrical about the virtues of  its taste and 
texture. This would require that I know a fair amount about hummus; if  I did this I would 
show myself  to have the concept ‘hummus’. However, I could still lack the knowledge that 
hummus is made from chickpeas and have a concept of  hummus that will be fit for use in 
many contexts. If  I were informed that hummus is made from chickpeas this would be 
informative and might change my concept, though this would require that my concept is 
open to change and defeasible. 
There are more sophisticated and qualified versions of  innate ideas from a 
generativist perspective. For example, Pinker supports a qualified theory of  ‘basic’ innate 
concepts and holds that ‘concepts like “cause” and “motion” really are basic concepts of  
our cognitive toolbox…saying that some concepts are basic and possibly innate, is not a 
slippery slope toward saying all concepts are innate’ (Pinker 12007, p.107). However, it is 
worth noting that even if  some concepts are ‘basic’, for example in the sense of  their being 
necessary for the acquisition of  other concepts, or in their acquisition being apparent at an 
early stage of  development, this does not imply they are innate, something which Pinker 
himself  notes. This then is a different claim from that of  Chomsky and moreover one that 
would not offer much of  a defence for Chomsky’s theoretical purview. As such I pursue it 
no further.
For Chomsky it seems, concepts must be an all or nothing affair. It will be 
remembered that he claims that ‘much or all of  their intricacy and structure predetermined’ 
(Chomsky 2000, p.61). Were he to drop the predetermination claim, he would have to give 
up the study of  language from an internalist perspective as impossible, or at least he would 
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have to abandon some of  the theoretical ambitions for generativism, including its 
association with the natural sciences as he sees it.
1.3.3 Natural science and place of  linguistics
We have already observed a problem for Chomskian linguistics in terms of  the scope of  
internalist enquiry and with that, the potential for linguistics to be a natural science in the 
way Chomsky wishes it. To be in a position to make the kind of  claim for innate concepts 
required by the programme, one would have either to change the scope of  enquiry which 
may make it less in-line with the natural sciences, or simply give up certain claims (I-
concepts, modular theory of  mind) which would lessen its intellectual appeal as a fruitful 
area of  investigation. Either way, the scientificity of  the programme is put in question.
I cited earlier Chomsky’s scepticism concerning induction as one of  the reasons for 
his commitment to innate ideas. I now argue such scepticism is problematic
21
. Let us recall 
Hume’s argument against induction. Hume argues that causation is a constant conjunction
of  events (such that whenever A then B) and that ‘The constant conjunction of  our 
resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the one are the causes of  the other 
(Hume 1969 [1739/40], p.53). As such, knowledge of  causation relies on knowledge of  
constant conjunctions (see 2.3). Any enquiry not falling under a priori ‘relations of  ideas’, 
such as geometry and mathematics falls into ‘matters of  fact’ and are open to question by 
counterfactual possibilities: ‘The contrary of  every matter of  fact is still possible, because it 
doesn’t imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and 
distinctness, as if  ever so conformable to reality’ (Hume 1975 [1777], p.25). In its strongest 
form the position is, ‘no constant conjunctions, no knowledge of  causation’. As every act 
of  induction is open to counterfactual possibilities, such acts will find it very difficult to 
meet the criterion of  a constant conjunction and so will fail to provide us with knowledge 
of  cause and effect.  
Chomsky’s proposal of  FL and other generative mechanisms is at odds with this 
view. There are two reasons. First, it is clear that Hume himself  would see the postulation 
of  FL as wrong because ‘From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects. This 
is the sum of  all our experimental conclusions’ (Hume 1975 [1777], p.25). Also; ‘on what 
                                                
21
This has been touched on in 1.1. It is worth noting that on the subject of acquisition and innate 
faculties Chomsky claims his stance ‘is much in accord with traditional rationalist conceptions and 
even, in some respects, the so called “empiricist” thought of James Harris, David Hume, and others’ 
(Chomsky 2000, p.64). 
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process of  argument is this inference [between sensible qualities and secret powers] founded? 
Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of  each 
other?’ (Hume 1975 [1777], p.37). Of  course the latter quote is rhetorical, Hume thought 
there could be no such ‘medium’ because any such proposal was open to counterfactual 
possibility. If  Chomsky is sceptical about induction then he has to explain how his 
scepticism permits him to propose such structures as FL and UG.
My second reason for thinking there is a tension is because Chomsky seems to 
need to endorse induction in some form
22
. If  he wants to get his theoretic postulates off  
the ground as respectable elements within his linguistics, he has to rely on empirical data 
and these, as ‘matters of  fact’ are open to counterfactual instances. Indeed, this is just what 
is implied by GS in terms of  its acceptance of  counter-phenomenality and of  the 
transfactual efficacy of  such mechanisms (1.3.1). That Chomsky sees FL as a transfactual 
mechanism is beyond doubt and he uses the example of  a man who, struck dumb,
nevertheless maintains his knowledge of  language, but loses his ability to speak it to make 
just this point (Chomsky 2000, p51)
23
. As linguist Peter Jones notes, ‘the theoretical 
abstractions of  the scientist, to be sure, are not the result of  induction from sense data 
(although induction does form a part of  the process of  scientific thinking) but they are, 
nonetheless, worked up -worked out- from available data’ (Jones in Cruickshank (ed.) 2003, 
p.98). Chomsky’s reading of  Hume appears to be selective and problematic. While Hume 
accepted that the mind did reach conclusions from experience, the fact that the premises 
such conclusions are based on do not entail these conclusions required the postulation of  
an explanatory medium about which Hume was suspicious:
There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, 
if  indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must 
confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who 
assert that it really exists and is the origin of  all our conclusions concerning matters 
of  fact (Hume 1975 [1777], p.34).
Scepticism about induction makes it difficult for one to claim the kinds of  generative 
mechanisms that generativism requires. On the one hand, part of  what makes UG and FL 
have plausibility as objects that can be studied from a purely internalist perspective is 
motivated by scepticism about induction. On the other hand, Chomsky is unsceptical about 
the rich and innate structures that constitute knowledge of  language and his theoretical 
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I discuss this issue further in 2.3.2.  
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postulates presuppose an inductive process which is ruled out by Hume. The problem is 
that if  Chomsky were to allow a place for induction in the language acquisition process, 
then it would be difficult to refuse to include within his linguistics reference to factors such 
as context, language use and more broadly, communication. If  this were the case then the 
scope of  internalist enquiry would be unfeasible and the claim of  linguistics to be a natural 
science would be problematised because the kind of  universal and general rules that 
Chomsky proposes as constituting UG could not be sustained. Chomsky’s assertion that 
the concepts of  social science ‘will not fall within the explanatory theories of  the 
naturalistic variety; not just now; but ever’ (Chomsky 2000, p.209) makes it clear that for 
him, such a result would be a disaster. Chomsky will not allow a place for social science 
within the domain of  linguistics. Leading on from this, I argue that Chomsky is guilty of  
dogma in his characterisation of  linguistics as a natural science and that as a result, the 
aspirations of  the Formalist Attitude of  which he is a member, fail. 
In 1.3.2, it was claimed that Chomsky held the following:
2b) UG is fixed and narrow in such a way that I-languages are (almost) identical. 
Mind-external and environmental factors should therefore not play a part in 
linguistics.
With this in mind, consider the following. Chomsky claims that the minimalist program is
based on:
Innumerable idealizations...We do not expect to find “pure instantiations” of  the 
initial state of  the language faculty (hence of  UG). Rather, Jones will have a jumble 
of  systems, based on the peculiar pattern of  his experience. The explanatory model 
outlined deals specifically with language acquisition under the idealized conditions 
of  a homogeneous speech community’ (Chomsky 1995 p.19). 
And in the same vein:
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with the ideal speak-listener, in a 
completely homogenous speech community, who knows its (the speech 
community’s) language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant 
conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts in attention and interest, and 
errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of  this language in 
actual performance (Chomsky 1965, p.3).
Troubling questions arise here that bring out the dogmatism as well as the limitations of  
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Chomsky’s view of  linguistics. In these concluding arguments, we will see that the 
limitations and dogmatism are ultimately a product of  Chomsky’s adherence to the 
Formalist Attitude. Considering the first quote above and given the idealisations in 
operation, it seems inevitable that ‘much of  the variability [of  languages] dissolves and we 
are left with a residue of  a few elementary parameters’ (Belletti and Rizzi in Chomsky 2002, 
p.20). This is because the idealised explanatory model sets a theory-internal series of  
stipulations which guarantee 2b. Therefore it is not clear that the model is referring to 
anything real because 2b is derived from a set of  stipulations whose bearing on the 
capacities of  real speakers is opaque at best
24
. A question is begged, namely: how does UG 
constrain and enable the acquisition of  linguistic knowledge? The Chomskian programme 
sets out explicitly to answer this question, though such stipulations mean it has already 
found its answers before starting to look. 
Second, we may wonder why one should not look at just that ‘peculiar pattern’ of  
experience that made Jones have the linguistic competence that he has. For Chomsky this 
would create a too heterogeneous field of  enquiry, one that would fail to meet the 
standards that he supposes are constitutive of  the appropriate level of  scientificity. Again, 
such a move would take us beyond the bounds of  internalist enquiry. Thirdly and most 
importantly, it is pertinent to ask if  the kinds of  idealisations which Chomsky assumes are
anything like those of  the natural sciences. Above, Chomsky implicitly relies on the 
paradigm of  laboratory conditions, where, to quote one Chomskian, ‘a finite set of  
identifiable and isolable agents or mechanisms are in operation’ (Pateman 1987, p.21). But 
to what extent are Chomsky’s idealisations applicable in this context? How is it that 
Chomsky can claim to be isolating something from the ‘jumble of  systems’ that all speakers 
have and which would pose a problem for the internalist enquiry of  UG?
Of  course, one can hold out hope that the cognitive sciences advance in such a way 
as to provide an experimentally closed system in which the idealisations Chomsky desires 
become available. But given that even Chomsky claims ‘No one knows the extent to which 
the specific properties of  human language are a consequence of  general biochemical laws 
applying to objects with general features of  the brain’ (Chomsky 2000, p.15), it is an 
indication that this has not been achieved. It is also indicative of  Chomsky’s idealisations 
being dogmatically driven rather than being part of  a robust and fruitful theoretical 
framework.  
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This also applies to innate concepts. If only the ‘ideal speaker-listener’ has innate concepts, then this is 
achieved by stipulation and it is hard to see how useful a claim this is. Though if Chomsky is making 
a claim that does apply to human beings then my argument against innate concepts holds.   
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Finally, Chomsky’s dogmatism and questionable view of  the scientificity of  
linguistics underpinning his programme are evident in an interview on the minimalist 
program. Chomsky was asked, ‘What kind of  empirical discovery could lead to the 
rejection of  the minimalist thesis?’ His response:
All the phenomena of  language appear to refute it, just as the phenomena of  the 
world appeared to refute the Copernican thesis. The question is whether it is a real 
refutation. At every stage of  every science most phenomena seem to refute it
(Chomsky 2002, p.124).  
By ‘phenomena’ Chomsky is referring to common-or-garden interpretations of  events or 
states which GS is disposed to reject. However, it is clear that Chomsky has avoided the 
question all together. He has not and does not answer what would constitute a refutation 
of  the minimalist program that he would accept. The question is what a ‘real refutation’ is 
and on that point, Chomsky will not be drawn. This is symptomatic of the problems 
concerned with Chomsky’s conception of  linguistics as a natural science and is evidence of  
a refusal to engage despite a tacit acceptance of  the pertinence of  the question. It is also 
evidence of a dogmatism that seeks to secure linguistics as a natural science at all costs. 
Chomsky’s attempt to view linguistics as one of  the natural sciences fails on its own terms.  
The postulation of  I-concepts does not sit happily with the purely internal scope of  his
enquiries and scepticism towards induction which provides motivation for UG and FL 
appears to presuppose induction. We saw in 1.3.1 how Chomsky subscribes to a number of  
the criteria of  natural science outlined in 1.2 and that he holds beliefs constitutive of  the 
Formalist Attitude (A and C). A question remains though concerning the extent to which 
Chomsky’s adherence to the Formalist Attitude is linked to some of  the problems we have 
so far seen. 
As I argued regarding linguistics of  the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
there was a desire to ascribe to a set of  principles seen as scientific, there is an 
accompanying danger that the shaping of  the object of  knowledge to meet with particular 
prescriptive standards can lead to an unjustified exclusion of  facts about that object. 
Indeed changes in the object of  knowledge imply changes in the scope of  the enquiry and 
so a threat to the conception of  the object of  knowledge can also be a threat to the 
perceived scientificity of  the enquiry.  Given Chomsky’s and Chomskians’ problematic 
insistence on the internal, closed and highly abstract nature of  their object of  knowledge, 
linked to their accompanying insistence on the irrelevance of  social accounts of  language 
to linguistics (ontologically and methodologically) and the added dogmatism in the 
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stipulation of  their theoretical domain; it becomes clear that the Chomskian programme’s 
desire for scientificity provides a series of  difficulties. So, one can conclude that the
adherence to the Formalist Attitude is linked to problems present in the programme.    
The Formalist Attitude can be seen as a source of  problems for at least one 
contemporary and influential account of  language and linguistics. This may not be 
surprising, as Chomsky and generativism in general have been criticised for an overly
abstract approach (Baker and Hacker 1984, Levinson in Gumperz and Levinson (eds.) 
1996, Seuren 2004, Evans and Green 2007). However, as I will now go on to argue, the 
Formalist Attitude is present and causes problems in less than obvious cases.
1.4 Derrida and linguistic science
Although my criticisms and presentation of  generativism as following a historically 
entrenched attitude in the study of  linguistics is new, that generativism has the objective of  
putting linguistics on a sufficiently scientific standing is widely recognised. The next 
theorist, however, has not been identified as being committed to the basic claims that make 
up the Formalist Attitude. Jacques Derrida, to whose views I now turn, is not an obvious 
proponent of  the view that linguistics should be modelled on the natural sciences. To argue 
this goes against the grain of  Derrida’s own professed philosophical objectives. First let me 
outline what some commentators see as these philosophical objectives
25
. Norris 
understands Derrida as arguing, 
[T]hat deconstruction is a rigorous attempt to think the limits of  that principle of  
reason which has shaped the emergence of  Western philosophy, science and 
technology at large…Thus the activity of  deconstruction is strictly inconceivable 
outside the tradition of  enlightened rational critique whose classic formulations are 
still found in Kant (Norris 1987, p.162). 
Rorty puts a different emphasis on Derrida’s enterprise,
To understand Derrida, one must see his work as the latest development in this 
non-Kantian, dialectical tradition-the latest attempt of  the dialecticians to shatter 
the Kantians’ ingenuous image of  themselves as accurately representing how things 
really are. Derrida talks a lot about language, and it is tempting to view him as a 
“philosopher  of  language”…But it would be less misleading to say that his writing 
about language is an attempt to show why there should be no philosophy  of  
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I rely on commentators due to Derrida’s characteristic prolixity and disinclination to be explicit about 
the aims and objectives of his philosophy. While not ideal, this has the advantage of additional clarity. 
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language (Rorty 1978, p.144). 
In an entry on Derrida in Key Thinkers in Linguistics and the Philosophy of  Language (2005), it is 
claimed,  
[Derrida thinks] the entire edifice of  Western thought is erected on the premise 
that speech or logos is anterior to writing, not only in the temporal sense of  order of  
acquisition but in a deeper, ontological sense…Western philosophy is unrepentantly 
‘logocentric’ (Rajagopalan in Chapman and Routledge (eds.) 2005, p.68).
While there are differences in views on Derrida’s philosophical project, at its most 
ambitious Derrida’s objectives question some fundamental assumptions and tenets of  
western philosophy. The pursuit of  these objectives is achieved by close analysis of  specific 
texts; their explicit and implicit commitments, their tensions and their style. As we will see, 
Derrida’s critiques of  texts often lead him to suspect and criticise the theoretical ambitions 
of  knowledge generating enterprises, especially in terms of  a desire for scientific objectivity 
and certainty. Therefore to claim that Derrida adheres to the Formalist Attitude goes 
against his philosophical objectives.
The argument progresses in three stages. I start by giving an account of  how 
Derrida sees writing functioning in language and linguistics and with respect to this, his 
criticism of  Saussure in chapter 2 of Grammatology, ‘Linguistics and Grammatology’. Having 
already shown how Saussure is a representative of  the Formalist Attitude (1.2.3), a 
discussion of  Saussure and Derrida is a useful way of  explaining the origin of  Derrida’s 
adherence to the Formalist Attitude due to his inheritance from Saussure of  a view of the
linguist’s object of  enquiry. I then examine Derrida’s argument against Saussure in the 
latter’s suppression of  writing and argue that speech, as well as writing, is problematically 
suppressed in Saussure’s theory. It becomes clear that Derrida also suppresses speech and 
this can be seen to be motivated by a Saussurean legacy which makes him consistent with 
the Formalist Attitude. In the third section I strengthen my account by showing Derrida’s
central thesis concerning the logocentric bias of  western philosophy and the accompanying 
claim concerning the suppression of  writing, leads him to deny the importance of  speech. 
It is in this denial that we see the clearest expression of  the Formalist Attitude.
  
1.4.1 Derrida, Saussure and writing
In Grammatology, Derrida has the central objective of  questioning the relation between 
42
speech and writing in the western tradition of  philosophy and science. It is Derrida’s thesis 
that speech has consistently taken precedence over writing in representing language and the 
concept of  language and this is due to what Derrida calls ‘logocentricism’. As Spivak 
explains it, logocentricism is, ‘the belief  that the first and last things are the Logos, the 
word...and closer to our time the self-presence of  full self  consciousness’ (Spivak in 
Derrida 1998, lxviii). Logocentricism is tied to the philosophical search for clarity and 
certainty.  
Derrida claims that despite the historical relationship between writing and speech 
that privileges the latter, there remains a consistent and often unacknowledged reliance on 
writing by those that assume its secondary or ancillary status:
[I]t seems as though the concept of  writing- no longer indicating a particular, 
derivative, auxiliary form of  language in general..., no longer designating the 
exterior surface, the insubstantial double of  a major signifier, the signifier of  the 
signifier- is beginning to go beyond the extension of  language. In all senses of  the 
word, writing thus comprehends language (Derrida 1998, pp.6-7). 
Therefore Derrida has a clear objective: ‘What I would wish to show is that one cannot 
exclude writing from the general experience of...[the structural relationship of  features of  
language]. Which amounts, of  course, to reforming the concept of  writing’ (Derrida 1998, 
p.55). 
An important part of  Derrida’s argument that writing is suppressed in favour of  
speech comes from his critique of  Saussurean linguistics in chapter two of Grammatology. 
Here, Derrida attacks Saussure in two ways. Firstly, he argues that Saussure is unable to 
discount writing as an efficacious and theoretically significant factor in a structuralist theory 
of  language. Derrida accuses Saussure of  internal inconsistency in his treatment of  the 
significance of  writing within the subject domain of  linguistics. Secondly, Derrida argues 
that the question of  the scientificity of  linguistics is problematised (in Saussure and 
beyond) by logocentric dogmas of  which Saussure is a representative. These dogmas leave 
telling discrepancies that can be exploited to show the unstable foundations of  structuralist 
linguistics. In dealing with Saussure’s Course, Derrida points to passages where he discerns
contradiction or inconsistency at work in Saussure’s view of  writing. Saussure explains his 
general view of  writing within the context of  linguistics thus:
A language and its written form constitute two separate systems of  signs. The sole 
reason for the existence of the latter is to represent the former. The object of  study 
in linguistics is not a combination of  the written word and the spoken word. The 
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spoken word alone constitutes that object (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.45). 
Saussure refuses writing a place within the object of  study and the domain of  linguistics, 
claiming the object of  study is speech and the synchronic structure that presupposes it. 
Derrida points to the consistently vituperative tone with which Saussure approaches 
writing, of the ‘tyranny of  the written form’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.54) that ‘obscures our 
view of  language. Writing is not a garment, but a disguise (Saussure 2006 [1922], pp.51-52). 
As Derrida describes it, it is ‘within a sort of  intralinguistic leper colony that Saussure 
wants to contain and concentrate the problem of  deformations through writing’ (Derrida
1998, p.42). 
However contra Saussure’s professed theoretical intentions, Saussure goes on to 
claim that,
26
[I]ts influence on the linguistic community may be strong enough to affect and 
modify the language itself. That happens only in highly literate communities, where 
written documents are of  considerable importance. In these cases, the written form 
may give rise to erroneous pronunciations…Darmesteter foresees the day when 
even the two final letters of  vingt (‘twenty’) will be pronounced: a genuine 
orthographic monstrosity. These phonetic changes do indeed belong to the 
language but they are not the result of  its natural evolution. They are due to an 
external factor (Saussure 2006 [1922], pp.53-54). 
For Derrida a question is begged, namely what constitutes the ‘natural evolution’ of  a 
language. The begged question impacts on what is seen as the appropriate object of  study 
for linguistics. Saussure assumes that the natural evolution of  a language is not influenced 
by writing so writing is outside the purview of  linguistics. Now, even if  one were to accept 
that writing is not part of  the natural evolution of  a language, it does not follow from this 
that writing is not appropriate to the study of  linguistics. The fact that Saussure admits the 
influence of  writing on language presents a problem for Saussure’s rejection of  writing. 
This is because there is motivation for the acceptance of  writing as relevant to linguistics.  
For Derrida, ‘It is this logocentricism which, by a bad abstraction, prevents Saussure...from 
determining fully and explicitly that which is called “the integral and concrete object of  
linguistics”’ (Derrida 1998, p.43).
For Derrida, Saussure’s complaint against writing is a moral, rather than a scientific
objection to writing; an objection informed by logocentricism. What Saussure attempts to 
treat as a de jure argument about the nature of  language is on Derrida’s reading a de facto 
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I quote beyond the scope of Derrida’s quotation of Saussure in order to pick out the tension Derrida 
sees in Saussure.
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stipulation about linguistics and an insufficiently justified one. The second way in which 
Derrida engages with Saussure is to question how linguistics has established its scientific 
status. Derrida claims that, ‘among the “sciences of  man,” linguistics is the one science 
whose scientificity is given as an example with a zealous and insistent unanimity’ (Derrida
1998, p.28). As I have pointed out earlier, this claim is correct (1.1) and it is one that 
motivates Derrida’s suspicion that the insistence of  the scientific status of  structuralist 
linguistics occludes a problem in the way its scientificity is framed. To argue this, Derrida 
picks out Saussure’s stipulation in the Course that discussion of  writing be kept to the 
phonetic system (as opposed to, say, the pictographic)
27
. Derrida argues that, 
[such] limitations are all the more reassuring [for structuralism] because they are 
just what we need at a specific point to fulfil the most legitimate of  exigencies; in 
fact the condition for the scientificity of  linguistics is that the field of  linguistics 
have hard and fast frontiers, that it be a system regulated by an internal necessity, 
and that in a certain way its structure be closed (Derrida 1998, p.33). 
Here, due to the imposed limitations, writing becomes automatically outside the field of  
linguistics. If  one limits discussion of  writing to phonetic writing, it is a simple move to 
treat writing as the image and representation of  speech. Once writing is established as the 
representation of  speech, its ancillary status is guaranteed as it is defined only in terms of  
speech. Derrida points here to a paradigm of  science where the overriding view of  
scientificity demands theoretical closure and a strictly delimited object of  knowledge (NSe), 
something which is a salient feature of  the Formalist Attitude. It should be noted that in 
some respects, Derrida’s concerns apropos Saussure resembled those I have outlined 
generally in my proposal of  the Formalist Attitude.
Once the status of  writing being on the ‘outside’ of  the discipline is assumed due 
to the closure of  the theoretical domain, any influence from writing, or from anything else, 
comes to be seen as interference with the ‘inner’ exigencies of  the discipline. As Derrida 
elliptically paraphrases it, ‘The outside bears with the inside a relationship that is, as usual, 
anything but simple exteriority. The meaning of  the outside was always present within the 
inside, imprisoned outside the outside, and vice versa’ (Derrida 1998, p.35). If  structuralist 
linguistics, in order to protect its own scientificity, refuses writing admission into the 
domain of  linguistics, it should do so for reasons that are scientifically justifiable. However, 
this is not the manner in which writing gets rejected; ‘it is as if, at the moment when the 
modern science of  the logos would come into its autonomy and its scientificity, it became 
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See Saussure 2006 [1922] p.27.
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necessary to attack a heresy’ (Derrida 1998, p.34). 
Derrida’s arguments can be summed up as follows:
1) Saussure is internally inconsistent in his treatment of  the place of  writing in 
linguistics. Saussure accepts that writing is a linguistic medium and has significant
influence on language, though he refuses to accept writing as part of  language.
2) The delimitation of  linguistics’ object of  knowledge is suspect. The move to 
suppress writing is linked to the demands that linguistics is a well defined object of  
study which in turn protects its scientificity. However, this is not justified as it is 
motivated by a dogma. 
3) Problems 1 and 2 are driven by a logocentricism within Saussure’s thought that 
wishes to attain a simple, unproblematic and strictly defined object, but is 
problematised by an ignorance of  its own conditions of  existence.
1.4.2 The suppression of  Actual Speech
Whilst Derrida accuses Saussure of  suppressing writing in favour of  speech, he supports 
Saussure in the suppression of  speech, or what I call Actual Speech, which functions in a 
similar way to writing in Saussure’s theory. This is a problem because Saussure’s reasons for 
the suppression of  Actual Speech are similar to the reason for his suppression of  writing. 
By the lights of  Derrida’s own argument then, he should not follow Saussure in his support 
of  the suppression of  Actual Speech. It is my argument that it is because Derrida 
suppresses Actual Speech that he can be seen as an adherent of  the Formalist Attitude. 
Let me first define Actual Speech. Actual Speech is to be contrasted with the 
Saussurean ‘sound image’ or ‘sound pattern’
28
. For Saussure, it was ‘particularly important 
to note that the sound patterns of  the words are not to be confused with actual sounds. 
The word patterns are psychological, just as the concepts associated with them are’ 
(Saussure 2006 [1922] p.29). So while not reducible to a psychological sound pattern, 
neither is Actual Speech simply ‘actual sound’, what Searle has described as ‘acoustic blasts 
produced by...physical and physiological phenomena’ (Searle 1999, p.136). Actual Speech 
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Saussure used a number of roughly synonymous terms including, ‘word image’, ‘acoustic image’, 
‘sound image’ and ‘verbal sign’. That there may be conceptual differences between these is 
unimportant here, it being enough to distinguish an act from its psychological necessary conditions.
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includes the phonic substance
29
and aural reception of  a linguistic act; it is meaningful 
utterance and its reception, not just a linguistic act. Actual Speech then is quite broad and I 
define it thus:
Actual Speech: A spoken linguistic act A which, belonging to a language L 
reproduces and potentially changes, language L
30
.
Actual Speech is not alien to Saussure’s and Derrida’s theories, and I define it here for 
purposes of  clarity. For Saussurean linguistics, Actual Speech is, like writing, inadmissible to 
linguistics. The reason for this is because Actual Speech emphasises the individual utterance 
and its reception and is thus temporal and so essentially diachronic. Saussure shows 
awareness of  Actual Speech and its diachronic nature thus; ‘everything which is diachronic in 
languages is only so through speech...Speech contains the seeds of  every change’ (Saussure 2006 
[1922] pp.138-139). It is this that makes Actual Speech inadmissible because for 
structuralist methodology, ‘The contrast between the two points of  view – the synchronic 
and the diachronic – is absolute and admits no compromise’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.119) 
and ‘[if  the linguist] takes the diachronic point of  view, he is no longer examining the 
language, but a series of  events which modify it’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.128). To study 
language scientifically is to study it synchronically and to do this Saussure recommended 
that the linguist ‘pay no attention to diachrony’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.117).
So a link can be discerned between the diachronic and Actual Speech and therefore, 
the suppression of  the diachronic entails the suppression of  Actual Speech. Maintaining 
the suppression of  Actual Speech is important to Saussure’s view of  linguistics, because it 
preserves its scientificity by delimiting the object of  knowledge, as was similarly the case 
with writing. But, as with writing, Actual Speech exerts an influence on the subject matter 
of  linguistics which Saussure would wish to refuse, but as with writing, tacitly admits. This 
can be seen in a few ways. Saussure makes this observation about the synchronic:
The first thing that strikes one on studying linguistic facts is that the language user 
is unaware of  their succession in time: he is dealing with a state. Hence the linguist 
who wishes to understand this state must rule out of  consideration everything 
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Though this should not be read as excluding other kinds of linguistic substance such as the graphic or 
haptic.
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This does not offer a definition of meaningful utterance or a language. As for the former, I can only 
appeal here to an intuitive understanding of the term. The latter question will be covered in more 
detail in 2.3 and 4.1.
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which brought the state about (Saussure 2006 [1992], p117).
For the speaker then, language exists only synchronically and this is one motivation for 
Saussure’s claim that synchronic, not diachronic study is appropriate for linguistics. Baker 
and Hacker have disputed this counter-claiming that, ‘the normal life-span of  a human 
being will allow one to live through significant linguistic change, of  which one will typically 
be aware’ (Baker and Hacker 1984, pp.269-270). If  this is the case, it puts into question 
Saussure’s motivation for separating the synchronic and diachronic. For example, those 
born and brought up before or during the digital revolution would have noticed an 
expansion of  the English lexicon to describe the various new technologies and activities 
(‘Googling’, ‘Ebaying’), brought about by the widespread use of  the internet. It does not 
help if  we accept or reject recent changes to the English lexicon as representing a new 
synchronic state; either way speakers do notice changes in their language. Saussure’s 
presupposition is that linguistics studies the intuitions of  speakers, but if  speakers are 
indeed aware of  change in their language through time, then the motivation for the 
synchronic/diachronic split is questionable.   
Another tension in Saussure’s separation of  the synchronic is apparent when 
Saussure defines a synchronic state by a lack of  change, though he accepts that ‘Since 
languages are always changing, however minimally, studying a linguistic state amounts in 
practice to ignoring unimportant changes’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.142). This raises a 
number of  questions, chiefly; is it possible to distinguish an important change from an 
unimportant one? There are reasons to think that Saussure has no answer to this. This is 
because any recognition of  a significant linguistic change will only happen after the event
31
and so can only be a matter for historic (diachronic) linguistics that will inform us of  the 
true extent and importance of  any change. Due to Saussure’s own restrictions, a synchronic 
perspective has no theoretical right to consider any change as unimportant because it treats 
languages ‘as self-contained systems of  communication at any particular time’ (Robins
1997, p.224). Two points emerge from this. First, it is only through the study of  the history 
of  a language that a synchronic state can in principle be proposed because only diachronic 
study is able to decide what might constitute an ‘unimportant change’. Secondly, if  
languages are at all points subject to change and speech is a phenomenon which brings 
about change, then it is theoretically and philosophically difficult to justify the delimitation 
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A truism of comparative linguistics. Lord argues ‘it is useless to look for the beginning of a particular 
sound change, for, by an old tautology, a sound change can only be said to have occurred after is has 
occurred’ (Lord 1974, p.137). Sound changes are explained post-hoc, see 3.2.
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of linguistics in the particular way that Saussure wishes to because those mechanisms are 
present within the synchronic state itself. Indeed if  they were not, then change would be 
impossible. Again the absolute distinction imposed between the synchronic and diachronic 
is questionable. 
Insofar as the activity of  speech implies the diachronic phenomenon of  language 
change, Saussure’s delimitation of  linguistics is not compatible with Actual Speech. Indeed, 
Actual Speech, like writing, threatens Saussure’s account of  the scientificity of  linguistics. 
As one commentator has noted, it is important to see how ‘remote the signe vocal [sound-
image] is from “sound,” and more important, how this remoteness is the very condition of  
possibility for the structure of  the Saussurean sign’ (Porter 1986, p.875). Considering the 
above claims, it is reasonable to expect that Derrida should not oppose Actual Speech as it 
is suppressed for the same reasons as writing. However, this is not the case. Derrida is 
aware that, ‘Saussure distinguishes between the sound-image and the objective sound’ 
(Derrida 1998, p.63) and supports the idea it has no place within linguistics. He accepts 
Saussure’s stipulation that it is ‘impossible for sound, the material element, itself  to belong 
to the language’ (Saussure quoted in Derrida 2002, p.18), arguing that,
[B]y desubstantializing both the signified content and the “expressive substance”-
which therefore is no longer in a privileged or exclusive way phonic, Saussure 
powerfully contributed to turning against the metaphysical tradition of  the concept 
of  the sign he borrowed from it (Derrida 2002, p.18). 
Derrida makes the odd move of  defending Saussure on this point, otherwise ‘the sphere of  
its [linguistics] legitimacy would be confused’ (Derrida 1998, p.56). This is incongruous 
because one of  Derrida’s philosophical objectives is to show as inadequate the sphere of  
legitimacy of  linguistics, to criticise the fact that, ‘structuralism above all insists upon 
preserving the coherence and completion of  each totality at its own level’ (Derrida 2006, 
p.30). Derrida opposes linguistics’ ‘hard and fast frontiers’ when writing is the matter in 
question, but supports those frontiers when Actual Speech is in question. 
Actual Speech is in respects similar to writing and Derrida’s refusal to recognise it-
to explicitly deny it- puts him in line with the Formalist Attitude as he defends moves to 
preserve the scientificity of  Saussurean linguistics even while attacking it. In this way, 
Derrida can be seen to be allied with the A and C of  the Formalist Attitude.  
1.4.3 The conflation of  ‘Writing’ and linguistic history
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Why should Derrida support the suppression of  Actual Speech? Most obviously, Derrida 
would wish to avoid privileging speech over writing as such a privileging is a motivation for 
Derrida’s general attack on logocentricism, of  which his attack on Saussure is a part. In 
addition to this it is apparent that if  Derrida did not suppress Actual Speech then his 
account of  writing would lose its special position as a suppressed but apparently 
inextricable part of  linguistic science. It is this avenue I will pursue by means of  two 
arguments. The first concerns a conflation of  the term ‘writing’ in Of  Grammatology that 
leaves Derrida’s treatment of  ‘writing’ in Saussure in difficulty and the second is an 
historical argument concerning Derrida’s use of  Saussure as a representative of  
logocentricism. If  writing lacks special significance, then treating it differently from Actual 
Speech lacks justification and Derrida becomes implicated in a questionable delimitation of  
the theoretical purview of  linguistics, similar to that which he criticises Saussure for.
First, to the issue of  the conflation of  ‘writing’. In order to understand Derrida’s 
position and see the conflation, one first must unpack what is meant by ‘writing’, as 
Derrida uses the term in two ways. Staten explains that in Derrida’s thought, ‘“Writing” in 
the usual sense of  the term is language physically detached from the subject who intends 
meaning, language that is material and intraworldly...Derrida generalizes this ordinary sense 
of  writing, holding on to the pure form of  the concept prior to its realization in a 
signifying substance’ (Staten 1986, p.61). He continues,
Prior to any “inscription” in the ordinary sense- with ink and paper…there must be 
the pure form of  “inscription” – that is “durable institution” of  a system of  signs 
upon which any particular realization of  the sign must draw. The transcendental 
concept of  writing is thus nothing but the general possibility of  the sign, and 
Derrida calls it “writing” to call attention to certain characteristics which have 
always been associated with the narrow concept of  writing (Staten 1986, p.61).  
According to Staten’s analysis which Derrida has offered a general encomium of,
32
we have 
two definitions of  writing:
Writing-A (WA): a physical mark having linguistic content. For Derrida this sense of  
writing is especially associated with the orthographic representation of  speech (phonetic 
writing), though it can include both phonetic and pictographic writing. Derrida has a 
number of  terms for this, calling it ‘narrow’, ‘colloquial’, ‘quotidian’, ‘general’ and ‘primary’ 
                                                
32
Derrida in Staten (1986, flyleaf).  
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writing
33
.  
Writing-B (WB): This is the possibility, or ‘transcendental concept’ of  language. It 
encapsulates the necessary conditions for language to come into being, and remain in a 
community. What the general conditions of  possibility are is not immediately clear in 
Derrida or Staten, but the capacity to ‘iterate’ signs, the power to reuse language and the 
reproducibility of  signs, is important. This is what Derrida comes to call ‘archè-writing’
34
which ‘cannot, as the condition of  all linguistic systems, form a part of  the linguistic 
system itself  and be situated as an object in its field’ (Derrida 1998, p.60). 
In terms of  the relation between WA and WB, Derrida argues that the suppression of  WA 
has the coterminous result of  the suppression of  WB and this link is a motivation for 
calling both ‘writing’. Where he sees the philosophical or theoretical sidelining of  writing in 
the narrow sense (WA), Derrida also sees at work blindness to the conditions of  possibility 
of  a particular philosophical or theoretical position, blindness to WB. Derrida claims that 
‘Oral language already belongs to this writing [i.e. WB]. But that presupposes a 
modification of  the concept of  writing [i.e. WA]’ (Derrida 1998, p.55). 
Some philosophers have stressed that this modification of  writing is not an attempt 
to introduce ‘some perverse counter-prejudice on Derrida’s part in favour of  writing over 
“speech”’ (Norris 1987, p.90). Derrida appears to support this when he claims that 
deconstruction should ‘not consist of  reversing it [the relation between speech and 
writing], of  making writing innocent’ (Derrida 1998, p.37). I argue that such assertions are 
false and that Derrida conflates WA and WB in order to achieve a reversal or re-
proportioning of  the relation between writing and speech. Let us look at two examples 
where conflation is evident and so dispel any worry I am misreading Derrida against his 
own and his commentators’ understanding,
Speech thus draws from a stock of  writing, noted or not, that language is, and it is 
here that one must meditate upon the complicity between the two “stabilities”
(Derrida 1998, p.53). 
Now one must think that writing is at the same time the more exterior to speech, not 
being its “image” or its “symbol”, and more interior to speech, which is already 
itself  a writing (Derrida 1998, p.46, my italics).
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See Derrida (1998, p.7).
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Norris claims that archè-writing is part of the heritage of ‘“transcendental” reasoning which Kant first 
brought to bear upon the central problems of philosophy’ (Norris 1987, p.94).
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Above, Derrida conflates WA and WB here in the following ways. In the first quotation, 
WB is referred to as the ‘stock of  writing’ and WA as one of  the two ‘stabilities’, speech 
and writing. Derrida is suggesting that if  language is founded upon writing, then one has 
motivation to reconsider the relationship between writing and speech. This, however, is not 
obvious as it is unclear why one should meditate upon the difference between speech and 
WA as Derrida thinks one should. If, as is meant to be the case, WA and WB are different 
concepts, then there seems no motivation for such a claim. Derrida appears to be glossing 
over the difference between WA and WB with the fact that they are, quite simply, both 
called ‘writing’.  Unless Derrida can offer better reason that they should be considered 
relevantly similar, then his recommendation is unfounded and uninteresting. 
In the second quotation, the conflation is clearer. What is ‘exterior’ and ‘interior’ to 
speech applies to WA and WB respectively. Derrida claims that writing is at the same time 
both external and internal to speech, suggesting a tension for those that would suppress 
writing. It is hard to see why this should be the case though, because again two different
concepts (WA and WB) are being referred to, so it is not remarkable that they should 
function differently within a conceptual scheme. Only if  they were the same or relevantly 
similar would this constitute the insight that Derrida claims. They are though, by Derrida’s 
own stipulation, not. Therefore Derrida conflates ‘writing’.    
This conflation goes unnoticed in some of  the literature. For example, in 
paraphrasing archè-writing, Norris argues that Derrida’s proposal, ‘can be stated most 
simply in the following terms. If  writing is the very condition of  knowledge…then how can 
writing be just one object among others?’ (Norris 1987, p.94). Again, the appearance of  
WA and WB as mutual homophones and homographs disguises the uses that ‘writing’ is 
put to. Of  course, it could be that Derrida is being consistent and he is implicitly 
recognising the different kinds of  ‘writing’. But were this the case, it would leave Derrida’s 
comments as trivial.   
Next, I move to my historical criticism of  Derrida’s use of  Saussure as a 
representative of  logocentricism. Roy Harris has argued that, 
[Derrida] seems quite oblivious of  the extent to which Saussurean linguistic theory, 
far from perpetuating the emphasis placed … on sound and sound change, marked 
a reaction against this trend in the history of  linguistics. (But that…would not fit 
with - let alone be explicable in terms of  – Derrida’s account of  Saussure’s role in 
promoting the pervasive ‘logocentricity’ of  the Western tradition.)’ (Harris 2003, 
p.178). 
52
In quoting Harris, I do not only mean to offer support for my own argument that Saussure 
and Derrida suppress Actual Speech. Harris is only partially correct here as he is does not
recognise that Derrida is aware of  and supports Saussure’s suppression of  Actual Speech; 
‘[Saussure] exclude[s] the very thing which had permitted him to exclude writing: sound’ 
(Derrida 1998, p.53). Harris’ criticism seems overly harsh. 
This noted, Harris makes a good point about the history of  linguistics. It is true 
that Derrida did not fully acknowledge the context of  Saussure’s refusal to consider writing 
as belonging within the purview of  linguistic science. The immediate historical background 
to Saussure’s work and thought comes from a century dominated by comparative philology 
(see 1.2-1.2.2) and the aim to reconstruct proto-indo-European, something which Harris 
gestures to in the quote above. In the nineteenth century, the body of  evidence and 
methodology of  linguistics had an overwhelmingly textual bias. For the majority of  
linguists, the study of  dead languages preserved in textual form, as opposed to the 
description and typological classification of  living (spoken) languages, was the principal 
source of  evidence in linguistic study. As I have pointed out before, linguistics in the 
nineteenth century was diachronically focused and of  this state of  affairs it was Saussure’s 
opinion that,
[A]n exclusively comparative approach...brings with it a whole series of  mistaken 
notions. They have no basis in reality and fail to reflect the conditions which do 
obtain in language everywhere...not until about 1870 did anyone begin to enquire 
into the conditions governing the life of  languages (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.17).
It was against this textual-comparative bias that Saussure (and some neogrammarians 
before him) reacted with a synchronic approach. By adopting the synchronic as the 
appropriate perspective for a scientific linguistics, Saussure signalled a move away from 
what he saw as the unfruitful and unscientific study of previous generations of  linguists.
The point is that the move away from studying sound change and writing was part 
of  a general methodological shift in linguistics. That is, it is not just the emphasis on sound change 
that changed, but also on the perceived appropriate empirical resources of  linguistics. With 
this in mind one can be justifiably suspicious of  Derrida’s assertion that Saussure’s reasons 
for suppressing writing are logocentric ones, inherited from the inception of  western 
philosophy rather than, as Harris argues, the intellectual climate in which Saussure was 
raised. Derrida does appear ignorant of  this as writing is not the only activity that Saussure 
suppresses. Rather, this was just one aspect of  a package of  changes that occurred in 
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linguistics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Harris notes, part of  this 
shift was with respect to the importance of  sound which, as I have argued, manifests itself  
in suppression of  Actual Speech.  
Both arguments support my contention that writing does not have the special 
status that Derrida assigns to it. Actual Speech is in important respects similar to writing in 
the problems that it causes for Saussure’s understanding of  the object of  linguistics and 
Derrida should, according to the logic of  his own argument concerning the suppression of  
writing, recognise that Actual Speech as well as writing has an equal claim to be considered 
within linguistics. This is not the case as Derrida is intent on ‘reconsidering the order of  
dependence’ (Derrida 1998, p.51) between speech and writing; a move which leaves him 
supporting Saussure’s account of  the scientific status of  linguistics, an account he is 
committed to oppose. In defending the strict delimitation of  the borders of  linguistics, 
Derrida unwittingly promotes the Formalist Attitude. That this is not Derrida’s professed 
philosophical position is clear. But what is also evident is that a problematic acceptance of  
the Formalist Attitude is not only representative of  those that univocally support the 
notion of  linguistics as a natural science, but it can also be found in those that ostensibly 
oppose such pretensions. 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown how linguistics is in an unusual position with respect to 
questions about its own scientific status. Not only are linguists particularly concerned with 
the scientificity of  their endeavours, but this concern has manifested itself  in a long and 
influential trend within linguistic thought which has sought to ally linguistics with the 
natural sciences, a trend I call the Formalist Attitude. In 1.2, I tracked the Formalist 
Attitude in its various manifestations among linguists of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries and in 1.3 and 1.4 I attacked two contemporary examples of  the Formalist 
Attitude. In both of  the contemporary cases, there was a failure to consistently delimit 
language as an object of  knowledge in such a way that was consistent with the theoretical 
ambitions of  the position in question. In both of  these cases, the motivation for 
delimitation could be seen to be influenced by the desire to maintain the scientific status of  
the endeavour. As Putnam has put it, ‘the question of  how much idealization is legitimate is 
one that has no general answer. What one has to answer in a specific case is whether the 
idealisations made…were or were not too severe’ (Putnam in Harman (ed.) 1974, p.81). In 
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the cases so far shown, one is given reason to think them too severe and indeed to consider 
the Formalist Attitude as requiring overly severe abstractions. 
This brings us to another motivation for holding the Formalist Attitude. Despite 
problems in satisfying the requirement to strictly delimit a theoretical purview, one reason 
for maintaining it as a goal and holding to the Formalist Attitude stems from an 
understandable worry. The worry can be put like this: once a study moves beyond a strictly 
specified domain, investigations become inchoate and open to reformulation so that 
interesting and verifiable knowledge claims become impossible. Indeed as we have seen, 
such concerns are expressed by Chomsky in his desire to avoid linguistics becoming an 
‘ethnoscience’ or what he has disparagingly called a ‘theory of  everything’ and also, as we 
have noted, with the neogrammarian view of  Leskien. Of  course, such concerns are not 
aimed at the idea that anything at all might come within the purview of  linguistics and the 
study of  language. Rather, and as we have already seen evidence of  in 1.3 and 1.4, there is a 
concern to remove or disallow such things as Actual Speech, communication and what we 
could term as ‘social’ or external factors from the study of  language, phenomena that seem 
less amenable to abstract study due either to their temporal nature or the fact that they 
appear inextricably interlinked with other phenomena. In attempting to go beyond the view 
of  language and linguistics of  the Formalist Attitude, there is then reason to consider this 
worry, if  it is justified and what kind of  alternatives might be proposed in its place.  
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Chapter 2 
Linguistics and causality in the social sciences
In chapter 1 I argued that in some of  its contemporary manifestations, the Formalist 
Attitude faced problems due to its construal of linguistics as a natural science. In order to 
accommodate this view of  linguistics, the positions I have identified as exemplifying the 
Formalist Attitude required that ‘language’ be defined in a way that it is either internally 
inconsistent or so narrow as to present a tension between the professed theoretical 
objectives and the ability to meet these objectives. I also argued that an abstract view of  
language is frequently accompanied by a reluctance to deal with issues arising from actual 
use of  language by speakers (Itkonen 1978, 1983, Pateman 1987). As Itkonen complains, 
[L]inguists, unlike anthropologists or sociologists, do not seem to be overly 
concerned by the fact that they continuously operate with context-dependent 
concepts as if  these were genuinely universal or context-free (Itkonen 1983, p.215). 
And Halliday has offered this opinion:
We tend nowadays to refer to sociolinguistics as if  this was something very 
different from the study of  language as practiced in linguistics tout court; but in a 
way new ‘sociolinguistics’ is but old ‘linguistics’ writ large, and the linguist’s interests 
have always extended to social behaviour (Halliday 2007, p.44). 
While a study of  language that is divested of  links to human behaviour has not in fact
existed, a tradition of  seeing language as abstract, closed and uniform is evident from
classical debates between grammarians and anomalists (Robins 1997, Seuren 1998) and up 
to the present. I have pointed out before that it is plausible such a position is motivated by 
the worry that to engage with speakers moves study away from what is considered the 
intellectually respectable tenets of natural science and into the contentious methods and 
objects of  social science. What Chomsky calls ‘ethnoscience’, or social science, strikes some 
linguists as possessing dubious claims to scientificity as the social sciences lack the rigorous 
methods and account of causation that would allow for the proposition of  laws or 
successful and useful predictions. If  this is the case, then it is worth considering why some 
linguists see the social sciences as an inappropriate model for linguistics and why they are
suspicious of  the social sciences generally. If  there are good reasons for this suspicion,
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then there may be good reasons to adhere to the Formalist Attitude, flaws not 
withstanding. The aim of  this chapter is to show that the suspicion of  the social sciences is 
badly motivated and so the reluctance to associate them with linguistics as well as 
considering the actual use of  language is unsound. My argument has two parts: I first
outline the worries linguists have about social sciences, focussing on causality, and then
seek to allay these fears by providing a persuasive account of  causality in the social 
sciences.  Tackling the problem of  causality removes the attractions of  the natural scientific
model that sustains the Formalist Attitude and completes the critical diagnostic of  this 
broad approach to language. 
In 2.1 I look at a well-known sceptical account about the relevance of  the social 
sciences to linguistics, Roger Lass’ On Explaining Language Change (1980). This work is
interesting in the present context because it rejects a central tenet of  the Formalist 
Attitude: that ‘laws’ within linguistics are sufficiently similar to those of  the natural sciences 
that linguistics can be seen within a natural scientific mould. I argue that Lass’ response to 
the challenge of  explaining language change shows an abiding scepticism about 
understanding and explaining causality in the socio-cultural realm and as a result, Lass fails
to provide an account of  linguistics superior to the one he attacks. The upshot of  this 
discussion is that a positive account of  the scientificity of  linguistics cannot afford to 
ignore certain problems that arise in the discussion of  laws in the philosophy of  science. 
In 2.2 I pursue this line of  enquiry by turning to recent arguments in the 
philosophy of  social science about causality and ceteris paribus laws. Invoking ceteris paribus 
clauses and laws is one common and influential way in which scientists and philosophers 
concerned with the social sciences seek to substantiate causal explanations and show the 
social sciences to be fruitful and intellectually respectable disciplines. The importance of  
this debate in discussions about the social sciences is hard to overstate. As noted in 1.1, the 
question of the scientificity of  the social sciences is generally accepted to be related to the 
question of  whether they can be seen to be law governed, offer predictions and explain 
events which fall within their theoretical purview. 
In 2.3 I propose that a powers interpretation of  ceteris paribus laws is philosophically 
and scientifically the most satisfactory in the context of the social sciences. This offers a 
way out of  the problems identified by Lass and others (2.1- 2.2), both in rejecting some 
accounts of ceteris paribus laws and in avoiding defaulting to the Deductive Nomological 
model.  I argue a corollary of  this is that language can best be seen as a causal power and
here I begin my answer to the question ‘what is language?’ by providing an account that 
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avoids the problems of  the Formalist Attitude while also avoiding pessimism about 
understanding and explaining events and processes within the socio-cultural realm.
2.1 Lass: On Explaining Language Change
The subject of  language change has been and continues to be important to linguistics. 
Winter has made this remark:
As long as there has been scientific study of  language, there has been an interest on 
the part of  linguistics in two major aspects of  the field. One may be expressed by 
the simple question: What is a language like?- the other, slightly more involved, by: 
What made a language like it is now? (Winter in Polomè (ed.) 1990, p.11). 
Language change is seen as relevant to the scientific claims of linguistics and in how 
linguistics conceives of  language as an object of  knowledge. This is borne out in Lass’ well-
known monograph, where he discusses a variety of ways in which language change has 
been explained and attempts to offer an account of  language change that can be given 
scientific credibility. In doing this Lass explicitly considers issues in the philosophy of  
science that are pertinent to linguistics and this makes him particularly relevant in the 
present context as it makes clear the philosophical issues that underpin scepticism about 
explanation in the social realm.
One way of  explaining language change that Lass considers and criticises is with 
the Deductive Nomological model (hereafter D-N).  The D-N model and problems with it 
as a model for the physical and natural sciences are well known, but I give an outline to 
contextualise Lass’ attack on it and why he thinks it inappropriate for use in linguistics. The 
D-N model is a model for scientific explanation that characterises laws as universal 
constant conjunctions between events. It seeks to explain the occurrence of  events 
(explananda) by reference to initial conditions plus at least one law (explanans). Ideally, this 
process occurs by means of  the deduction of  the event from the initial conditions plus the 
laws:
The deductive paradigm with its emphasis of  ‘laws’…seems to offer the strongest 
and most generally satisfying kind of  explanation; but it is appropriate only to 
certain subject matters…this set neither includes linguistics nor any form of  
history, and thus a fortiori excludes historical linguistics (Lass 1980, p.3).
Lass goes on to argue for a positive theory free from the problems he sees besetting the D-
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N model. The problems he identifies have been rehearsed in the wider philosophy of  the 
social and natural sciences (Bhaskar 1979, Bird 1998) and so a brief  overview will suffice 
that captures Lass’ key criticisms. 
Lass argues that both the probabilistic and standard versions of  the D-N model fail 
to offer explanations useful to linguistics. For a probabilistic version of  the D-N model, 
Lass’ criticism is twofold. The first problem a logical one and the second is semantic. The 
logical problem is that the concept of  explanation implicit in the D-N model is one that 
excludes probabilistic explanation as they reduce to uncertain beliefs rather than 
establishing knowledge of  causal relations though deduction, ‘it is a necessary property of  
such explanations that they are (in a strict sense) non-empirical: unlike D-N explanations 
they can neither predict particular states of  affairs … nor counter predict their instances’ (Lass 1980, 
p.20). Probabilistic explanation relies on ‘only inductive likelihood, not deductive 
certainty...[this] makes them not only “weaker” than D-N explanations, but makes them 
non-explanatory’ (Lass 1980, p.13). The semantic problem is that probabilistic laws are 
unable to offer explanations because ‘the residue (of  whatever size) of  instances excluded 
from the workings of  the ‘law’ [are accounted for] for no apparent reason than the 
statistical distributions stated by that law’ (Lass 1980, p.25). While an event might fit within 
a distribution of  event-types predicted by a probabilistic law, this does not give an 
explanation of why something did or did not happen.
Against the standard D-N account, Lass raises the familiar point
35
that within 
historical linguistics, laws of  the requisite type are not available because all relevant factors 
cannot be stipulated within the explanans
36
. This of  course is also a frequent criticism of  
the D-N model from within the philosophy of natural and physical sciences (Cartwright 
1983, Bhaskar 2008), but this is not Lass’ concern here. The D-N model requires a causally 
closed system in order to derive explanandum from the explanans and in linguistics the D-N 
model would only be applicable ‘if  in fact one could develop a predictive mathematical 
model for the development, say, of an open system over time’ (Lass 1980, p.88), which 
would make it possible to treat an open system as a closed one. Lass argues that the causal 
factors which influence language change are complex, non-deterministic and even non-
stochastic so the D-N model is otiose as there are no ‘algorithms down the bottom of  the 
[linguistic] garden’ (Lass 1980, p.89) that might allow for the fruitful adoption of  the D-N 
model.  Lass concludes that the D-N model would ideally be the most desirable model of  
prediction and explanation for linguistics, though it requires that language be a closed 
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See Sorokin (1938) and McMahon (1995). 
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This motivates the adoption of a probabilistic account which as we have just seen, is rejected by Lass.
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system or be treatable as a closed system for the purposes of  study. This is an idea we have 
encountered in chapter 1 and it is Lass’ opinion that due to problems with the D-N model, 
‘a pure autonomy metaphysics is likely to raise a number of  deep problems, and even if  it 
removes the messiness engendered by speakers, it fails to explain anything’ (Lass 1980, 
p.128). Linguistics is simply not a discipline that can fruitfully employ the D-N model.
Though Lass, quite rightly rejects the D-N model, he also rejects theories
attempting to deal with the ‘messiness engendered by speakers’. Due to the causal 
complexity and non-deterministic environment which speakers operate in, attempts to 
include speakers are either superficial or otiose: ‘one might therefore ask whether, 
considering what looks like a fair consensus [about the lack of  need to include speakers
within linguistic theory], there is really any need to invoke human beings (messy, 
complicated things), at all’ (Lass 1980, pp.121-122). Whatever the truth of  Lass’ claim 
about ‘consensus’ among linguists
37
, there are problems with the idea that linguistics can 
ignore human beings. One problem is that Lass assumes the failure to usefully include
speakers in linguistic theory is indicative of  the irrelevance of  speakers to linguistics and 
questions about language. This is hasty, because it is far from clear if  it is the nature of the
subject matter or the theory itself  that is responsible for this state of  affairs. What are 
required are grounds to decide between the two, something that Lass does not provide. 
There is good reason to suspect that suppositions of  the theory, rather than 
speakers, is the problem. Lass sees speakers and social phenomena in general as too 
complex to be included within a theory of  language change and is open about a lack of  
knowledge about them. But it appears that it is because of  this lack of  knowledge that Lass 
sees speakers as unimportant, rather than on account of  their putative irrelevance. 
Removing or refusing something from theoretical consideration presupposes some 
understanding about what is being excluded and therefore it is illegitimate to remove 
speakers on account of  the fact that one lacks knowledge about them. Insofar as Lass 
refuses the inclusion of  speakers due to their ‘causal messiness’, it is plausible he is guilty 
of the dogma we found with Chomsky (1.3) that in order to maintain a strictly delimited 
object of  knowledge, one could not consider speakers or communication within the 
purview of  linguistics. If  Lass holds this view then he too exemplifies the Formalist 
Attitude, as strict delimitation of  the object of  knowledge was identified as a salient 
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The fact that philosophers and linguists (Searle 1969, 1995, Itkonen 1978, 1991, Harris 1980, 1995, 
2009, Travis 2008) find a place within their respective theories for the role of speakers suggests Lass’ 
claim about the ‘mild embarrassment’ (Lass 1980, p.122) speakers cause linguists does not represent a
consensus.
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feature. This is only a suspicion at present, but I will go on to argue that this is the case.
What is particularly interesting about On Explaining Language Change is that there is 
recognition of  problems besetting a strictly autonomous conception of  linguistics which 
suggests that linguistics cannot be autonomous. This is not born out however, as the 
rejection of  autonomy is accompanied by a rejection of  speakers in linguistic theory. This 
suggests a tension which is evident when Lass claims that in linguistics, 
‘[T]he notion ‘cause’ in the deductive sense is wholly inappropriate: our explanandum 
domain is a set of  interactions between non-deterministic open systems...In other words, 
we are dealing with cultural phenomena, and these are not ‘caused’… This does not make 
[linguistic change], as I will argue, unintelligible (though is does make it inexplicable, which 
is not the same thing) (Lass 1980, p.132).
In his conclusions, he cites that ‘There are (as yet) no D-N explanations for any linguistic 
change’ (Lass 1980, p.143) as a reason to think explaining language change is not possible 
and asks ‘is there any sense in which, in the absence of  D-N explanations, and even in the 
absence of  (strictly) falsifiable claims, our accounts of  language change can be rational?’ 
(Lass 1980, p.145). The idea that cultural phenomena are not ‘caused’ and are therefore 
inexplicable strongly suggests that Lass is presupposing a D-N account of  what constitutes 
cause and explanation. It is not only that he sees the deductive paradigm providing ‘the 
strongest and most generally satisfying kind of  explanation’, but he doubts anything else 
can. As linguistics functions within a non-deterministic open-system, events are therefore 
not ‘caused’, or at least we cannot say anything about their causes. Lass appears to think the
D-N model is the only intellectually respectable option and as the D-N model cannot apply 
to linguistics, there are no intellectually respectable options for explaining language 
change
38
.
Lass attempts to obviate this pessimism by proposing in what he sees as the spirit 
of  Eddington (1958) and Feyerabend (1982 [1975]), that in replacement of  a theory 
making truth claims about language, we should accept that,
[O]ur theories do not in any sense map realia directly, but are analogues to them, 
based on structures we discover in (or impose on) certain sensible aspects of  the 
world...Our theories and descriptions then become theories and descriptions of  
STRUCTURE only...with no attribution of  the structure to anything but our 
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It is worth noting that Lass has offered comment on his earlier work and has been more qualified. 
However, since he maintains ‘This is not to say I think causal explanations are or ever will be 
available, as I made clear in 1980’ (Lass 1997, p.336), his position with respect to my criticisms 
remains unchanged.
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‘knowledge’ (such as it is) of  the particular sensibilia we happen to be investigating
(Lass 1980, p.124).
Lass favourably quotes Eddington to the effect when conducting science ‘we emancipate 
ourselves from a frame of  thought when we realize it is only a frame of  thought and not an 
objective truth we are accepting’ (Eddington 1958, p.120). With this understanding,
linguistics would investigate language structure and linguistic phenomena, though any
resulting ‘knowledge’ would be a product of  our linguistic theories rather than of  anything 
real. This allows one to stipulate that language can be viewed as an ‘“ideal” formalized 
theory’ (Lass 1980, p.124) and in doing this problems of  explanation caused by rejection of  
the D-N model are dissolved, as it is applicable by fiat. What we expect from linguistic 
theories is not then truth, but what Lass comes later to refer to as ‘Insight’.
Insight consists in two things: ‘i) virtually undeniable ‘facts’ discovered about some 
domain, such as statistical correlations and ii) rather more imaginative projections from 
facts, such as taxonomic schemata and models as ‘metaphorical redescription’ (Lass 1980, 
p.160). Now, i) is a reasonable description of some knowledge claims where reference to 
causal mechanisms and statistical correlations account for events, such as ‘economic 
depression increases rates of  suicide’. This is justified by pointing to studies showing a 
statistical relationship between an increase in suicides and economic depression, but this is 
not all. Crucially, what allows the statistical relation to be considered causal is that we have 
an intelligible explanation about how economic depression could lead to suicide (economic 
hardship, breakdown in social relations, loss of  support services etc). 
One problem is that if  we accept Lass’ account of  the inexplicability of
sociocultural phenomena and his advocacy of Insight, we would have no rational 
expectation that, say, funding mental health charities or lobbying government to pursue 
deprivation-reducing policies would decrease the suicide rate or slow the rate of  increase. 
This is because any Insight we have into open systems concerns our knowledge, not realia,
and our knowledge is only directed toward our own theories. As such Insight cannot 
influence rational
39
action because it rejects the idea that we identify causal mechanisms and 
connections in our explanations of  sociocultural phenomena. If  causality is about how 
substances interact then our knowledge of  causality is knowledge about how substances 
interact. This is what Lass rejects and though we might recognise statistical correlations, 
these cannot influence rational action because they do not permit us to believe any causal 
claims. Insight can be of  little scientific use and by Lass’ admission such practices reduce to 
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I am taking it that Lass sees ‘rational’ as synonymous with ‘deductively derivable’ and I use it in this 
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‘myth’ and ‘poetical’ redescription which is ‘like an art form’ (Lass 1980, pp.158-159). 
Lass’ proposals for linguistics face a number of  problems. His characterisation of  
linguistics is plausibly circular: a linguistic theory (LT) investigates knowledge that is a 
product of  (LT) and so ‘LT’ is the object of  knowledge of  LT. If  this were true, then the 
investigations of  the linguist are vacuous and aside from the fact that people called 
‘linguists’ wish to have highly paid and prestigious work, the motivation of  linguistics 
would be unclear
40
. Lass states that ‘if  the search for nomic necessity in language history is 
a lost cause, we might as well be content with Insight: so long as we do not lapse into 
irrationalism or bigotry’ (Lass 1980, p.169), though his position is unable to halt such a 
lapse. If  Insight cannot give us rational grounds for action to reduce human misery or 
believe in Universal Grammar or Zipf ’s law of  least effort, then it is unclear how it can
provide a prophylactic against irrationalism. While Insight would not necessarily lead to 
irrationality, it does not defend against it. 
Indeed, Lass’s scepticism about non-deductive explanation results in him subverting
his own position. He claims, ‘there exist no explicit warrants for arguing from distributions 
[of  data] to anything else; any claim that such an argument is meaningful or valid is an 
assertion of belief, not an argument’ (Lass 1980, p.45) but concedes that his sceptical 
stance concerning inferential warrants ‘is also an assertion of  belief ’ (Lass 1980, p.45).
Therefore, his position is open to the same criticism he levels at theories holding inference 
and non-deductive explanations are credible.  As Pateman puts it, ‘in the end, [Lass] is left 
not with an alternative to positivist metascience, but only with the discontents of  a failed 
would-be positivist’ (Pateman 1987, p.23). To repeat, while I agree with Lass’ rejection of  
the D-N model, his theory faces problems because he is sceptical of  any non-deductive 
model of  explanation supplying reasonable grounds for belief  in explanations for language 
change. Lass explicitly rejects the D-N model while implicitly relying on deductive certainty
as the only respectable standard of  explanation.
Discussion of  Lass provides a well-known and clear example of  the reluctance of  
linguists to take sociocultural causation seriously and some of  the problems that such
reluctance can cause. This reluctance and the problems with it resonates with a broader
debate within the philosophy of  social science concerning causation and explanation in 
open systems, systems taken to be characteristic of  the study of  the social sciences. A 
sensible way to proceed would be to forego Lass’ scepticism about explaining language 
change and causation of  cultural phenomena and try to better understand issues 
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surrounding the explanation of  events in open systems. By doing this and offering an 
account of causation in the social sciences which can answer some sceptical worries, the 
aforementioned tendency within linguistics to ignore or disqualify ‘messy’ things as 
speakers and social structures might be defused. I now turn to look at one of  the main 
ways in which causality and explanation are accounted for within the social sciences. 
2.2 Ceteris Paribus laws in the social sciences
It has been widely accepted in discussion of  the social sciences (Sorokin 1938, Bhaskar 
1979, Mantzavinos (ed.) 2009) that exceptionless laws amenable to deductive models of  
prediction and explanation are not available in this domain. Whether this is due to the 
practice of  the social sciences or the objects the social sciences study, it is not the case that 
social sciences seek regularities and laws of  the kind associated with the natural sciences. 
The main practical consequence of  this for the social sciences (and arguably ‘inexact’ 
sciences such as biology or tidology)
41
is a de-emphasis on prediction and a concern with 
post hoc explanation of  events
42
. For the social sciences, having a philosophically robust 
account of  causation and explanation could not be more important, for without one the 
social sciences cannot hope to explain events and objects within their disciplines. For those 
seeing linguistics as a natural science or as the most natural scientific of  the social sciences, 
suspicion of  speakers and ‘enthnoscience’ appears reasonable in the absence of  such an 
account. This was seen with Lass, who recognised the D-N model was not suitable for 
linguistics but in the absence of  a clear alternative remained a ‘failed would-be positivist’ or
more generously, remained undecided and sceptical.  
In forgoing the expectation of  constant conjunctions and deductive derivability of  
explanandum from explanans, one popular way social causation is explained is by reference to 
ceteris paribus clauses or laws (cp laws)
43
. A ceteris paribus law expresses a causal relationship 
between objects or events in the form of an antecedent-consequent statement. With a cp 
law, the consequent being met requires that other potential causal influences, the cetera, be 
non-interfering or ‘equal’ (paribus). An example would be ‘ceteris paribus, high unemployment 
leads to increased crime’. Here, ‘leads to’ is a term expressing a causal relation between 
‘unemployment’ and ‘crime’. In this case, cetera that might prevent the consequent being
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For example see Mitchell (2002 in Mantzavinos (ed.) 2009). For a discussion of the example of 
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  I discuss post-hoc explanations in the case of language change in 3.2.
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A ‘ceteris paribus law’ is a law qualified by a ceteris paribus clause. Here a ‘cp law’ and a ‘cp clause’ 
are used interchangeably. 
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met could be increased resource allocation for crime prevention (Police, CCTV) or the 
government funding of  new jobs. 
Over the last few decades, the usefulness and metaphysical status of  cp laws have 
been the subject of much debate in the philosophy of  science and social science (Schiffer 
1991, Pietroski and Rey 1995, Earman and Roberts 1999, Schurz 2001, Spohn 2002, Lange 
2002, Cartwright 2002, Earman, Robers and Smith 2002, Kowalenko 2009). Proponents 
and opponents of  cp laws cite a number of  factors which make them attractive and 
unattractive respectively in forming part of causal accounts within the social sciences. Let 
us begin with what are seen as the advantages of  cp laws. Broadly, Schiffer (1991) has 
described the need for cp laws in this way:
Some philosophers believe that there are ceteris paribus laws and that without them 
there would be no special-science explanations, and hence no special sciences. 
These philosophers think that science is in the business of providing scientific 
explanations, that such explanations require laws, and that there are no, or only 
very few, strict special-science laws; whence their appeal to ceteris paribus laws
(Schiffer 1991, p.397).
This again emphasises the importance of  developing a non-deductive account of  causation
for the social sciences. As Schiffer states, cp laws are seen by their proponents as providing 
a way in which the necessity and exceptionlessness of  laws can be salvaged in the face of  
the argument that due to the clearly exceptional nature of  proposed generalisations in the 
social sciences, laws do not function in the social realm (Earman et al 2002). As laws are 
often seen as being necessary and exceptionless, cp laws offer the prospect of the concept 
of  law being salvageable within a social scientific context and even laws generally. A 
different approach is made by Lange who argues that cp laws are useful because they do 
not require laws to be strict regularities at all: ‘ceteris-paribus laws aren’t associated with
regularities in the straightforward manner demanded by regularity analyses of  law and 
analyses of  laws as relations among universals’ (Lange 2002, p.412). Despite some 
differences then, cp laws are firstly seen by their proponents as a way of  preserving laws 
for the social sciences. 
Second, cp laws provide conceptual closure that makes causal connections explicit. 
As the social world is causally open, an event could be causally influenced by any number 
of  factors: ‘a cp law holds only in a ‘closed system’, i.e. a system considered in abstraction 
from other, independently existing factors’ (Pietroski and Rey 1995, p.89). Proponents 
argue that for the social sciences, the conceptual work that cp laws do is an analogue to the 
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more practical closure the laboratory experiment provides for the natural sciences and in 
this spirit Kowalenko claims that cp laws consist in a ‘type of  theorising whose goal is the 
separation (in the mind) of  nature into what are assumed to be its true component parts 
and processes’ (Kowalenko 2009, p.188). A cp law suspends the analog causal matrix of  the 
social world and makes conceptually salient a causal connection or mechanism present in
that causal matrix.
Third, cp laws have a philosophically justifiable resilience to direct falsifiability. This 
is motivated by the aforementioned acceptance that utilising a deductive causal account for 
explaining social events is doomed to failure as no social hypothesis is exceptionless, given 
that the social world is causally open and unclosable. There are no hypotheses in the social 
world that are not subject to instances where they might not obtain. Cp laws allow causal 
hypotheses to remain intact in the face of  counter-instances and there is no requirement 
that a cp law be exceptionless. Though this is similar to the issue of defending the concept 
of  laws in the social sciences, this advantage differs in that it does not directly offer a way 
of  salvaging the concept of  ‘law’ in the social sciences, but rather the idea of having useful
and reliable causal hypotheses. That these concepts are different can be seen if  one 
considers that it is consistent to reject the notion that ‘laws’ of  a relevant kind can be
applied to social phenomena while maintain that social phenomena are caused and are 
explicable.  
      Against the claimed advantages of  cp laws, there are some substantive
philosophical objections.  The main ones and those I will focus on are:
Problem of  vacuity: Cp laws are universal and exceptionless but only when they obtain or are 
met. That they do not always obtain or are not always met is clear, otherwise there would 
be no need for cp laws in the first place. Therefore, the attempt to save the 
exceptionlessness and universality of  laws in social science by means of  cp laws leaves the 
notion of  ‘law’ vague or  not useful as it is always possible to make a statement universally 
true by the creation of  a cp law. Cp laws allow for the stipulation of ad hoc universals and 
this makes them vacuous. At bottom, all cp laws contain a vacuous claim of  the form ‘A 
causes B only when A causes B’. This is a prevalent criticism of  cp laws (Earman, Roberts 
and Smith 2002, Mitchell 2002).
Problem of  confirmation: We cannot know if  cp laws are confirmed and explanatory in cases 
consistent with the cp law being met. If  we postulate ‘(cp) A → B’ and we observe that A 
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is followed by B, due to the unspecified nature of  the causal forces surrounding the event,
we have no way of  ruling out that C, E or F caused B; that is to say, no way of  establishing 
that all other things really were equal. For example, Schurz argues, ‘There exists no test 
criterion which tells us, independently from the truth of  the consequent, when the 
undisturbed case of  a cp law is empirically realized. Therefore, indefinite cp laws cannot be 
used for the purposes of  predictions…with their help, all kinds of  events which have 
independently identifiable causes can be ex post facto explained by arbitrary and other co-
occurring events’ (Schurz 2001, p368). Sandra Mitchell (in Mantzavinos (ed.) 2009) points 
out that due to the problem of  confirmation, cp laws violate a pragmatic aspect of  the 
concept of  ‘law’ which preserves the connection between antecedent and consequent. This 
is because cp laws allow that interactions of  different kinds (A→B/C→B) can be treated 
the same with respect to a cp law.
Problem of  counterfactuals: cp clauses do not specify the conditions under which, where the 
antecedent is present, one can expect the consequent to follow. In a circumstance where 
‘(cp) A -> B’ does not obtain, we are left ignorant of  the factors which produce 
counterfactual instances. While it is possible to fill out cp laws to include interfering factors, 
(‘cp, my dog will bark at the postman unless my dog is asleep, dead, being taken for a walk 
etc.’) it is impossible to specify all potentially interfering conditions as such a list is in 
principle limitless and one cannot exclude the possibility that the environment will change 
in an unexpected way. For example, the introduction of  price caps on commodities would 
affect Gresham’s law of  supply and demand, as would an anarcho-syndicalist uprising. If  
one cannot specify interfering conditions, we have a situation where it is not possible to 
distinguish between a disconfirming counterfactual (where the cetera were equal but the 
consequent is not realised) from a non-disconfirming counterfactual (where cetera were not 
equal and the consequent is not realised). 
These objections amount to a substantial case for the rejection of  cp laws as the solution to
issues of  causation and explanation in the social sciences. If  cp laws are vacuous and
cannot be empirically confirmed or disconfirmed then they cannot be useful to the social 
sciences in supporting explanations and causal claims and we may see that in such a case 
the suspicions of  linguists would be supported
44
. From the problems outlined, it is the 
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These problems have not prevented cp laws from being taken up by social scientists in their 
methodology and practice. As suggested by Rupert; ‘Admittedly, the assumption that there are c.p. 
laws has proven useful; perhaps those working in the social and behavioural sciences should continue 
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problem of  vacuity that is most threatening to cp laws and abiding because vacuity is an all-
or-nothing thing. If  cp laws are vacuous, then they are useless. The same is not the case for
the problems of  confirmation and counterfactuals, for if  cp laws suffered from these 
problems an optimistic view could be taken, holding that we might improve our 
understanding of  the causal matrix in future (more rigor in observation, larger data sets 
etc.) which would lead to the problems of  confirmation and counterfactuals being less
problematic. 
I wish to offer a broad, but not uncritical, defence of  cp laws in order to show that 
taking social causation and explanation seriously is warranted and that the suspicion shown 
by many linguists of  sociocultural causation is unwarranted. As cp laws are in some 
respects ambiguous, covering the lesser problems first will help sharpen what cp laws are 
and this in turn will inform my discussion of  the problem of  vacuity and so I will proceed 
by first defusing the problems of  confirmation and counterfactuals.
2.2.1 Defusing problems with cp laws
In discussing the problem of  counterfactuals, Mitchell raises this problem for cp laws:
[T]he ability to fully fill in the conditions that could possibly interfere may well be 
an impossible task. Indeed, in evolutionary systems new structures accompanied by 
new rules may appear in the future, and hence we could never fully specify the 
content of  potential interfering factors (Mitchell 2002, p.55). 
Though this quote does not concern a social science, it raises an issue for cp laws and is 
therefore relevant to the present discussion. The first point to make in defence of  cp laws
is that the problem of  counterfactuals is not unique to cp laws and is found in apparently 
non-cp laws in the natural sciences (Fodor 1991, Pietroski and Rey 1995). Lange for 
example discusses Boyle’s law:
When Boyle’s law was discovered, for example, scientists must have understood its 
ceteris-paribus clause. But they did not know all of  the factors that can cause gases to 
deviate from PV = k. They had not yet justified the kinetic-molecular theory of  
gases. They did not know that the forces exerted by gas molecules upon each other, 
the molecules’ sizes, their adhesion to the container walls, the container’s shape, and 
a host of  other petty influences cause departures from PV = k. So in discovering 
that PV = k, ceteris paribus, scientists couldn’t have discovered that PV = k holds 
when the gas is ‘ideal’ in the above respects. Rather, the ceteris-paribus clause in 
                                                                                                                                              
to investigate c.p. laws, regardless of whether anyone has developed a satisfactory semantics for c.p. 
law-statements’ (Rupert 2007, p.2).
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Boyle’s law covers the ‘disturbing influences’ recognized by scientists when 
discovering the law (Lange 2002, pp.411-412).
Lange is making the epistemic and pragmatic point that even with so-called strict laws, 
there is a process where scientists can come to understand potential interfering factors, 
something which requires they work with a law as a cp law, where interfering conditions are 
not fully ‘filled in’ (because not discovered yet). There is not an obvious upper time limit to
fill in interfering factors and if  there were such an imposition, we would risk rejecting 
genuine law candidates.
What the above shows is that the problem of  counterfactuals does not only apply 
to the cp laws of  the social sciences and so Mitchell’s implication that unless one can 
specify all present and future interfering factors then cp laws are not feasible seems too 
strong. If  all present and future interfering factors were somehow filled-in, we would not 
have a cp law at all because we would no longer have any cetera, simply a well-defined set of  
antecedents. As Lange’s example suggests, this demand must be too strong, for Mitchell’s
position appears to rule out that we might rationally maintain a law in the face of  a surprise 
from nature. Surprises from nature are just that -surprising- and impossible to rule out. It is 
important to remember that scientists have to work with laws that are not ‘filled in’ as if  
this were not the case and if we followed Mitchell’s suggestion, then many proposed laws 
would have a very short lifespan indeed. The problem of  counterfactuals is an issue for 
causal hypotheses in general and so is not a particular problem for cp laws within the social 
sciences.
Now to the problem of  confirmation. It is clear that (cp) Ax->Bx & Bx, while 
being consistent with the cp law, does not allow us to discount Cx, Dx, Ex etc. as the cause 
where (cp) Cx/Dx/Ex->Bx. For example, let us say that a particular change in the 
phonemic system of  English (Bx) can be explained by Zipf ’s law of ease of  articulation 
(Ax) and mimicry of  prestige forms (Cx). It may not seem that one can choose between Ax 
and Cx as to the cause of  Bx. If  we had no grounds upon which to decide between 
competing cp laws as explanations of  events, then the problem of  confirmation would be 
damaging. This problem is made clearer if  we consider that events are almost always
polygenic and if  they were not then science would be considerably simpler. In the case of  
the natural sciences, the causal closure offered by laboratory conditions allows for the 
possibility that causal influences can be determined in terms of  their respective influence 
and that one can test a causal hypothesis without interference from other factors. As these 
conditions are not available to the social sciences, neither is that possibility. The problem 
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of  counterfactuals does then look formidable. 
One proposed solution is to construe the semantics of  cp laws as stating what 
normally happens (Schurz 1995, 2001, Silverberg 1996). Schurz argues that a law such as (cp) 
Ax->Bx should be reconstructed as Ax->Bx where ‘->’ is a normic operator. He explains,
[T]he indefinite CP-clause is understood as a normality clause that does not make a 
separate antecedent-conjunct but is implicitly contained in the normic conditional 
operator…[normic laws] imply a statistical normality condition and hence have 
empirical content and can be used for probabilistic predictions (Schurz 2001, 
p.369).
This would defuse the problem of  confirmation as probabilistic laws do not commit 
themselves to specifying cause in an event where the antecedent condition (Ax) is present. 
They simply hold that where Ax, there is probability p>0.5 of  Bx occurring. In the case of  
normic-cp laws, a requirement that they be distinguished when an event occurs which is 
consistent with more than one of  them is not applicable. This move defuses the problem 
of  counterfactuals as a probabilistic law allows for a specified degree of  counterfactual 
instances within a data set without being disconfirmed. The problem with this move is that 
the construal of  cp laws as normic collapses any distinction between cp laws and 
probabilistic laws. Therefore it is hard to see how this provides a defence of cp laws rather 
than an abandonment of  them, as there is little to distinguish the two. Though Schurz 
might justifiably claim to be clarifying the semantics of  cp laws rather than dropping them,
in doing so he removes an important aspect of  them: their claim to explain why something 
happens. As such, normic-cp laws cannot effectively answer the problem of  confirmation 
or counterfactuals as they do not look like cp laws at all, they look like probabilistic laws.   
As well as this, the idea that cp laws should tell us about what normally holds raises 
a doubt about their value to scientific practice and theorising. For example, take society S. 
All the members of  S exercise regularly and eat a balanced diet but also smoke. It is a true 
statement that ‘cancer is a rare disease in S’ with respect to the lifetime probability of a 
member of  S developing cancer (<0.5). For S then, it is untrue that ‘smoking normally 
causes cancer’ and so the implicit normic rider in, (cp) Px->Qx where Px is ‘smoking’ and 
Qx is ‘cancer’ is falsified. The interpretation of S that we want to give is that eating a 
balanced diet and regular exercise prevents cancer and so while ‘smoking causes cancer’ is 
true, its influence is masked by the influence of other factors. In S, smoking is not a very 
effective cause of  cancer, though it still has efficacy in causing cancer. If  we want to hold on to 
accounts of  this kind (and I strongly suspect that we do), a normic interpretation of  cp 
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laws will not suffice as it cannot account for anything that does not normally happen and
so we would be forced to reject the claim ‘smoking causes cancer’ for society S.    
While I disagree with the normic view of  cp laws, Schurz’s view raises an important 
point. This is that there do appear to be cp laws that concern what normally happens. The 
rise in popularity of  far-right parties normally leads to an increase in race-related attacks, 
printing money normally leads to inflation, murdering a spouse normally leads to 
imprisonment. Without these and many other normal happenings which justify the 
expectations of  agents, social life would be impossible and this gives some plausibility to
normic-cp laws. Though in spite of  this plausibility, there are many things that normally 
happen, and many things that don’t normally happen. If  we want the things that don’t 
normally happen to stand any chance of  being treatable by a ceteris paribus clause or 
explainable at all, then a normic interpretation of  them is inadequate. 
I return now to the problem of  confirmation for cp laws that are not normative. I 
admitted before that due to the polygenic nature of  events and the open system which 
constitutes the social science’s explanatory domain, there is no clear way of  recognising an 
undisturbed instance of  a cp law. One may take this to mean that the problem of  
confirmation is fatal for cp laws, but while this characterisation of cp laws is accurate, it
does not warrant their rejection. One thing to consider is that if  cp laws are viewed 
through a deducivistic prism where rational belief in them consists in every other possible 
causal factor being ruled out, then we are simply requiring that cp laws not be cp laws and
so beg the question (cf. discussion of  the problem of  counterfactuals above). The issue 
then is about the availability of  good reasons for citing an antecedent as the cause of  the 
consequent when there are other competing antecedents available. 
Let me elaborate with the following example. A recent Guardian article on the 2011 
London riots cites a government report which claims that the riots were the result of  a 
number of  factors; distrust of  police, unemployment and disaffection of  some rioters from 
wider society
45
. If  such cp laws were suggested as, ‘(cp) unemployment causes civil unrest’ 
and ‘(cp) distrust of  police leads to civil unrest’, then one would not on the face of  it be 
able to decide if  these cp laws were confirmed in the instance of  the London riots because 
there appears no way of  attributing causal influence and there is no way to develop a test 
which tells us when an undisturbed case of  a cp law is realised. In so far as the explanation
relies upon cp laws, should one reject the findings of  the report as unscientific and 
incredible?
                                                
45
Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/05/anger-police-fuelled-riots-study. Accessed 
23/3/2012.  
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Such a conclusion would miss the point about explanations in the social sciences
and what it misses, I argue, motivates the rejection of  the problem of  confirmation. 
Explanations of  the above kind look vulnerable to the problem of  confirmation because 
they are framed outside the context of  any canon of  research (say into the Brixton riots or
LA riots). Though reasons for discounting one cause over another, or seeing a cause as 
effective in a particular context are many, congruence with other data, explanatory 
adequacy, rational reconstruction of  the event, induction concerning the (non)presence of  
other factors in similar situations and the ability to motivate interesting research 
programmes are (still disputable) criteria used in assessing laws
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in both the natural and 
social sciences. Despite what is seen as the problematic quality of  cp laws in their not being 
easily confirmable or refutable, they are not arbitrary. We can see this if we consider that,
‘(cp) oaks cause an increase in neologisms’ or ‘(cp) watching cricket causes psychotic 
episodes’ are never proposed. This is because such proposals lack intelligibility; we cannot
imagine how they might be true. These points support the idea that the problem of  
confirmation is not fatal to cp laws.
Recall my example of  language change. While only an outline, it is not far-fetched 
as mimicry and ease of  articulation are often cited as reasons for sound change (Saussure 
2006 [1922], Aitchison 2001, cf. 3.2). In this case, it appeared that there was no rational way 
of choosing between Ax and Cx as the cause of  Bx. Though without what might be 
relevant context (the speech community may have no prestige form, brevity in speech may 
be government policy), such an example is bound to be vulnerable to the problem of  
confirmation and this appears to be the case with many cp laws because, as statements, they 
are given without a specified context. But as statements given without specified contexts,
we might be doing one of  two things. As Earman et al suggest, we might have a ‘pragmatic 
reason for producing a CP law-statement, rather than [an] epistemic reason for believing in 
the existence of  a CP law’ (Earman et al 2002, p.296). That is, a cp clause might be used in 
the same way we might say ‘stuff ’ rather than list the full contents of  our shopping basket 
in a conversation about our activities. This is innocuous shorthand. Another thing we 
might be doing though is producing a cp law that, pragmatics aside, is contextually 
impoverished. In this case we might well reject the cp law, but this does not mean that
within a specified context and canon of  research there can be good reason to believe in the 
explanations from open-systems of  polygenic events that are presented with a ceteris paribus 
rider. 
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As a last note here, it is important that we not resort to a default scepticism because 
of  lack of  deductive certainty or surety obtainable from laboratory experiments where an 
event occurs which is a confirming instance of  a cp law. Again this begs the question 
against cp laws and could also represent a double standard, for as we saw in the case of  
Boyle’s Law, some natural scientific hypotheses survive in the face of  the same issues.
I now move to the problem of  vacuity. The problem of  vacuity is the most 
discussed and the most difficult of  the problems facing cp laws (Pietrosky and Rey 1995, 
Mumford 1998, Mitchell 2002) and to make the issue clearer, I wish to separate two 
concerns involved in the problem of  vacuity. These are:
(i) cp laws allow for ad hoc universal generalisations.
(ii) cp laws are non-explanatory tautologies. 
For (i), the worry is that acceptance of  cp laws gives one free reign to stipulate universal 
generalisations. This makes cp laws useless to science as they lose the ability to distinguish a 
putatively true causal claim from a false one or an accident from a causal connection. Any 
cp law I invent ‘(cp) oaks cause an increase in neologisms’ is universally true by dint of  the 
cp clause and while this is clearly not the intention of  anyone proposing a cp law, it 
nevertheless fails to stop such universals from being posited and cp laws are therefore 
vacuous.
While cp laws do not block the proposal of  ad hoc universals, they do not licence 
the belief  in any universal I might invent in a way that would make them all vacuous. If  I 
believe in at least one cp law, I may still rationally deny the truth of  other cp laws and if  I 
can do this, then the complaint that cp laws licence ad hoc universals is not damaging to cp 
laws simpliciter. Let us use an analogy. I may hold that no word in and of  itself  is racist and 
therefore deny the idea, say, that no non-black person can ever use the word ‘nigger’ in a 
way which is not racially offensive. Rather, I suggest, it is the use that people put the word 
to that matters. Now let us say that the (white) leader of  a political party uses the N-word 
in the context of  suggesting that black people are to blame for the moral degeneracy of  the 
nation. When called a racist because of  his use of  a racist word, he responds by pointing 
out that he did not use a racist word for there are no racist words, just words used in a 
racist way. Here, the political leader is using the licence given him by my position which is 
roughly, ‘no word is racist, only the use words are put to’. Some may draw the inference 
that because they believe the political leader to be a racist and to be using words that are 
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racist, then I must be a racist, because my position licences the use of  such words and a 
defence of  their use. My position ‘no word is racist, only the use words are put to’ might 
then be accused of  being a racist position because it licences ad hoc defences of  racism, for
one can always say that one is not being racist. To this I would respond that my position 
does nothing of  the sort. My position might give racists an excuse to indulge their racism 
(which is regrettable), but the real issue is with our analysis of  the speech of  those that use 
such terms and in what context. If  we can beg a question here and say that the leader of  
the political party was in fact being racist because of  the way in which he was using terms 
which are often used in racist ways, then we can see that his defence is a sham and it is not 
my position, but his illegitimate use of  my position, that is the problem. 
I argue that this is the situation with cp laws licensing ad hoc universal 
generalisations. Cp clauses do licence ‘(cp) oaks cause an increase in neologisms’ or ‘(cp) 
ionic bonding causes nuclear fission’ but cp laws do not stop nonsense from being false
and from those that support cp laws rejecting such nonsense. Such a claim is not supported
by any research, it does not bear up to any rational reconstruction of  how oaks might cause 
what the statement claims and so on. As with any bad (unsupported, unintelligible) 
hypothesis, it should be barred from being a working hypothesis. As with discussion of  the 
problem of  confirmation, the issue again concerns the availability of  good reasons for 
citing an antecedent as the cause of  the consequent in a particular instance. Cp laws are 
open to abuse in a way that exceptionless and universal laws derived from the D-N model 
are not but that we can in principle distinguish abusive and non-abusive cases means that 
licensing ad hoc universal generalisations is not a problem.
Now to the idea (ii) that cp laws are non-explanatory tautologies. Pietrosky and Rey
characterise the problem like this:
There is a legitimate worry that appeals to cp-clauses render the nomic statements 
they modify somehow vacuous or unacceptably circular. In particular, if  ‘cp, F => 
G’ means merely that ‘F => G’ is true in those circumstances in which there are no 
instances of  F and not G, then ‘cp-laws’ look to be strictly tautologous. True, but 
presumably not explanatory laws in an empirical science (Pietrosky and Rey 1995, 
p.87).
As with other responses to problems with cp laws, defenders sometimes stress that all or 
many laws are cp and so shift the pressure off  the social sciences specifically and onto the
sciences in general: ‘[it] allows them to proceed without worry that they are focusing on 
some peculiar and, perhaps, undesirable feature of the special sciences’ (Earman et al. 2002, 
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p.283). The laws of  physics have exceptions and our predictions using them fallible 
(Cartwright 1983, Bhaskar 2008) and there are laws in the natural sciences which rarely or 
never apply in events in the world as freefall does not occur in frictionless environments, 
receptacles containing gases are not uniform etc. Such observations lead some defenders 
of  cp laws (Morreau 1999, Lange 2002) to claim that they ‘go all the way down’ and that all 
laws contain ceteris paribus clauses. The brothers-in-guild argument goes like this:
P1: Any law with an unspecified antecedent is vacuous.
P2: All laws have unspecified antecedents.
C: All laws are vacuous. 
Defenders point to the unpalatable conclusion as a reason to accept that laws can have 
unspecified antecedents without being vacuous and so cp laws are not irredeemably 
vacuous. It looks like if we do not accept this we are forced to accept that laws are not
useful in explaining and/or predicting events in the world because they are vacuous. 
As a response to the problem of  vacuity, this move is not effective. For the sake of  
argument, let us assume that cp laws do ‘go all the way down’ and we reject C. The 
defender of  cp laws in this case has got their way in showing that cp laws cannot be strictly 
vacuous because there are cp laws in the natural sciences and they are very useful. This
however does not prevent cp laws from being near vacuous (Schurz 2002). It does not 
matter if  all laws contain a cp clause, what matters is how effective and informative laws 
are as tools for prediction and explanation and it is not controversial that the laws of  the 
natural sciences are useful. We can gain knowledge of  causal connections through 
laboratory experiments by creating (relatively) closed environments and can apply this 
knowledge to contexts where we know enough about the presence of  other causal 
influences to make successful predictions. It is acknowledged that this kind of  knowledge 
and predictive success is lacking in the social sciences
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and that causation within the social 
realm is more complex than in the areas studied by the natural sciences. If  the aim is to 
defuse the worry there is something about cp laws in the social sciences that makes them 
especially vulnerable, then the brothers-in-guild argument does not achieve this.   
An explanation of  why cp laws in the social sciences may be vacuous or near 
vacuous even if all laws are cp ‘at bottom’, is that the subject matter of  the social sciences
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With the notable exception of economics. Though as MacIntyre (1981) has shown, the accuracy of 
predictions by economists are notoriously poor, despite an institutionalised assumption that economics 
is predictive.
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is so ‘messy’ or causally complicated that one cannot disentangle the causal matrix.
Mumford puts the problem this way:
The possible background conditions cannot be excluded in a finite list that is 
appended to the conditional. This is because there is no finite list that could name 
all such possible conditions in which the manifestation is prevented. To state that 
the excluded background conditions are any conditions which interfere with the 
disposition manifestation is to render the conditional trivial (Mumford 1998, p88).
While we have already seen concerns about the ‘filling in’ (here ‘finite list’) of  antecedents,
Mumford emphasises the fact that this leads to cp laws being trivial, or non-explanatory 
tautologies. This makes the connection between the problems of  vacuity, counterfactuals 
and confirmation clear because all the problems are related to our failure to identify
background conditions: either conditions interfering with ‘(cp) Ax->Bx’, or those 
conditions we cannot discount as causally responsible for Bx, or those regarding which we 
do not know their influence on Bx. Failure here leads to the semantics of  cp laws being 
construed as vacuous or near-vacuous, though it is an open question whether ‘filled in’ cp 
laws are cp laws at all. 
As a final point here, the link between idealisation and the vacuity problem is also
important. As I pointed out before, something that makes cp laws attractive is that they 
offer conceptual closure that makes causal connections salient (Kowalenko 2009). Though
this appears problematic when they are interpreted as being, ‘a vehicle of  such abstractions
[those of the natural sciences]. Metaphorically: cp-clauses are cheques written on the bank 
of  independent theories’ (Pietrosky and Rey 1995, p.89). The danger is that such cheques
become blank cheques which produce idealisations so abstract as to be unhelpful in 
investigating the nature of  objects, leaving them open to the change of gerrymandering 
conditions to suit theoretical purposes
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. Such blank cheques are indeed vacuous or near 
vacuous. 
So where are we with cp laws in the social sciences? I have argued that the 
problems of  confirmation and counterfactuals are not fatal for cp laws in the social 
sciences and that cp laws cannot be considered normic as these are no different from 
probabilistic laws and are also non-explanatory. In consideration of  cp laws as idealisations, 
they run the risk of  being blank cheques leading to vacuity and as there is no prospect of  
having ‘filled in’ antecedents or in creating causally closed environments, cp laws in the 
social sciences look considerably shakier than their natural-scientific counterparts, even if  
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76
we agree that some or even many laws of  the natural sciences contain a cp rider. 
2.2.2 Cp laws and causal powers
Are cp laws in the social sciences to be discarded as vacuous? Is the caution toward the 
social sciences and social causation by some linguists justified in light of  the problems 
besetting an influential way of  construing causal claims in the social sciences? I want to 
argue that cp laws are not vacuous and the general pessimism shown by Lass, Chomsky and 
others is unjustified. This requires that we think differently about cp laws and the way in 
which I suggest we do so may for some constitute a rejection of  them. I suggest that we 
consider causal statements in the social sciences as statements about power. Powers are 
sometimes known as ‘dispositions’ (Mumford 1998) or ‘tendencies’ (Bhaskar 1979, 2008), 
but in the present context these distinctions are of  no import. Seeing cp laws either as 
power ascriptions (Kusch 2005) or inadequate representations of  power ascriptions 
(Cartwright 2002, Molnar 2003) is not new but what I hope to show is that the 
interpretation of  cp laws as power ascriptions retains the advantages that make cp laws 
attractive but does not suffer from their problems. Ascription of  causal power consists in a 
number of  theses. Basically, the notion of a ‘power’ captures the idea that an object 
possesses a causal potential (which forms the antecedent in the formulation of  a law) that 
can lead to a particular event (the consequent). Powers are transfactually efficacious and 
can be exercised despite not empirically realised (the attractive force of  one magnet may be 
disguised by that of  another). Also, powers can remain unexercised. For example, a car has 
the power to go 60mph, but when stationary it is not exercising this power and a store 
manager may have the power to fire an employee, but may not do so. Like cp laws, 
conditionals implied by power ascriptions are defeasible propositions and acceptance of  
them implies rejection of  the idea that causal statements can only be maintained by the 
postulation of  nomically necessary exceptionless laws.
Power ascriptions make different claims from cp laws as cp laws quantify over 
events, whereas powers quantify over properties. If  cp laws are taken to be universally 
quantified propositions describing a strict nomic regularity between events then they are 
vacuous because their predictions about events are exception-riddled and it is not possible 
to fully specify the background conditions under which they would be realised. While I 
have argued that the requirement for fully ‘filled in’ background conditions begs the 
question against cp laws, such a mistake is understandable if  one views a law as a strict 
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regularity of  event-types. If  a law is just a description of  a regularity of  events then the
only way to judge that law is at the level of  events; a reason one finds very few strict laws in 
nature (Cartwright 1983). As the history of  logical positivism has attested, this often leads 
to scepticism about induction and causation in the social sciences (cf. 1.3.2).  
As this view of  laws motivates scepticism, it is plausible that a different view of  
laws will affect how sceptical one is about conditional causal statements. And as laws 
relating to dispositions do not quantify over events, we have reason not to be as sceptical as 
if  we consider laws as quantifying over events. One reason for this expectation is because
the fact that dispositions are not always realised at the level of  events is fundamental to our 
everyday existence; we cover the fragile wine glasses in bubble wrap when moving, at times 
of  high demand for rented housing governments can impose rent caps and soldiers wear 
armor. If  this is true and we have less reason to be sceptical, then we also have a reason to 
reject the problem of  vacuity as being lethal because there cannot be a requirement to 
specify all possible conditions. Where this complaint was understandable against cp laws 
seen as conjunctions of  events, it is not if  cp laws are seen as power ascriptions. 
Kowalenko explains the association between powers and cp laws as follows:
Given that the laws of  nature cannot lie, any successful metaphysical account must 
allow that laws relate not to particulars, but dispositions. Non-strict laws fit 
comfortably with this world picture: dispositions are underlying states that remain
constant across varied changes that are visible manifestations, and they are 
therefore ideal candidates for the true subject matter of  ceteris-paribus laws
(Kowalenko 2009, p.191). 
Happy fit between cp laws and power ascriptions however is not an argument that one 
should accept powers. At this point I present a promissory note concerning belief  in
powers and I will cover this subject in detail in the next section. Though seeing cp laws as 
power ascriptions does not motivate the same level of  scepticism when considering 
conventional cp laws, it also avoids the problem of  vacuity in other ways. Unlike 
conventional cp laws, power ascriptions are not conditionals (though they entail 
conditionals). Cartwright claims that the power ascription ‘smoking has the capacity to 
cause cancer’, 
[I]s a precise claim. It states a matter of  fact that is either true or not; it is not 
vague; and it has no ceteris paribus clause that needs filling in…More central to 
objections, it is testable, it makes predictions, and it entails regularities in the course 
of  events, in this case statistical regularities’ (Cartwright 2002, p.430).
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Insofar as power ascriptions are not conditionals they are not vacuous. They do not idealise
or abstract from other causal factors, they state that the antecedent has the power to cause 
the consequent. As such they do not have or require ‘filled in’ antecedents and are not 
directly vulnerable to the charge of  vacuity. Still, it will be argued, power ascriptions are
ultimately vulnerable to the problem of  vacuity because they imply conditional statements:
a power ascription that X can cause P implies that X will cause P in given circumstances. 
Mumford recognises this issue and responds by arguing that power ascriptions represent 
context-relative ideal conditions where the consequent would be met. I quote at length as 
Mumford raises a number of  issues present throughout my discussion of  causation and cp 
laws.  
Disposition ascriptions are made for a reason. The ideal conditions that facilitate 
the manifestation of  the disposition are thus expected to be ones which are not 
realised only in exceptional circumstances. If  such ideal conditions were 
exceptional, relative to the context of  the disposition ascription, then there would 
be little utility in making the ascription…In making an appropriate and useful 
disposition ascription I am saying that, in ordinary conditions for the present 
context, if  a particular antecedent is realised, a particular manifestation usually 
follows (Mumford 1998, p.89).
This might appear to fall back on the idea that conditional casual claims should be seen as 
statements of  what normally happens (Silverberg 1996, Schurz 2002). I have argued against 
a probabilistic construal of  cp laws and while Mumford’s position has some ostensible 
similarity, there are differences that make Mumford’s position tenable. A problem with 
probabilistic cp laws was that they appeared not to account for unusual events, but this is 
not the case with Mumford’s position. If  power ascriptions are context relative then it is 
not problematic to discuss what might happen in an unusual context, so long as the context 
is specified. Bear markets are not common, but we do talk about typical events and 
expectations within the context of  a Bear market (wealthy long-term investors buy up vast
amounts of  what is deemed ‘cheap’ stock). Also, I argued probabilistic cp laws were non-
explanatory as they only stated a probability and it is not clear how a probability is 
explanatory. Mumford’s position is explanatory as power ascriptions require that we can tell 
an intelligible and cogent story about how a power can cause that which it is directed 
towards (see 2.3). 
Mumford’s position avoids the problem of  vacuity by arguing that conditionals are 
met in normal circumstances relevant to a particular context. He argues that ‘For any set S 
stating a list of  such conditions, there is always the possibility of  some interfering 
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condition C which renders the entailed conditional false…the set of  ideal conditions can 
thus only be assumed to be unremarkable for the context of  the disposition ascription’ 
(Mumford 1998, p.92). This means that filled-in conditionals are beside the point, as each 
power ascription must be looked at on its own merits and within context. One might reject 
the notion of  ‘normal’ or ‘ideal’ conditions as too vague, but the context relativity of  such 
claims means that it is not possible, in a general sense, to specify ‘normal’. Indeed to do 
such a thing is just what Mumford would reject as leading to vacuity. 
It could be claimed that I have not offered a defence but a rejection of cp laws in 
favour of  something else. To this I would respond that I am not concerned if  we keep cp 
laws whilst understanding that they are power ascriptions or we drop ceteris paribus 
references to avoid confusion. Power ascriptions share enough in common with cp laws
(they are transfactually efficacious, tolerate non-confirming instances, make a causal 
connection salient) that they occupy a similar place in the philosophical spectrum and so, I 
am not concerned what name is used. Rather, what is important is that we defuse problems 
and offer an understanding of causation in the social realm.  
Turning back to linguistics, what might we provisionally conclude? In chapter 1 I 
argued that the Formalist Attitude offers an unsatisfactory account of  language as an 
object of  knowledge and fails to make it a sufficiently closed object. This inability to close 
off  the theoretical domain of  linguistics problematised the idea that linguistics be 
considered a natural science or a social science especially associated with the natural 
sciences. In 2.1 I argued that one reason for considering linguistics a natural science in spite 
of  problems with the Formalist Attitude was due to pessimism about understanding social 
causality. In considering Lass’s position with reference to language change, it was seen that 
Lass shared this pessimism, seeing social phenomena as inexplicable and not ‘caused’: 
something which led to him supporting the deductivist account of  causation indicative of
the Formalist Attitude. 
To show that the pessimism of  linguists is not justified, I have argued that one 
scientifically and philosophically popular way of  understanding and expressing causality in 
the social realm, by means of ceteris paribus clauses and laws, is more robust than opponents 
of  cp laws suggest. I have suggested that cp laws are best seen as power ascriptions, which 
is a plausible way of avoiding pessimism about causality in the social realm and in the next 
section I will do more to defend powers. I consider there to be little reason to think the 
Formalist Attitude a viable position in linguistics. As the social realm is not as a forbidding 
and unscientific a place as some may fear, it is reasonable to consider that such things as 
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speakers, speech, time and social structures have a place within linguistics: in explaining the 
nature of  language, language change, knowledge of  language and what kind of  a science 
linguistics is. By the end of  this thesis I will have answered these questions, but in light of  
my recent discussion of  powers, I wish to consider the idea that language is itself  a power 
or disposition of  speakers.   
2.3 Language as a power: An answer to ‘What is a language?’
The question of  what language is and what is the appropriate object of  knowledge of  
linguistics has been central to this thesis. As has been stated before, the object of  
knowledge of  a discipline determines to a considerable degree how a discipline sees itself
in terms of  its theoretical purview, what kind of  science it is considered and the questions 
it can be expected to ask and answer. So far, I have argued for a way of  seeing language 
where as Halliday once put it, ‘instead of  rejecting what is messy, we accept the mess and 
build it into a theory’ (Halliday 1984, p.38). Such a view is not suspicious of social 
causation and recognises the importance of  speakers and communication to language. This 
section continues this by asking the question ‘What is a language?’
My argument moves in three stages. In the first part I argue that language is a
power of  speakers to understand and be understood by other speakers of  that language
and use criteria developed in George Molnar (2003) to support my position. I then show 
some advantages of  this approach and argue that this power can be used as a basis for 
language typology which makes sense of  the intuitive responses of  speakers about the 
language that they speak. In essence I will argue when speakers talk about the language they
speak, they are picking out those powers that they and others possess. In the second 
section I consider some problems raised by my position and in the third I consider some 
more advantages that make my position attractive. I will argue that as my position avoids 
problems and possesses several attractive features, it is a good answer to ‘what is a 
language?’ and in light of  the failures of  the Formalist Attitude, offers a reasonable 
alternative that is in keeping with taking speech and speakers seriously.
2.3.1 Language as a power
I claim that language is the power of  a speaker to communicate
49
with another speaker of  a
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I accept that there is more to communication than verbal communication, but use ‘communication’ here 
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language. A monoglot speaker of  language La has the power to communicate with another 
speaker of  La but not with a monoglot speaker of  Lb, who has the power to communicate 
with other speakers of  Lb. This is why we need subtitles in some films, why we might only 
be able to read Don Quixote in translation and why I once disappointed a Japanese woman, 
whose need for some kind of  assistance fell on, if  not deaf, then at least uncomprehending 
ears. Seeing language as a something akin to a power has been suggested before, albeit not 
in detail. For example, in De Anima, Aristotle discusses the knowledge of  (Greek) grammar 
in terms of  a potential to speak Greek (Aristotle 1987), Kenny (1984) discusses language as 
an ability to produce and understand certain kinds of  behaviour and Morriss (2002) sees
human ‘‘power’ as a sort of  ability’ (Morriss 2002, p.48) and language among those
abilities
50
.
A preliminary point before I elaborate further. It may be objected that as I am 
providing a characterisation of  what language is, I am begging the question because I am 
stipulating that two speakers have the same language when the question is how to 
characterise ‘language’. Indeed, I am assuming that some speakers can communicate with 
one another and some cannot, but this seems such a fundamental observation that I am 
happy to assume it. What I am claiming in addition to this is that language is the power to 
communicate and I will be arguing that it is a power. There is an awkwardness which 
accompanies some power ascriptions to human beings which is not present in power 
ascriptions to inanimate objects. For example: 
1) Ben has the power to run a marathon.*
2) Water has the power to dissolve sodium.
3) Clara has the power to hire and fire. 
4) Mr Universe has the power to lift a family saloon car.
With 1 we feel more comfortable with ‘ability’, ‘is fit enough’ or ‘can’ in place of  ‘power’ or 
‘disposition’, though we are unlikely to have any scruple with 2, 3, or 4. I do not think the 
reason for this is of  philosophical importance as we can see from 3 and 4 that power 
ascriptions can apply to agents without appearing odd. The issue then is one of  convention 
and I see no problem in substituting ‘power’ in 1 for any of  the other options as they all
pick out a property within an object that has the potential to affect a change in the world. 
                                                                                                                                              
as ‘verbal communication’ because it is a prominent example of communication and clearly bears on 
language.  
50
See Morriss (2002, pp.24-25, pp.100-101).
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What matters is how we characterise ‘power’, ‘ability’ or ‘disposition’.
In what sense or senses can language be considered a power? In Powers, Molnar
identifies five features of  powers that will form the basis of  the discussion of  language as a 
power. These are: 
- Directedness. A power must be directed towards some outcome or outcomes. A power 
is a power to do something.  
- Independence. A power is not reducible to its manifestations and exists apart from those 
manifestations. A power exists even when not being manifested.  
- Actuality. A power is not the mere possibility of  a manifestation-event, but is actual in 
the same way in which common-or-garden objects are actual. 
- Intrinsicality. Powers are intrinsically properties of  their bearers. Molnar defines 
intrinsicality in this way:
F is an intrinsic property of  a iff  a’s having property F is ontologically independent of  
the existence, and non-existence, of  any contingent b such that a is wholly distinct 
from b; and a’s not having property F is ontologically independent of  the existence, 
and of  the non-existence, of  any contingent b such that a is wholly distinct from b
(Molnar 2003, pp.39-40). 
- Objectivity. This has two parts. First, powers exist irrespective of  our knowledge of  
them and second, powers are not reducible to our beliefs about them. This is especially 
interesting, and problematic, in discussion of psychological and social powers, such as 
bravery or being Prime Minister of  the United Kingdom. In such cases there is a 
tension between the first requirement of  objectivity and the need for a psychological or 
social power to be recognised by agents as a condition of  its existence. I will return to 
this as it is crucial for my account of  language as a power of  speakers.  
These features provide a useful set of  criteria by which language can be judged a power. In 
this discussion I make good on my promissory note that I would provide an account of  
why one should believe in powers. The scope of  this thesis does not allow for a 
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comprehensive account
51
though it will be made clear the broad advantages and plausibility 
of  powers. Where I have specific issues with Molnar’s treatment of  powers I will make this 
clear and argue why I think that despite some difficulties, language can be considered a 
power and further why it is a suitable way to understand causal claims in the social sciences. 
2.3.2 Aspects of  powers
- Directedness 
Powers are directed towards events: they make things happen. The consumption of alcohol 
is directed towards intoxication, honesty is directed towards truth-telling and candour, the 
brittleness of an object is directed toward that object breaking when suitably struck.  The
conceptual criteria of  a power’s identity consists in the manifestation of  that power, be that 
through direct observation or inference from explanatory gaps in our observations (e.g. the
postulation of  the gravitational force of  dark matter to explain the rotation of  galaxies). It 
is a familiar tenet that without the manifestation of  powers we would have no objects of  
knowledge at all (Mumford 1998). For example Searle, like other philosophers sees
directedness as an important characteristic of  cognition: ‘intentional states and events are 
those mental states that are directed at or about objects and states of  affairs in the world’
(Searle 2009, p.10) and like Molnar, Searle understands directedness as a condition of  
conceptual identity. As language is a possession of  individuals and plays an undeniable role 
in cognition it is then appropriate to see language within the framework of  the intentional.
But in what sense can language be considered directed?
There is a clear sense in which our pre-theoretical notions about language are 
consistent with the idea that its identity is constituted by its directedness (to what 
behaviours/events its manifestation pertains). If  I can read the Sunday Mirror or give a 
lecture at the University of  Surrey (outside of  the department of  languages), I do this 
partly in virtue of  my speaking English and my speaking English is identified in my 
performing those kinds of  behaviours. Language is used to communicate and we identify 
animals and some humans as not having language or a particular language by something 
they cannot do, inferred from behaviours that they do not exhibit. We can speak of  
language-possessing individuals as, ‘not having Greek/German/Xhosa’, implying that the 
individual cannot communicate with monoglot Greek/German/Xhosa speakers.  This 
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See Mumford (1998) and Molnar (2003). For debates around the more contentious issues within the 
theory of dispositions and powers, see Crane (ed.) (1996). 
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suggests that language has directedness in the same way as objects predicated with powers
have directedness. 
We only have language as an object of  knowledge because it is available to us 
through acts of  speech and writing, though one might worry that not all such acts are 
directed, because we sometimes speak without any communicative purpose. One possible 
way of  defusing this worry would be to state that our understanding of  language as an 
object of  knowledge rests on the recording of  very many acts of  communication or 
would-be communication (imagine the English-speaking linguist in their office saying 
grammatically correct English sentences for research purposes). If  powers are to be 
identified by their manifestations, then as all examples of  language are communicative or 
would-be communicative it is reasonable to see language as directed. Things are not this 
straightforward though. Morriss notes a distinction between what he calls ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ powers in discussing the difference between intentional acts of  speaking one’s 
language (an active power) and unintentionally understanding one’s language (a passive 
power). According to Morriss, seeing language as ability (a non-natural power) has,
the slightly unfortunate consequence that your ‘ability’ to understand your native 
language when it is spoken in your presence is not an ability at all, since you cannot 
not understand it…But nevertheless, you do understand your native language. By 
contrast, a monoglot Eskimo will not understand your native language. (Morriss
2002, p.100). 
There is a distinction because the power to speak concerns the intentional choice of  the 
agent where in understanding there is no choice. Therefore it seems that language is not
directed towards a single event-kind, for to be identified in terms of  its directionality, it 
needs to be seen as the power to speak and to understand. This suggests that language is an 
object with powers (like a sugar lump that can dissolve in water, be used as chemical energy
etc.) rather than a power of  an object and this is because the passive power of  understanding
and the active power of  speaking cannot be reduced to one another. However, I do not 
think the idea that we understand unintentionally is as obvious and clear-cut as Morriss 
claims. 
There are at least two ways in which it might be said I choose not to understand. I 
might stick my fingers in my ears and shout ‘Not listening!’ or as at various points in my 
school days, ‘switch off ’ in class so that though I can hear the teacher speaking, I am not
listening. The former example is not convincing as it is ‘interference’: analogously I might 
gag myself  to stop myself speaking. This does not offer a genuine example of  intentional 
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non-understanding, as I have prevented rather than chosen not to use my ability. In the 
latter example though it seems fair to say that I am choosing not to understand which is 
implied by the semantic difference between ‘hearing’ and ‘listening’. Still, it is difficult to 
deny that we do understand our native language unintentionally or even when we do not 
want to. I have ‘undergone’ the opinions of  racists when I would rather not listen and if  I 
catch Meatloaf ’s ‘Two out of  three ain’t bad’ on the radio I understand its overwrought and 
sentimental depiction of  unrequited love without a particular desire to do so. Also 
suggesting Morriss’ distinction is correct is the existence of receptive and expressive 
aphasia, where individuals can either produce speech but not understand it or vice versa. 
What is clear is that the power to speak one’s native language and understand it are 
connected in a more intimate way than the power of  the sugar lump to dissolve and be 
metabolised to produce chemical energy. We can see this is the case because all aphasics
speak and understand their native language before the onset of  aphasia. This is how aphasia
happens and part of  the definition of  receptive and expressive aphasia is that one loses 
part of  one’s language ability or ‘system’ (Evans and Green 2007, p.745). We cannot learn 
to speak without learning to understand or vice-versa and my example of  the hearing-not-
listening student supports the idea that the active/passive distinction is not absolute. All 
this suggests that language is a power rather than an object with powers. 
Another possible objection is that I am allowing language to be assimilated into
intentional states but that it is intentional states, not language per se, that possess 
directionality, even if language possession is important or essential for some intentional 
states. If  language does possess directionality, then it is directed toward a very large set of  
events and objects, perhaps every object or event that an intentional state is about. This 
would make it directed in a vague sense because it is directed to no manifestations in 
particular. While I would agree that we never speak for the sake of  language (see 3.2) and 
so manifestations are not directed towards what we could term ‘English/Xhosa situations’,
that does not stop manifestations being in some sense about English or Xhosa. But in what 
sense? In the sense that an English sentence is not about Xhosa and a sentence in Xhosa is 
not about English. That is, a language is directed to acts of  communication with other 
speakers of  the same language and when it is successful this is partly because speakers
share a language. While the directedness of  languages still appears broad, it is not trivial for 
we can identify manifestations of  English from manifestations of  Xhosa, even when
manifestations of  different languages are about the same subject.
It is usual that opponents of powers do not focus their attacks on the directedness 
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of  powers because directedness itself  presupposes much of  the metaphysics of  powers. To 
give a fuller account and defence of  the directedness of  language requires discussion of  
questions of  independence and objectivity. 
     
-  Independence and actualism
Independence is the thesis that powers exist apart from the manifestations they are directed 
toward or disposed to produce. It follows from the thesis of  independence that a power
may exist which is never manifested. Actualism rejects the thesis of independence and
there is a long tradition of  realists since Aristotle that have defended independence against 
actualism. The independence of  powers is rejected by actualists because there is a worry 
that as everything that exists is actual, independence permits unmanifested powers to exist 
while being non-actual. Such unmanifested powers present, it is argued, something both 
mysterious and ontologically superfluous
52
. To effectively show why actualism is false, I 
want to separate and define a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ actualism. The arguments I present in 
discussion of  independence refute weak actualism and the arguments I present later in 
discussion of  objectivity refute strong actualism.
Weak Actualism (WeA): Powers exist only when being manifested. If the power P of  
an object O is manifested at time t then O has power P at time t. Ascriptions of  
power and statements of  manifestations of  those powers are isomorphic.
Strong Actualism (StA): Powers do not exist, only happenings. 
Hume espoused WeA:
[W]hy, in other instances where those qualities have appeared, do you presume that 
the same power is also there? Your appeal to past experience gives you no help 
with this. The most it can prove is that that very object which produced a certain other 
object was at that very instant endowed with a power to do this; but it can’t prove 
that the same power must continue in the same object (Hume 1739-40 [2004] p.55).
Weak Actualism is consistent with the reality, but not the independence of  powers. In 
addition, WeA implies the impossibility of  countervailing powers preventing the 
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of Actualism’ (2005). 
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manifestation of  other powers as powers would have to exist at a time before their 
manifestation and this is rejected by WeA. On the other hand, strong actualism is 
consistent with neither the reality nor the independence of  powers. This being the case, the 
term ‘manifestation’ is not appropriate so I have opted for the neutral ‘happenings’. It is 
not clear if  StA implies the impossibility of  causal interference, though if  StA is to have a 
coherent account of  causality it would need to countenance counterfactuals. StA relies on
what Molnar calls the ‘thesis of deductivism’, which I will deal with when discussing 
objectivity. Here though it is enough to state that if  deductivism is false, strong actualism is 
not a viable position.  
It is quite natural to explain the fact that I smell the roses at time t1 and then at time 
t2 by virtue of  my olfactory senses, which are present between t1 and t2, though may not be 
active during that interval. This presents a challenge for WeA but not for StA, for the 
strong actualist can claim that rose-smelling at t1 and t2 is the result of  a psychological 
imposition of  order on unconnected events. StA then becomes a question for the 
objectivity of  powers, not of  their independence and so I will deal with StA later. For WeA 
however, the example demands an explanation. WeA holds that powers are intermittent, 
existing only when manifested. This is an odd position because it is unclear why the 
advocate of  WeA needs to talk of powers at all, as the distinction between powers and 
manifestations seems to have collapsed. Part of  what makes powers philosophically 
attractive is that they explain the occurrence of  iterable events and as WeA denies that 
powers are independent, powers lose this attractive feature. So essential is independence to 
the understanding of  powers that it is unclear if  powers are being discussed at all in WeA. 
Whatever the case, WeA appears incapable of  explaining iterable events and also offends 
against the intuition that causation is always linear. If  powers are the causal base of  their 
manifestations then it follows that they exist before the manifestations that they are the 
causal base of. WeA claims that power and manifestation are coterminous and so violates 
this requirement. 
Another issue concerns how WeA deals with our intuitions about causal 
interference. Consider a patient undergoing chemotherapy. We know through a large body 
of  double-blind studies that one of  the side effects of  chemotherapy treatment is sickness 
and nausea. To prevent sickness and nausea, it is normal for a doctor to prescribe a course 
of  anti-emetics. Now let us say that the patient undergoing chemotherapy suffers from 
sickness before they take anti-emetics and the sickness ceases or significantly reduces after 
beginning the prescription. We are likely to explain this by reference to the anti-emetics and 
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this is consistent with the thesis of  independence. This explanation though is unavailable to 
WeA because according to it, once sickness is no longer manifest, there is nothing for the 
anti-emetics to suppress. At the point where sickness stops there is also no reason to 
believe that chemotherapy has the power to cause sickness and nausea, as that power is not 
actual (though it might be in the future- who can tell?). It follows that the patient can now 
stop the course of  anti-emetics without particular fear of  the onset of  sickness and nausea. 
Presumably, the anti-emetics themselves have also now lost their power to suppress 
sickness and nausea because although the patient is not nauseous, there is nothing with the 
power to cause sickness and nausea currently being manifested. If  this is the case, there is 
another reason to stop taking anti-emetics as its power to prevent sickness is unmanifested
and hence for WeA, not a power. 
The issues raised here are mirrored in linguistics and the philosophy of  language 
and have a direct bearing upon my claim that language is a power. This can be seen in the 
argument concerning the reducibility of  knowledge of  language to the ability to speak and 
write (and presumably understand). Among those who believe that knowledge reduces to 
ability are Dummet (1993) and Kenny: ‘to know a language is just to have the ability to do 
these and similar things’ (Kenny 1984, p.138). Here it is useful to distinguish Kenny’s 
position on ‘ability’ from my own on power, as they bear some resemblance. Kenny gives 
language directionality, but refuses it independence from its manifestations in speech. For 
Kenny, it is important that language is used to communicate, but this does not permit us to
make claims about non-sensible properties (knowledge of  language) putatively possessed 
by the speaker
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. He may therefore justifiably be seen to hold WeA. Against this view 
Chomsky argues,
Suppose Jones, a speaker of  some variety of  what we call ‘English’ in informal 
usage…loses this ability because of  an injury or disease (then recovers that ability, 
say, with a drug). Note that a speaker of  “Japanese”, under the same circumstances, 
would recover Japanese, not English, with the same drug (Chomsky 2000, p.51).
Chomsky’s point against Kenny is analogous to arguments I have made against WeA above. 
For Kenny, it appears difficult to explain the situation Chomsky has described without 
reference to a distinction between knowledge and ability, analogous to power and 
manifestation respectively. It is not clear what Kenny means by ‘ability’: ‘[it is] plainly not 
ability in the quite useful normal sense of  the word’ (Chomsky 2000, p.51) as Kenny does 
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not countenance a distinction between ability and the manifestation of  that ability. Here 
too the issue of  interference is present, for while Chomsky sees language as independent in 
a power-relevant sense (as it can be masked by injury or disease), Kenny is committed to 
refusing that Jones ‘knows’ English, which fails to explain what has happened when he 
recovers. Though Chomsky is anti-actualist, it would be wrong to see him as an advocate 
of  language as a power because he does not see language as a system for communication. 
Chomsky does not argue that language is a power, only that a distinction exists between 
knowledge of  language and the ability to use language and he rejects talk of  ‘knowledge-
ability’ as a needless addition to technical vocabulary (Chomsky 2000, p.52). In stark 
contrast to Kenny, Chomsky sees what he calls language as having independence, but not 
directionality.
While I think both positions are incorrect, Chomsky’s ‘knowledge’ and Kenny’s 
‘ability’ are not mutually exclusive, but from a powers point of  view, quite compatible. The 
irreducible cognitive element of  linguistic knowledge that Chomsky wishes to preserve can 
be seen as part of  the power of  a speaker to communicate and the denial of it by Kenny 
raises the same problems for him as for WeA. On the other hand, the view that ‘language is 
not properly regarded as a system of  communication’ (Chomsky 2002, p.76) requires that
knowledge is ‘completely divorced from ability’ (Chomsky 2000, p.51) and unless we 
recognise, as Kenny does, the importance of  communication, we are left with the problem 
of  how one identifies language at all if  not by its manifestations. 
- Actuality 
There is a clear sense in which powers are actual and not the mere possibility of  particular
manifestations. Molnar argues, ‘[w]hat is not actual cannot be a cause or any part of  a 
cause. Merely possible events are not actual, and that makes them causally impotent’
(Molnar 2003, p.101). Therefore if  powers are causally potent, they have to be actual. The 
actuality of  powers is reflected in the way we talk about directedness. Powers are for things 
and to do things, i.e. to causally contribute to events through their manifestations. The 
actuality of  powers makes it possible that such-and-such events happen, but this does not 
warrant the conclusion that powers reduce to mere possibilities because if  this were the 
case, powers would be impotent.
What goes for powers generally goes for my thesis that language is a power and so 
I need not spend much time on this here. By defending powers and the claim that language 
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is a power, the actuality of  language is implied. Actuality is implied by directedness, 
independence and objectivity (discussion forthcoming) and as such, does not require
special attention if  my stance on independence and/or directedness is correct. 
- Intrinsicality and relations
A power P is intrinsic to an object O only if  it does not rely on being in relation to another 
object or power in order to exist. This is the intrinsicality condition. Something is extrinsic 
if  it relies on such a relation, be that between a single object or multiple. Molnar’s position
is that all powers are intrinsic and that what may initially look like extrinsic powers are 
reducible to intrinsic ones, so a power can never be intrinsic and relational. A well known 
candidate for an extrinsic power and one that Molnar discusses is accredited to Boyle 
(1666). This is the example of  the relation between the key and lock. It is in virtue of  the 
existence both of  the key and the lock that they have a power, namely for the lock to be 
opened by the key and for the key to open the lock. The power of  these objects appears to 
rely on a relation with another object in order to exist and so do not meet the intrinsicality 
condition. To avoid this conclusion, Molnar argues that in order for the key and lock to 
bear the relation they do, a relation that bestows a disposition upon both objects, there 
must be congruence between the objects. He explains,
Congruence is comparative. Comparatives are founded relations that supervene on 
properties of  the relata. The properties of  the lock and the key that found their 
congruence are the very ones that explain why they can interact in the functionally 
appropriate way (Molnar 2003 p.105).
Therefore putatively extrinsic powers have their ontological base in intrinsic powers:
All dispositional and extrinsic predicates that apply to an object do so by virtue of  
intrinsic powers borne by the object. All truths about the powers of  objects have 
only intrinsic properties as truthmakers (Molnar 2003, p.109).
In explaining and defending the intrinsicality of  powers, Molnar adopts a deflationary 
account of  extrinsic powers that is open to criticism. Molnar conjectures, but does not 
argue, that ‘the class of  actual powers does not include any the having of  which by one 
object depends on that object standing in some relation to another object’ (Molnar 2003. 
p.108). There are no truly extrinsic powers and talk of  them is due to the pragmatic benefit 
they have in our everyday talk. This position is in keeping with the intrinsicality condition 
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as stated by Molnar but it reveals a tension between the intrinsicality condition and 
Molnar’s deflationary account of  extrinsic powers. The tension concerns how truths about 
powers can have only intrinsic truthmakers when at least some powers appear not to fulfil 
the intrinsicality condition.
To return to the lock-and-key example. Whatever the intrinsic powers of  key K, its 
power P to unlock lock L is reliant upon the existence of  L and a relation of  congruence 
between L and K. This Molnar accepts, but stresses that such congruence is founded on 
the intrinsic powers of  K and L. But the power of  K to open L requires K standing in a 
particular relation to L in order for it to possess P which the relation describes. The 
statement ‘if  L had not existed, K would not have P’ is true and if  this is the case then K 
(and L) fail the intrinsicality condition and so cannot be truthmakers for truths about 
powers, because those powers are not intrinsic. We have an example of  something that 
looks like a power but we are not permitted to conclude this because of  Molnar’s 
intrinsicality condition. There seems to be no obvious alternative account of  the true 
statement ‘K can open L’ without reference to a power that is possessed by another object, 
and this breaks the intrinsicality condition. Now, this is not just a recapitulation of  Boyle’s 
argument for the existence of extrinsic powers, for I accept Molnar’s argument that 
extrinsic powers are founded on intrinsic powers. The problem is that we appear to have a 
case where the intrinsicality condition fails to characterise all powers.
I think this problem stems from an assumption held by Molnar that a power cannot 
be both intrinsic and relational. This subject is taken up in Westphal’s article on Hegel’s 
‘Force and Understanding’. Westphal points to two senses of  ‘intrinsic’ that he argues are 
systematically conflated in talk about powers:
One use of  the term ‘intrinsic’…is to designate a characteristic which is essential to 
a substance, so that the substance would not be what it is without that 
characteristic. Another use of  the term ‘intrinsic’ in this connection contrasts with 
‘extrinsic’ in the sense of  ‘relational’. In view of  this contrast, an ‘intrinsic’ 
characteristic is contained solely within the individual substance; it is non-
relational…conflating them [the two uses of ‘intrinsic’] generates the standard 
assumption that relational properties cannot be essential to individual substances
(Westphal 2008, p.2).
We can characterise two kinds of  intrinsicality as follows:
IntA: F is an intrinsic property of  a iff  being F is constitutive of  the identity of  a. 
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IntB: F is an intrinsic property of  a iff  F’s being F does not require that it stands in relation 
to any other object or property distinct from a.  
As Westphal makes clear, one can hold IntA without also holding IntB and this is not 
obviously philosophically contentious. Molnar distinguishes between IntA and IntB and so 
is not guilty of the equivocation or conflation suggested by Westphal. He recognises IntA 
in his definition of  an essential property (Molnar 2003, p.39) and his recognition of IntB is 
implied both by his support for IntA and his position that there are no truly extrinsic 
(relational) powers. Again: ‘the class of  actual powers does not include any, the having of  
which by one object depends on that object standing in some relation to another object’
(Molnar 2003, p.108). Molnar then is committed to denying that a power can be intrinsic
and relational and so supports both IntA and IntB, though he does not conflate them.
My disagreement with Molnar is twofold. First, there is a good argument against it 
being the case that an intrinsic power cannot be relational and second, accepting that an 
intrinsic power can be relational (accepting IntA but rejecting IntB) has philosophically 
attractive qualities. Westphal argues that if  intrinsic properties are not relational then it 
becomes ‘impossible to understand causal necessity’ (Westphal 2008, p.3), a serious charge. 
His argument goes like this. Powers are essential to objects, but in being manifested no 
power acts alone and therefore all causation is interaction (being reliant upon and acting 
with the powers of  other objects). If  one holds that intrinsic or essential characteristics
cannot be relational (IntB) then one cannot explain causal necessity as all causation appears
contingent because all causation is interaction. This idea is familiar in discussion of  powers 
and is sometimes referred to as ‘reciprocity’
54
. The thesis of  reciprocity states that a power’s 
directedness to a manifestation is not solely a result of  facts about the object that the 
power can be truly predicated of. As Martin puts it, ‘the manifestation of  a given 
dispositional state will require the cooperation of  some other dispositional states amongst 
its reciprocating partners’ (Martin in Bacon (ed.) 1993, p.183). It is certainly hard to 
describe a power without explicitly or tacitly assuming the power of  something else. The 
power of  aspirin to relieve headaches is not simply a power of  aspirin; it requires that such-
and-such be the case about human physiology, in this case the power of  the enzyme 
cylooxygenase-2 to bind with acetylsalicylic acid, the active ingredient in aspirin. The power 
of  governments to stimulate consumer spending by cutting taxes relies (among other 
things) on people’s ability to spend. Needless to say examples of  reciprocity abound.   
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Accepting that powers can be intrinsic and relational is attractive in a number of  
ways. Following Westphal, it stops our concept of  causal necessity being obscure. Also, 
acceptance dissolves any tension between the intrinsicality condition and extrinsic powers 
because we have dropped the intrinsicality condition (IntB). To repeat, the intrinsicality 
condition is the idea that a power P is intrinsic to an object O only if  it does not rely on 
being in relation to another object or power in order to exist. We can accept, contra Boyle, 
that truthmakers for propositions about powers are intrinsic but that things true about the 
powers of  object O are true only in virtue of  the intrinsic properties of  some set of
objects (O…On) which includes objects that are not O. If  we accept, contra Molnar, that the 
intrinsicality condition is false because powers can be intrinsic and relational (which the 
intrinsicality condition denies), then we avoid the problem of  falsifying the statement that 
all truths about powers have intrinsic truthmakers. 
My position is this: All truthmakers about powers have intrinsic truthmakers (here I
agree with Molnar) but all the true propositions about the powers of  object O are not
exhausted by reference to the intrinsic powers of  O. The intrinsic powers of  other objects
can be truthmakers for truths about the powers of  O and vice versa. We can maintain 
Molnar’s position that relational powers are founded in the essential properties of  objects, 
but deny that relational powers are reducible to the essential properties of  single objects. 
This improves on Molnar’s position and is consistent with its general thrust, giving us the 
best of  both worlds: powers are linked to the nature of  objects and we can also accept the 
intuitive appeal of  the idea that there are powers that exist in virtue of  a relation or 
relations to another object or objects. 
Part of  my motivation for arguing that powers can be intrinsic and relational is 
because my definition of  language implies that it is a relational power and if  one accepts 
the intrinsicality condition, then my understanding of language would not qualify as a 
power. The idea that speaker A with property P only has the power to communicate with 
speaker B if  speaker B also has that P makes this clear. Language is a power where a 
relation holds between some speakers and not between others and this relation holds due 
to facts that are true for sets of  speakers, not for a single speaker. If  my criticism of  
Molnar is correct then language possession can also be seen as an intrinsic property of  
speakers. The criticism defuses a tension in Molnar’s theory that does not come at a high 
price for the theory globally, so my using of  Molnar’s criteria for powers is not jeopardised. 
-Objectivity and the ontology of  social entities
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X is objective if  it does not rely for its existence on any actual or potential knower of  X. 
Defences of  the objectivity of  powers in the face of empiricist attack are common and I 
do not intend to offer a defence of  what has been said better elsewhere (Collier 1994, 
Crane (ed.) 1996). I want to offer something more modest and pertinent to my argument 
that language is a power that involves saying something about powers that are non-natural 
or social. This is important because like Morriss (2002), I see language as a social power.
In order that I can go on to argue for a distinction between natural and social 
powers, I first want to establish that there are objective natural powers. I will only focus on 
rebutting anti-objectivist arguments against powers that make the criticism that natural 
powers are anthropocentric concepts, not objective properties. I do this because social 
powers putatively differ from natural powers in that social powers are ‘human-made’ and so
without a defence of  the non-anthropocentric status of  natural powers an account of  
social powers which did not immediately submit to an anti-realist or sceptical position 
would be difficult to sustain. The position I wish to attack is accredited to Hume but has a 
number of  modern adherents (Van Fraassen 1980, Rorty 1998). The claim is that our 
causal language and assumptions about causal connections between objects and events 
make the world intelligible to us, but causation cannot be validly inferred from the 
succession of  events given to us by experience
55
. This is also the case for our belief  that we 
as agents are possessors of  powers. Powers are not objective but rather are anthropocentric 
projections; necessary for intelligibility but illusory. Hume argues, 
An act of  volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our 
imagination. This influence of  the will we know by consciousness. Hence we 
acquire the idea of  power or energy; and are certain, that we ourselves and all other 
intelligent beings are possessed of  power […] But the means, by which this is 
effected; the energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of  
this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that this must for ever escape 
our most diligent enquiry (Hume 1975 [1777], pp.64-65). 
For Hume, it is not only in our experience of  the external world, but also in our experience 
of  our own consciousness that we are unwarrantedly led to be ‘certain’ that there are such 
things as powers because the way we reason about both is the same. In light of  this, for 
Molnar, the challenge for the supporter of  powers is this:
To deduce power statements from observation statements one would need 
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additional premises, but these are not available from observation alone. 
Consequently, we have no (purely) experiential grounds for asserting singular causal 
statements, or for prescribing powers to particulars on a single occasion (Molnar
2003, p.118).
Molnar offers an attack on Hume by pointing out that Hume accepts the Thesis of  
Deductivism (TD), exposited by Stove. Stove explains TD like this:
A being who knew only the premises of  an invalid argument…would never, if  he 
were completely rational, invest the conclusion with any positive degree of  belief  at 
all. All invalid arguments, that is, are completely irrational: or there are no different 
degrees of  conclusiveness or reasonableness among invalid arguments (Stove 1970, 
p.77).
TD is the thesis that a judgment is only rationally supported by that which entails the truth 
of  the judgment. Molnar’s approach is not to attack TD, but rather to show the destructive 
consequences of  its application to various questions and argue that TD blocks the 
employment of  some important forms of  argument. To use one of  Molnar’s examples,
P1) If  the past is knowable, then it is knowable a priori or it is knowable a 
posteriori.
P2) The past is not knowable a priori.
P3) Nothing in our observations entails the reality of  the past.
P4) (TD) A judgment is only rationally supported by that which entails the truth of  
the judgment.       
C) The past is not knowable. (Molnar 2003, p.124).     
Accepting TD means that we are compelled to throw the baby out with the bathwater as 
TD is ‘such an unrestrained generator of  sceptical conclusions that it violates the principle 
of selective anthropocentricism’ (Molnar 2003, p.124). If  we consider this alongside my 
argument that Hume assumes something like powers (iterable acts of  volition) in 
supporting his sceptical position, then we have good grounds to reject TD.  We can reject
the argument that powers are not objective and that they are anthropocentric projections. 
We might accept the objectivity of  natural powers, but there are problems for allying my 
argument that language is a power with the claim that it is objective as there is a serious 
question as to whether social powers are objective. When considering objects of  natural 
science such as gravity and the elements as paradigmatically objective entities, there are a 
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number of  differences between these and putative social entities that pose questions about 
the objectivity of  social entities. Here again is a standard definition of  ‘objective’:
Ob: x is objective if  it does not rely for its existence on any potential or actual 
knower of  x. 
In light of  this definition, social entities and social powers are not objective because a social 
power is something which is maintained by mutual belief  and entails the existence of  
people, so social entities and powers are strongly anthropocentric
56
. Social entities falsify 
the conditions for objectivity as their existence relies upon epistemic facts about human 
beings. To illustrate, let us say that an alien race puts the world to sleep and then wipes 
everyone’s memories of  the concept ‘marriage’. The aliens then remove any reference to 
marriage in literature, painting, the legal system, etc. When the world awakes, what reason 
would an independent observer have to think that marriage exists in the world? It is hard to 
resist the conclusion that marriage would have ceased to exist because humans no longer 
have the concept ‘marriage’ and its accompanying social relations (though it may have been 
invented again by lunchtime). Not accepting this and maintaining that marriage does still 
exist would lead to an unattractive ontological profligacy as it implies that concepts exist
which have never been known. This just does not seem to be what we mean by ‘concept’
and it collapses the distinction between natural and social powers and leaves one without a 
principled way of  defining which social entities do and do not exist.
What follows for social entities and powers from not meeting conditions for 
objectivity is that they are ontologically dependent upon the continued existence of  human 
beings as well as our knowledge of  them (see 4.2). Social objects, as well as differing from 
natural objects in not existing independently of  our conceptions of  them, do not exist 
independently of  humans simpliciter. This though is not damaging to my argument that 
language is a power. To be damaging it would have to be the case that social powers were 
merely subjective and possess little or none of  the qualities we associate with objectivity. If  
social powers were merely subjective then they would be open to limitless re-definition and 
it would be impossible to distinguish one power from another. Indeed, failure to distinguish
one power from another would mean that we have no definitions available to us in the first 
place. The fact that people communicate, get paid wages, pass GCSEs, get married and 
vote in elections all refute this. 
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If  social powers are neither objective in the way that gravity is nor merely 
subjective, what are they? As well as the definition of Ob above, there is another sense in 
which objectivity can plausibly be considered: 
Ob1: x is objective if  x is not reducible to beliefs about x.
What this requires for a social power (in this case language) to be objective is that it display 
a degree of  autonomy from the agents whose existence and beliefs are required for it to 
exist. It implies that agents’ beliefs about a social power or entity are fallible and that social 
entities provide criteria for success and failure for particular behaviours. I share the opinion 
of  a number of  philosophers (Bhaskar 1979, Itkonen 1983, Searle 1995) that social entities 
or systems of  rules maintain a degree of  autonomy and as such social/institutional facts
can be considered objective in the sense of  Ob1, if  not in the sense of  Ob. The case for 
the autonomy of  social entities and powers can be argued, in Durkheimian fashion, by 
pointing to the constraints the entity puts upon agents. Itkonen claims that ‘the 
intersubjective existence of  goals and beliefs is shown precisely by the existence of  
controlling and controlled behaviour’ (Itkonen 1983, p.188) and this can be seen in the 
following example. If  in 2012 I try to pay my greengrocer with one pound notes, I will be
frustrated. This is explained by the fact that one-pound notes are not part of the currency 
system of  the UK. My intended action of  purchasing celeriac is constrained by facts about 
the currency system and no matter what my beliefs about the purchasing power of  one-
pound notes, it is not the case that I can buy celeriac with them. This is relevant to the 
explanation of  why I would have been successful in such an action before the 12
th
November 1984, the date when pound notes were removed from circulation. At different 
places and times, agents are enabled and constrained by the rules that govern the social 
entities which they sustain and this suggests they have the degree of  autonomy described 
by Ob1. 
Within linguistics, the autonomy of  language as a social entity has been most 
emphasised by the Saussurean or structuralist tradition
57
. As Saussure put it, ‘language 
constitutes a system…precisely because of  this, the community is unable to change it at 
will’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.107). As with other social entities, language is not reducible to 
beliefs about it. For example, if  I believe I can express in English specific or particular 
nouns by using the pronoun ‘a/an’, I misunderstand English and attempts to act on this 
                                                
57
See 4.2 for discussion of the relationship between Durkheim and structuralism.
98
belief  are likely to fail. Language is not reducible to beliefs about it because it is linguistic 
behaviour that constitutes the conceptual criteria for someone being a speaker of  a language. 
The English speaker cannot have the rational belief  that they do not speak ‘English’. It is 
on pain of  performative contradiction that I say ‘I don’t speak English’, and if  this is my 
belief, it is ipso facto an irrational belief. In deciding who is a speaker of  a language, we take 
what someone can do (speak fluent English) as the criteria, not what they profess to or in 
fact believe. Again this does not mean that agents can hold any belief  whatever about a 
social entity, for social entities are not merely subjective for the reasons given above. As 
Searle puts it, in identifying social entities and powers, ‘it seems almost to be a logical truth 
that you cannot fool all the people all of  the time’ (Searle 1995, p.32). 
I have now shown how language is a power by considering it with respect to some 
recognised features of  powers. Language is directed, actual, independent, intrinsic to 
speakers (and relational) and in a qualified sense objective (Ob1). Language is a power to
speak a specific language, so when one speaks one does not speak language, but English, 
Greek, Xhosa etc. By seeing language as a power of  individuals in virtue of  their ability to 
communicate with another speaker of  that language, the relational and social aspects of  
language are recognised without losing sight of  the fact that language is used by individuals. 
I now want to turn to some of  the problems and advantages for my understanding of  
language.
2.3.3 Some problems with powers
I wish to head off  criticism of  my position that language is a power by looking at three
possible problems. These are: a problem in defining languages if  intelligibility can be 
asymmetric, a potential conflation of  manifestation and event in consideration of  
polygenic events and a question about the necessity of  manifestations of  social powers 
leading back to actualism.  
- Mutual and asymmetric intelligibility 
For my thesis, mutual intelligibility (MI) is important in defining what a particular language 
is, as language is not an undifferentiated power to communicate, but a power to speak and 
understand a particular language
58
. MI is the relation that holds between speakers of  the 
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same language. Seeing languages as separated by the mutual intelligibility of  speakers is an 
intuitive way in which non-specialists distinguish languages, as well as linguists. MI is a neat 
way of  defining languages and language powers, though it meets a problem when we 
consider asymmetric intelligibility. Take Jensen’s (1989) work on the intelligibility between 
Spanish and Portuguese, an important background factor of  which is that Portuguese 
speakers are usually deemed to have significantly higher comprehension rates of  Spanish 
than Spanish speakers have for Portuguese (Jebsen and Biel 1986). This is known as 
asymmetric intelligibility. Jensen finds that ‘Spanish and Portuguese are mutually intelligible, 
but at a level of  only about 50% to 60%’ though this is qualified by his ‘support [for] the 
common belief  that Portuguese speakers understand Spanish better than vice-versa’ 
(Jensen 1989, p.851).
This asymmetricality of intelligibility raises a problem for my argument as it seems
that ‘intelligibility’ is not as clear cut a concept as I have assumed. I require that a language 
have at least two speakers who share rules and/or abilities necessary for communication 
and that the power to communicate is relational. In the Portuguese/Spanish example it 
appears there is no consistent way to employ MI to distinguish languages as the 
Portuguese/Spanish example does not give us grounds to decide if  Spanish and Portuguese 
are the same or different languages. If  this is the case then we cannot decide if  we are 
dealing with a single power or two powers and so the directionality of  the power appears 
ambiguous and confused. This is not a problem however. It would powerfully speak against 
my thesis if  two languages (P, Q) were found where a monoglot speaker of  P could 
understand philosophy lectures and poetry in Q, but the monoglot speaker of  Q would be 
unable to understand simple requests, statements of  affirmation and other interlocutory 
staples in P. No such situation exists however and as Jensen makes clear, Spanish and 
Portuguese speakers do have the power to communicate, albeit the situation is slightly 
different for the respective speakers. Such examples (see also Lind 1972) support the 
notion of  a dialect or language continuum, where intelligibility is scalar and that there is 
such a continuum does not threaten my view, because I am not supposing that powers be 
entirely distinct and so asymmetrical intelligibility is just a limit case of MI. Grey areas are 
found in many places, not just in language.
                                                                                                                                              
between language-in-general and specific languages. This is because ‘language’ can be used as a 
plural or singular term, which ‘sponsors the confused notion that language is knowable’ (Harris 1981, 
p6). However, in contrast to my position, Harris also rejects the concept of ‘a language’ as a starting 
point for linguistic enquiry. For Harris, such a move supports the ‘fixed code’ fallacy, which is 
characteristic of the modern linguistic orthodoxy he rejects.
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- Language and polygenic events.
Manifestations of  powers are typically distinct from events. If  Ben is riding his motorcycle 
down the road, there are many powers being manifested: the combustive properties of  
petrol, Ben’s balance and co-ordination, the gravitational pull that keeps the motorcycle 
firmly on the road and so on. This is important to recognise lest we confuse manifestations 
with events. Molnar explains an aspect of  polygeny that leads to a worry for me,
[T]he causally operative sufficient condition for almost any manifestation is 
complex, and its parts are bound to include circumstances that are extrinsic to the 
bearer of  the disposition. The first consequence of  equating the causal base of  the 
disposition with the complete cause of  the manifestation is that we lose 
intrinsicality (Molnar 1999, p.3).
Molnar is here making two points, one of  which is repeating his position that powers 
cannot be intrinsic and relational, which I have already discussed. The other point he is 
making is that causal complexity at the level of  events (Bob rides his motorbike, Carol buys 
an Italian bond, a meteor passes earth) is such that a variety of  powers be manifested in 
any event and this can make conceptual or empirical separation of  powers difficult. One
may then worry that in taking language to be a power there is confusion between event and 
manifestation, that I am conflating a communicative event with the manifestation of  
linguistic power.
The worry is misplaced though. I have argued that language is necessary for a 
communicative event to take place, not that it is sufficient. A communicative event, like any 
event, will consist of  many manifested powers and by allowing that a communicative event 
is a complex of  powers of  which language will be part, I am not confusing event and 
manifestation. Whether two speakers communicate about cricket, the hustings or 
metaphysics is reliant upon a host of  factors, including the rational objectives of  the 
speaker in a given situation (see 3.2/3.3). Strongly anthropocentric powers such as language 
are to be viewed in broad terms as the social realm is causally open, experimentally 
unclosable and the directionality of  a social power makes it conceptually necessary that it 
be connected to a social event which will always be polygenic. That power ascriptions in
natural objects are more specific and determinable than those of  social objects is hardly 
surprising due to the potential for causal closure in laboratory experiments. To ask then for 
comparable specificity of  social powers with those of the natural is not reasonable. 
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- Necessity of  manifestations
Realism about powers implies that there can in principle be powers that are never
manifested as well as powers that are manifested but never known. It is a corollary of  my
discussion of  social powers that this cannot be the case as social powers rely on the 
existence of  people and on people having some concept of  that power. Language then
requires reproduction and mutual belief  in order to exist, something I will say more about 
in 4.1 when considering the relationship between agent and language structure. 
What this suggests about social powers is that it is necessary that they be
manifested in order to exist, for without manifestation they cannot be known. This leads to 
the worry that the standard realist distinction between ontology and epistemology does not 
hold for social powers. It also leads to a question about whether social entities cease to 
exist when not being manifested. Here the question of  actualism appears again, for if  
social powers rely on manifestations to exist, one can argue they do not exist when not 
being manifested and this suggests WeA. I have already attacked WeA and to avoid 
inadvertently adopting it, I need to show how social powers are compatible with realism.
Let us compare the window tax and the higher rate of  income tax in the UK, which is 
currently 45% for income over £150,000. We have the intuition that the window tax does 
not exist but the higher rate of  income tax does and that it does, does not depend upon the 
higher rate of  income tax being manifested. If  no one in the UK earned over £150,000 
then the Inland Revenue would not be taxing any income at 45%. One might argue that if  
this was the case, then the window tax and the higher rate of  income tax would be on an 
ontological par as neither is manifested and so we have no reason to believe there is a 
difference. This is unconvincing because while both taxes have conditions of  satisfaction, 
only the higher rate of  income tax has the potential to be manifested because it is recognised 
within the UK tax code. 
If  the higher rate of  income tax did not exist when not being applied to income, 
for example on bank holidays, then it would be impossible to explain why it factors in 
agent’s judgments and why Conservatives desire to reduce it or why people try to avoid it 
by exploiting tax loopholes. Likewise, what makes the difference between ignorance and 
sound judgment in those who make and design buildings without reference to the window 
tax comes down to whether the window tax has the potential to be manifested. That it does 
not have the potential to be manifested is reflected in the lack of  concern for it or 
reference to it when designing or building. One might argue that my example does not 
102
show that the window tax lacks the potential to be manifested and that it would only take 
the election of  an ‘anti-window’ government to show that the window tax does have such a 
potential. To this I would respond that no-one acts with consideration of  such a potential 
window tax in mind, which suggests that the ‘potential’ of  higher income tax to be 
manifested and the ‘potential’ of  the window tax to be manifested are different. Social 
powers then have the potential to manifest themselves, but it is not necessary that they 
manifest themselves to be considered a power. If  they did not exist apart from their 
manifestations, then we could not include them in our decision making. There is therefore 
no danger of  a slip into actualism and social powers are broadly consistent with realism.  
Having dealt with several potential problems, I want to look at some of  the benefits of  
seeing language as a power and of  a powers approach generally.  
2.3.4 The perks of  powers
Let me conclude by briefly discussing the advantages of  my position for linguistics and for 
thinking about language generally. Some of  these have been touched on before, but I bring 
them together here for clarity.
-Vindication of  Social Causation
In 2.1 I claimed that linguists are often suspicious of  taking social causation and social 
factors seriously in their endeavours to understand language and in 2.2 I tried to defeat this
suspicion by considering one way in which social causation is explained, namely by the use 
of  ceteris paribus laws. While cp laws were more robust than opponents deemed them to be, 
they were still vulnerable to the charge of  vacuity. This was avoided by interpreting (some 
may claim discarding) cp laws as power ascriptions. As my powers account of  causation
avoids the problems of  a deductivist account and the problematic aspects of cp laws, it can 
therefore justifiably obviate the suspicion of  linguists about social causation.
It follows from my stance on powers in the social sciences that language is a power. 
It should be noted how different my view of  language is from rival views expressed by 
those ascribed to the Formalist Attitude. My view of  language does not require that 
language be the kind of  strictly delimited object required by the Formalist Attitude to 
maintain sufficiently ‘scientific’ study; it is neither a closed synchronic system or an internal 
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‘dictionary of  which each individual has an identical copy’ (Saussure 2006 [1922] p.38)
(structuralism) nor a universal, innate and exceptionless series of  rules to which all 
‘languages’ reduce (generativism). It avoids seeing language as what Peter Jones has 
described as ‘an abstract, self-contained system of  forms, meanings, and rules whose 
existence is the precondition for successful acts of  linguistic communication, any such act 
being the mere realization or expression of  elements or rules in the system’ (Jones 2007, 
p.338). In seeing language as a power, the linguistic behaviour of  speakers is foregrounded 
rather than occluded at the expense of  the ‘self-contained system’ and by understanding
language as a strongly anthropocentric object, its operation within an open causal system is 
explicitly admitted. 
-Actual Speech and Social structures
In 1.3, I criticised Derrida and Saussure for their unjustified exclusion of  what I termed
‘Actual Speech’ from the purview of  linguistics. To recap, I defined actual speech in this
way:
Actual Speech: A spoken linguistic act A which, belonging to a language L 
reproduces and potentially changes, language L.
By foregrounding communication in my understanding, it is clear that my view of  language 
as a power does not exclude Actual Speech and so is not susceptible to the criticisms
levelled at Derrida and Saussure. Seeing intelligibility as a continuum and particular 
languages as objects that exist and function within an open causal system does not entail 
Actual Speech, but it is certainly consistent with it. Indeed as I will go on to argue in 4.1, it 
is not just consistent, but readily compatible with Actual Speech. On my view, speakers are
not relegated as ‘messy’ things that are justifiably excluded from the theoretical purview of  
linguistics. Speakers and what they speak is, to use a metaphor, the engine of  language. To 
possess a language is to possess a power and this power is ineluctably social in nature. To 
deny this, as we have seen, is beset with difficulties: explaining how language changes, 
maintaining a consistent and justifiable theoretical purview and understanding how we have 
concepts are a few such problems. There is more to say about these subjects and I deal 
more with Actual Speech in 3.1, language change in 3.2 and language as a social structure 
and Actual Speech in 4.2. 
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-Language variation and typology 
My view chimes with an intuitive understanding of  language typology in giving a criterion 
for distinguishing between languages. As I mentioned before, the idea that possession of  a 
language allows us to communicate with some speakers and not others seems fundamental 
to our intuitions about what it is to speak a particular language. As is shown in Jensen 
(1989) and Lind (1972), it is accepted that intelligibility is a continuum and my position is 
both able to recognise this, while allowing for a principled view of  language typology.
While my position offers a criterion that is both intuitive and useful in distinguishing 
languages, it is not the job of  philosophy, but of  linguistics, to provide workable and 
practical criteria for defining language boundaries. That courgettes become marrows at no 
particular point does not mean that there cannot be a rational and consistent framework 
upon which to judge a courgette from a marrow. Nor does it mean that what counts as a 
courgette or a marrow has nothing to do with the objective properties of  the courgette or 
the marrow. At best, my work provides some small amount of underlabouring for language 
typology, but I do not intend to engage in this further. 
My position has a number of  advantages and does not encounter the kind of  
problems I have outlined in chapters 1 and in 2.1. My answer though requires expansion 
and adumbration. For example, what might my stance on language and social causation 
mean for the explanation of  language change? If  language is a power, what does 
knowledge of  it consist in? What does my position suggest about the scientific status of  
linguistics? It is to these questions that the next chapters will be devoted. 
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Chapter 3
Language change, social action and linguistic knowledge
In the last chapter I argued language should be viewed as a power of  speakers to 
communicate and that knowledge of  language consists, at least in part, in the defeasible 
and causally maskable ability to communicate with other speakers sharing the same 
language. Seeing language as a power helps us to understand what we mean when we say 
‘Bob speaks English’ as well as the idea that one can be in possession of  a language, though 
not in fact be able to use it (one may be dumb).  But to argue that language is a power 
leaves open specific questions about the nature of  language, which I now plan to address. 
In this chapter I provide a more comprehensive view of  language in how it functions in 
society and what it is for a speaker to understand a language. In order to do this I pick up 
on some debates in the philosophy of  language and linguistics, again with a view to 
considering their implications for linguistics qua science and for what they can tell us about 
the nature of  language. 
I start by considering something often taken as a given in discussions about 
language; that the signs making it up are arbitrary. I argue there is no philosophically or 
scientifically interesting sense in which language is arbitrary and that discussions about the 
arbitrary nature of  language conflate two distinct notions of  arbitrariness. This conflation 
is both unjustified philosophically and scientifically damaging, obfuscating the idea that 
language is used by people for purposes and is inextricably embedded into social activity. 
Again I point to the desire for the delimitation of  theory as one plausible motivation for 
seeing signs as arbitrary.
Next, following my discussion of  language change, the suspicion of  ‘messy’ 
speakers and the non-deductive methods and causal claims of  the social sciences, I 
consider a contemporary account of  language change and argue that knowledge of  
language, language use and rationality are intimately intertwined. I argue that if  language 
change is to be explained at all, it has to be explained in terms of understanding what 
speakers are using language for. In consideration of  this, I reject accounts of  language 
change that see language as changing ‘for its own sake’ or having a ‘life of  its own’, an idea 
we have encountered with organicism, but one with a contemporary pedigree aligned with
the Formalist Attitude. In addition, I argue that a powers conception of  language is fully 
compatible with this approach to language change and I bring together arguments from 
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previous chapters to this effect.
In the final section of  this chapter I look at the issue of  knowledge of  language 
and consider to what extent, if  at all, there is ‘knowledge of  language’ as something
separable and distinct from knowledge of  the world. I argue that there is little difference
and that to maintain a rigid distinction between the two obfuscates our understanding of  
language. I compare an internalist stance on knowledge of  language to an externalist one 
and defend the latter as the more plausible by showing how interrelated knowledge of  the 
world and ‘knowledge of  language’ are. 
3.1 The Myth of  Language Arbitrariness
It is widely accepted that natural languages are systems of  arbitrary signs. This I intend to 
question. The idea has been held widely in the history of  thought on language and is
sometimes taken as an obvious and unproblematic truth. The claim that language is 
arbitrary is this:
Arbitrariness thesis (AT): Any word in a linguistic system could and could just as well have 
been, represented by another, any other. Words are associated to objects, ideas or uses, de 
facto, not de jure. 
To contextualise AT one should note that historically, AT has stood in opposition to 
natural nomenclaturism (NN), which is defined as follows: 
Natural nomenclaturism (NN): There exist or could exist words that naturally or ideally 
belong to the object they refer to or the quality or concept they pick out
59
. 
The debate between these two positions occurs first in Plato’s Cratylus, where Cratylus
asserts in support of  NN: ‘Representing by likeness the thing represented is absolutely and 
entirely superior to representation by chance signs’ (Plato 1926, p.169). Here, we can read 
‘chance signs’ as representative of AT. AT is an interesting thesis, with some important 
claims relying upon it. I have provided below a series of  chronological quotations to show 
the historical breadth, consistency of  support as well as the claims made for AT in terms 
of  what it explains.
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Sometimes known as the Adamic thesis in reference to the Biblical account of naming found in 
Genesis, see Harris (1988, p.47).
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Plato: 
1. [Hermogenes:] For I think no name belongs to any particular thing by nature, but 
only by the habit and custom of  those that employ it and who established the usage
(Plato 1926, p.11). 
2. For it seems to me that whatever name you give to a thing is the right name; if  you 
give up that name and change it for another, the later name is not less correct than 
the earlier (Plato 1926, p.9).
Saussure: 
       3. There is no internal connexion, for example, between the idea ‘sister’ and the 
French sequence of  sounds s-ö-r which acts as its signal. The same idea might as 
well be represented by any other sequence of  sounds. This is demonstrated by the 
differences between languages, and even by the existence of  different languages
(Saussure 2006 [1922], p. 100).
        4. The arbitrary nature of  the linguistic sign was adduced above as a reason for 
conceding the theoretical possibility of  linguistic change. But more detailed 
consideration reveals that this very same factor tends to protect a language against 
any attempt to change it. It means that there is no issue for the community of  
language users to discuss, even if  they were sufficiently aware to do so (Saussure
2006 [1922], p.106).
From a modern linguistics textbook:
5.  [T]he word dog is arbitrary in the sense that there is nothing predictable about 
the...sounds that are used to express the lexical concept DOG in English (Evans 
and Green 2007, p.123).
Chomsky:
6. Variation of  I-languages may reduce to Saussurean arbitrariness (an association of  
concepts with abstract representations of  sound) and parts of  the sound system, 
relativity accessible, and, hence, “learnable” (Chomsky 2000, p.27).
7. [There are] arbitrary links between concepts and sounds: the genetic program does 
not determine whether tree, the concept, is associated with the sounds “tree” (in 
English) or “Baum” (in German). The linkage of  concept and sound can be 
acquired on minimal evidence, so variation here is not surprising (Chomsky 2000, 
p.120)
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These quotes argue for or show support for AT. What some also show and suggest is that 
AT is used to help explain a number of  things about language. These are:
a) The existence of  different linguistic systems.  This is supported or argued for by 
quotes 2, 3 and 7.
b) The necessity of  learning languages. Supported by 6.
c) The creation of  new words and languages (linguistic change). Supported by 
quotes 2, 3 and 4.
d) The stability of  linguistic systems. Supported by 4.
The explanations offered by supporters of  AT motivate the rejection of  NN. This is 
because given the claim of  NN that there is a ‘correct’ language and a natural connection 
between signified and signifier, NN looks unable to account for the uncontroversial fact 
that there are and have been a variety of  languages. Also, NN cannot explain how language 
change would be possible if  there is such a correct or ‘natural’ language. It could be that 
modern languages are in some way defective, though it would be upon a supporter of NN 
to argue where, despite the fact that all languages allow for successful communication, such
defection lies. Needless to say, the prospects of  NN looking like a reasonable thesis are
bleak and this is why Harris notes that, ‘few thinkers since antiquity have ever championed 
the Cratyline [i.e. NN] thesis’ (Harris 1988, p.47).
My argument moves in three steps. First, I consider what arbitrariness is and argue
that language is not arbitrary, but is in fact pervasively motivated. Second, I argue that AT 
does not have the explanatory power it claims to with respect to a-d. Third I argue that 
some of  the things AT claims to explain can be explained by motivation. It will be my 
assumption that a successful attack on AT does not entail that NN be made any more 
plausible. As such, the focus for the rest of  this section will be on the arbitrariness thesis, 
not NN.
3.1.1 Two versions of  AT: Lack of  motivation and logical arbitrariness
The most influential contribution to and re-capitulation of  AT comes from Saussure’s 
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Course. Saussure is particularly relevant as he argues that AT can explain a, c and d above 
(see (6) in respect of  (a) and (7) in respect of  (c) and (d)).  One commentator has 
paraphrased Saussure’s position on AT in this way:
Saussure’s idea of  arbitrariness has two dimensions: (1) Signs are arbitrary insofar as 
they are social conventions. (2) They are arbitrary insofar as they are composed of  
elements (a concept and a sound image) that have no necessary or natural 
connection to each other (Lemert 1979, p.935). 
Saussure qualified his stance on arbitrariness, stating ‘[t]he term implies simply that the 
signal is unmotivated’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.101) and claimed that one can distinguish ‘in 
any language between what is intrinsically arbitrary- that is, unmotivated- and what is only 
relatively arbitrary. Not all signs are absolutely arbitrary…The sign may be motivated to some 
extent’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.181) and he separated ‘absolute’ from a ‘relative’ 
arbitrariness. Put simply, linguistic motivation is the idea that there are explicable reasons 
for words being the words they are
60
. In Saussure’s distinction, he used the example of  
‘vingt’ (twenty) as an unmotivated or ‘absolutely arbitrary’ sign and ‘dix-neuf ’ (nineteen) as 
a ‘relatively arbitrary’ sign, being composed of  two arbitrary elements combined 
presumably according to some analogical process. It is clear that relatively arbitrary signs 
are still social conventions, so being a social convention is not sufficient for being 
arbitrary
61
. A non-numerical example would be ‘screwdriver’. Though ‘screw’, ‘drive’ and 
the affix ‘er’ are absolutely arbitrary, ‘screwdriver’ (something used to drive screws into a 
substance) is not. All this implies arbitrariness is connected with the absence of  motivation 
of  the sign and so the issue of  motivation is therefore relevant to AT. We can give a
modified definition of  AT which recognises this: 
ATm: Any word in a linguistic system could and could just as well have been, 
represented by another, any other. Therefore arbitrary words are words that lack 
motivation. To the extent a word or sign is motivated, it is non-arbitrary. 
Many linguists share the view that arbitrariness is related to a lack of  motivation (ATm)
62
. 
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This in principle includes such things as syntax and grammar though as Saussure discusses arbitrariness 
principally in terms of the sign, I shall keep my focus here.  
61
Indeed Harris (1988, pp48-49.) and Waugh (1993) warn against the conflation of arbitrariness and 
convention.
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It is not clear this is the case with philosophers, for a few reasons. Firstly, some philosophers who 
discuss arbitrariness (Locke) are still arguing against NN and where arbitrariness is discussed, it is 
often only in passing, so one should be cautious about reading into such statements. 
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In discussing arbitrariness, Barthes states ‘in linguistics the signification is unmotivated.’ 
(Barthes 1968, p.50) and elsewhere: ‘arbitrariness is the rule, not the exception’ (Lord 1974, 
p.20), ‘arbitrariness is often contrasted with motivation’ (Radden and Panther 2004, p.4), 
‘the notion of  motivation is usually contrasted with that of  arbitrariness’ (Konieczna and 
Kleparski 2006, p.103)
63
. Indeed as Waugh notes with respect to arguments about 
arbitrariness and motivation, ‘any aspect of  language that goes against this assumption [of  
arbitrariness] is considered to be only a minor exception to the general rule’ (Waugh 1993, 
p.71).
ATm though is in tension with the definition of  AT because AT was defined in 
terms of the possibility of  one signifier replacing another. Therefore, it needs to be shown 
that AT and ATm are equivalent or roughly equivalent. It is appropriate to ask what AT 
would entail if  it is seen apart from lack of  motivation. It is quite possible to hold that 
signs may be motivated (in the way that ‘dix-neuf ’ is motivated), but are still arbitrary. If  
such a position were a viable representative of  AT, then there would be an alternative to 
ATm. Such a position could hold that arbitrariness is the logical possibility of  one signifier 
being replaced with another and that the issue of  lack of  motivation is not pertinent to AT. 
It can be defined as follows:
ATl: Any word in a linguistic system could and could just as well have been, 
represented by another, any other. Arbitrariness is the logical possibility of  words 
being different. 
Though linguistic motivation may exist, it has nothing to do with the logical possibility of  
one signifier being replaced by any other. One holding ATl might accept that ‘dix-neuf ’ is 
motivated without ceding that the sign is arbitrary. ATl is distinguished from ATm as ATm 
holds that lack of  motivation is connected to arbitrariness, whereas ATl denies this. If  
arbitrariness only concerns the logical possibility of  signifier substitution then ATl makes 
no commitment whatsoever to linguistic motivation. What is critical to note is that for ATl, 
discussion of  motivation in any particular language or any kinds of  motivation that function 
on and influence language is categorically different from the abstract and atemporal 
conception of  arbitrariness represented in ATl. Harris recognises something like ATl in his
comment that ‘[t]he key feature of  the linguistic sign, for Saussure, is that the relationship 
between signifiant and signifiè is arbitrary. But in the non-linguistic domain he recognised the 
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See also Holdcroft (1991, pp.53-55) and Thibault (1997, pp.249-151).
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existence of  signs in which a non-arbitrary relation obtains’ (Harris 2009, p.65). As we have 
just seen though, Saussure as well as many other linguists sees arbitrariness related to 
motivation and his example of  ‘dix-neuf ’ is certainly a linguistic example. As Holdcroft 
points out, ‘the principle of  the Arbitrariness of  the Sign has universal scope but only 
those signs which are not modelled on productive patterns internal to the language are 
completely arbitrary, the remainder being relatively arbitrary’ (Holdcroft 1991, p56). 
However, what Harris recognises is that ATl considers language in an atemporal and 
abstract sense of  a form/content association, a way in which the Formalist Attitude has
characteristically seen it. We now have two competing versions of  AT.
To become clearer about AT we should consider which version best fits the initial 
quotes and more importantly, which version is more congruent with the claims of  what AT 
explains (a-d). I argue that ATm is the appropriate representative of  AT because though 
ATl is correct, it is not an interesting position and is not relevant for discussion of the 
explanations (a-d). On the other hand, ATm can help to explain at least some of  (a-d). The 
first thing to say against ATl being representative of  AT is that I have shown that there is a 
relation between AT and ATm for Saussure and many other linguists and as Saussure’s 
thought here has been so influential, it is plausible that many of  the quotes do express a 
relation between AT and ATm. It is also evident in the first discussion of  arbitrariness in 
Cratylus. There, Hermogenes’ claims about arbitrariness (1, 2) in naming are brought into 
question by Socrates, who does this by pointing to putatively motivated words in Greek: ‘The 
name Orestes (mountain man) is undoubtedly correct, Hermogenes, whether it was given 
to him by chance or by some poet who indicated by the name the fierceness, rudeness, and 
mountain-wildness of  his nature’ (Plato 1926, p.45). Though the seriousness of  Socrates in 
establishing some of  the etymologies found in Cratylus is questionable, Socrates’ frequent 
opposition to Hermogenes along these lines suggest that ATm is relevant to AT in this 
case. 
Another reason to think that ATl is not representative of  AT is because it is not 
clear it can explain (a-d) and most of  the quotes purport to explain at least one of  (a-d). By 
definition ATl has nothing to say about how language functions in a society and for a 
speaker, so it can only claim that certain events are possible and this is different from 
explaining them. The Big Bang made it possible for me to subscribe to Private Eye, but it 
would be odd to suggest that this explains my subscription in any interesting way. One who 
supports AT and with it wishes to explain (a-d) must choose between ATm and ATl. AT 
cannot be both ATm and ATl because they are categorically distinct with respect to their
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relation to lack of  motivation. If  one sees AT in terms of ATl then they should give up
claims to explain (a-d) by AT. ATl is true but aside from tackling NN, is a fairly trivial 
thesis. 
I think there has been confusion about AT that has made discussion of  it difficult 
and it may be that Saussure and others hold an unclear mixture of ATl and ATm. Where 
this is the case there is need for qualification as ATl and ATm are distinct. It is important to 
note that insofar as supporters of  AT hold ATl, it is an uninteresting but true thesis, 
though insofar as they hold ATm this is an interesting but not obviously true thesis that 
needs to be considered further. Having now done something to clear up the issue, I will
now consider AT synonymous with ATm. 
3.1.2 Problems for AT: Motivation and Delimitation
In this section I raise a problem for AT in order to further my argument that language is in
no interesting sense arbitrary and also to show that discussion of  arbitrariness is difficult to 
keep within the realms of  the linguistic. In the last section I discussed the distinction
between absolute and relative arbitrariness and outlined how signs could be considered 
motivated. However, there is reason to doubt the category of  the absolutely arbitrary is 
useful and if  there is reason to doubt the non-motivated nature of  putatively absolutely 
arbitrary signs, then AT should be considered in peril. 
Saussure’s list of ‘relatively arbitrary’ (motivated) signs is not limited to the 
numerical: trees, people, places and crafts are all picked out as examples where linguistic 
motivation is present (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.181). The list is long and varied enough to 
give one suspicion about the extent to which signs are absolutely arbitrary and the extent to 
which Saussure’s ‘first principle’ of  the arbitrariness of  the sign is representative of  
linguistic systems. In defending the idea of  absolute arbitrariness, one might point to signs
already defined as absolutely arbitrary (vingt) and claim that the basis of  motivated signs is 
always reliant upon absolutely arbitrary ones. However, there is a clear sense in which
‘absolutely arbitrary’ numbers can be seen to be motivated and if  they can be seen to be 
motivated, then it is plausible that this is the case with other candidates for absolutely
arbitrary words. An uncontroversial example: French Un, German Ein, Italian/Spanish Uno 
and English One are all connected from a common heritage of  Latinisation 
(unus/una/unam). Saussure, a polyglot linguist specialising in Sanskrit, was well aware of  
these etymological facts and doubtless considered them facts, so it is worth questioning 
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why he does not see ‘Un’ as motivated. 
In light of  Saussure’s support for the Formalist Attitude, one reason suggests itself. 
As I have shown, Saussure is committed to the view that languages were, or should be 
treated as if  they functioned, as ‘closed systems’ and that there is a synchronic/diachronic 
separation that ‘is absolute and admits no compromise’ (Saussure 2006, [1922], p.119). One 
plausible answer therefore is that trans-linguistic motivation is not motivation of  the 
relevant sort as it falls outside the synchronic. The first point against this is that if  this is 
the case, arbitrariness is maintained by mere stipulation, so one cannot claim that signs are 
arbitrary because their arbitrariness is only a result of  a theoretical imposition, rather than 
anything about language per se. Still, even if  we are generous and delimit motivation so that 
it does not include trans-linguistic motivation, there are intra-linguistic cases that cause
similar problems. For example, the English word ‘Werewolf ’ derives from Anglo-Saxon for 
‘man’, ‘Wer’
64
(lit. Werewolf = Man-Wolf). This example fits Saussure’s definition of  a 
motivated unit as it is a compound of  two other apparently arbitrary elements. However, 
‘Wer’ is not part of  demotic English and so one is faced with a dilemma. One might deny
that ‘Werewolf ’ is motivated because ‘Wer’ is not an English word so its formation is not a 
synchronic but a diachronic matter. This though is not a satisfactory response for two 
reasons. First, it refuses motivation in the face of  a case that fits Saussure’s own account of  
motivated signs and second, such a refusal simply stipulates arbitrariness. Alternatively, one
might accept ‘Werewolf ’ as motivated, but this would allow a word not in the current 
English lexicon to provide a basis for the motivation of  an English word. This would mean 
that tout court status of  trans-linguistic motivation would need to be dropped because one 
can accept motivation from outside the current English lexicon.  As Norris notes, the 
presence of  relative arbitrariness requires that ‘the most basic precept of  structural-
synchronic linguistics is one that has to be given up…as soon as the focus of  attention  
switches from language conceived in abstractio…to language as a means of  communication 
between rationally motivated subjects’ (Norris in Sanders (ed.) 2004, p.227).
Another option remains though. One could respond by accepting ‘Werewolf ’ as a 
motivated English word in virtue of  a definition of  ‘English’ that includes Anglo-Saxon. 
Here, it will be argued, the disallowing of  intra-linguistic motivation will still hold. But this 
is the thin end of  the wedge. One would presumably refuse the motivation of  
‘Floccinaucinihilipilification’ because Latin is not English but it is hard to see how the 
motivation of ‘Werewolf ’ differs from that of  ‘Floccinaucinihilipilification’ and it is not 
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clear that Latin has had less of  an influence on English than Anglo-Saxon. Again this move
refuses motivation in the face of  a clear case. There seems no good reason why one should 
stop linguistic motivation at the much disputed
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boundaries of  natural languages. If  this is 
the case and plausibly many examples of  the ‘absolutely arbitrary’ are motivated, AT 
becomes less plausible. 
As has been noted before (Jospeh 2000, Norris in Sanders (ed.) 2004), despite 
holding AT, some of Saussure’s claims appear to accept the importance of  motivation: ‘the 
entire linguistic system is founded upon the irrational principle that the sign is arbitrary. 
Applied without restriction, this principle would lead to utter chaos’ (Saussure 2006 [1922],
p.182). This claim supports the importance of  motivation because if  the entire system were
founded upon arbitrariness then it would be chaotic, which is not the case if  ‘chaos’ means 
anything like ‘unorganised’. Holdcroft notes the oddity of  Saussure’s claim, commenting it 
‘is something of  an understatement if  it suggests that we can conceive of  a language that is 
not systematic’ (Holdcroft 1991, pp.93-94). Motivation then halts arbitrariness and prevents
chaos in language systems as arbitrariness is not ‘applied without restriction’. This implies 
that languages require motivation in the construction and maintenance of  language and 
again suggests that language use and social activity are more connected than Saussure often 
recognises, something I will discuss more in 3.2 and 3.3.
So far I have put AT into doubt by showing how arbitrariness is connected to lack 
of  motivation and have then pointed out how some strong candidates for absolute
arbitrariness are motivated and how motivation cannot be limited to the ‘closed system’ of  
language. AT then has been wounded, but it is not finished. This is because AT purports to 
support some interesting theses. To effectively undermine AT, I now show how it does not 
have the explanatory power it claims to.
3.1.3 The varieties of  motivation 
As AT is linked to lack of  motivation, an explanatory account of  (a-d) which cited 
linguistic motivation within its explanatory framework would be in conflict with the 
explanations offered by AT. This is how I will proceed in order to discredit AT. However, 
if  motivation is going to provide convincing explanations for (a-d), it will be necessary to 
provide an overview of  some kinds of  linguistic motivation, as the definition of  
motivation has been broad so far. Literature on linguistic motivation does not just discuss
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motivation of  the sign, but also grammatical, syntactical and ‘non-linguistic’ motivation. 
For example, Haiman posits a kind of  grammatical motivation called ‘iconicity of  
motivation’ which he defines as, ‘that in which a grammatical structure…reflects its 
meaning directly. The clearest example of  such iconicity is that of  sequence. Other things 
being equal, the order of  statements in a narrative description corresponds to the order of  
the events they describe’ (Haiman 1980, p.516). However, both for the sake of  simplicity 
and because it is the sign the initial quotes concern, I will concentrate on types of  
motivation affecting the sign. The collection Studies in Linguistic Motivation (Radden and
Panther (eds.) 2004) identifies kinds of  motivation that affect the sign and language
broadly. The kinds of  motivation I will look at briefly are: ecological, genetic, experiential, 
perceptual and cognitive motivation.
Ecological Motivation: This refers to a unit’s place or ‘ecological niche’ within the language 
system and how it can motivate and be motivated by other linguistic units. As Taylor claims 
‘it is not the case that each structure occupies a self  contained pigeon hole. Each unit has 
pointers to other units’ (Taylor in Radden and Panther (eds.) 2004, p.58). Radden and 
Panther give the example of  ‘hamburger as a compound is motivated in being related to 
other compounds within the system of  English’ (Radden and Panther 2004, p.24).
Ecological motivation is similar to Saussure’s ‘relative arbitrariness’ in his example of ‘dix-
neuf ’ (and equally of  ‘Werewolf ’) as such a sign is ‘decomposable into its constituent 
grammatical units. It draws attention to its own principles of  grammatical construction’ 
(Thibault 1997, p.283).
Genetic/Structural Motivation: Genetic motivation is synonymous with ‘Structural Motivation’
(Heine in Radden and Panther (eds.) 2004) and concerns historical factors, with an
emphasis on grammatical phenomena though is relevant to signs also. It rests on the idea 
that what people speak in linguistic state X at time t is partly due to what people spoke in 
state Y at t-1. Wittgenstein recognises something like structural motivation in the Tractatus
when he claims, ‘[a]lthough there is something arbitrary in our notations, this much is not 
arbitrary- that when we have determined one thing arbitrarily, something else is necessarily 
the case’ (Wittgenstein 2001 [1922], 3.342). For example, in English the dominance of  the
subject-verb-object (SVO) sequence is partly explained because English in past centuries 
has utilised the SVO sequence. This is not the same for Japanese, where the SOV sequence 
dominates and has dominated historically. What is interesting about genetic motivation is
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that in contrast to the opinion that ‘arbitrariness is the rule, not the exception’ (Lord 1974, 
p.20), it supposes that arbitrariness is the exception rather than rule.
Experiential Motivation: This concerns how embodiment affects linguistic structure and signs. 
For example, the words ‘lift/elevator’, ‘pacifier’ (‘dummy’) and ‘screwdriver’ are all 
motivated by the way in which we characteristically experience and interact with them. The 
existence of personal and impersonal pronouns reflect facts about embodiment and ‘basic 
verbs have a fundamental role in language, as they are subject to figurative extensions’ 
(Benczes 2007, p.96) as for the verb ‘take’: ‘take out’, ‘take in’, ‘take on’ etc. 
Perceptual Motivation: Radden and Panther claim that ‘[m]any of  the organising principles 
that are pertinent in the structuring of  perception also motivate language structure’ 
(Radden and Panther 2004, p.28). They use figure/ground and gestalt examples as evidence 
for this, contrasting the unremarkable sentence, ‘The book on the table’ with the odd ‘The 
table under the book’. While the latter sentence may be appropriate in a given context, the 
point is that perceptual salience can motivate the construction of  sentences where the 
perceptually salient object is grammatically salient (takes the subject). 
This is far short of  a comprehensive list or account of motivation, which would be beyond 
the scope of  this thesis. What I hope to do with reference to these four kinds of  
motivation is to show how AT does not explain (a-d) and that motivation can provide 
better explanations for some of  (a-d). 
3.1.4 Motivation as explanation
Where arbitrariness putatively explains something about language, the explanatory 
framework will be simple as there are no kinds of  arbitrariness that are not categorically 
distinct. This is not the case with motivation. As Konieczna and Kleparski state ‘there is no 
denying that motivational factors usually do not function in isolation but they tend either to 
apply jointly or to compete with one another’ (Konieczna and Kleparski 2006, p.105). This 
is consistent with my arguments in chapter 2 emphasising the open system that language 
functions in but it presents an explanatory challenge as explanations of  linguistic 
phenomena will be unavoidably post-hoc and non-predictable. This is something I will deal 
with in 3.2.
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Before dealing with (a-d), I wish to make a point about genetic motivation that 
supports the idea that language is pervasively motivated. The idea that language is genetically 
motivated is presupposed by any notion of  linguistic change. Consider the following. For any 
change to occur, it has to operate upon a linguistic object or state
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O to form a new 
linguistic object or state, O1. Without some connection between O and O1 the term
‘change’ would be misapplied. As linguistic change does occur then change from O to O1
has to be delimited as if  it were not then we would not be able to recognise any change and
would have no basis for thinking that O1 was related to O. The intelligibility of  etymology, 
no matter how erroneous or fanciful postulations might be, assumes the genetic motivation 
of  language. This strongly suggests that individuals and communities create signs out of  
the existing stock of  signs and grammar from their (and other) languages. This stock 
motivates and constrains signifier selection and therefore signs can never be absolutely
arbitrary. Language is basically motivated and even where we might not clearly see the 
reasons for motivation, we have reason for not being pessimistic about the presence of  
motivation. I now address how I think AT does not explain (a-d) and how motivation 
offers a plausible explanation for at least some of  them.
Linguistic stability (d). Motivation can help us understand how languages remain relatively 
stable if  we consider the idea that the words we use reflect how we typically experience an 
object, action or idea. For example, it is plausible that ‘Carrion Crow’ has its name not only 
because English contains the words ‘Crow’ and ‘Carrion’ (ecological motivation), but also 
because certain ornithological specimens of  a sub-genus corvid feed upon cadavers 
(experiential motivation). ‘Tennis-Elbow’ is another example, being ecologically motivated 
by the meaning of  its constituents in being a compound and also by the location and 
manner in which tennis is played, with strenuous use of  the elbow (experiential 
motivation). How does this relate to linguistic stability?  That communities call things what 
they do because of  the character of  the world and the way they experience the world, it 
suggests that words that are motivated by such experience will tend to be stable insofar as 
the way in which that community experiences them remains stable. In Cratylus, Socrates 
argues that in naming ‘we cannot follow our own will, but the way the instrument which 
the nature of  things prescribes must be employed...if  we pursue this course we shall be 
better in our naming’ (Plato 1926, p.21)
67
. This is not simply the point that one cannot say 
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‘bubububu’ to mean ‘pass the salt’, it suggests that there are ‘extra-linguistic’ reasons for a 
sign being that sign and that language use and meaning are interconnected. This not only 
suggests that stable practices secure a degree of  language stability, but also that the relative 
stability of  the world also affects the stability of  language. 
Saussure’s claim that linguistic stability is due to the arbitrary nature of  signs
because ‘there is no issue for the community of  language users to discuss…For to discuss 
an issue, there must be some reasonable basis for discussion’ (Saussure 2006, p.106) is 
wrong in two respects. First, people discuss and debate words continually, such as words 
considered sexist or racist. One might object that this is a non-linguistic point and Saussure 
is only concerned with the linguistic, not facts about language use. I disagree here, for 
Saussure accepts that one can discuss ‘the pros and cons of  a system of  symbols’ (Saussure 
2006 [1922], p.106) and that ‘our symbol of  justice, the scales, could hardly be replaced by a 
chariot’ (Saussure 2006 [1922] p.101). Of  course a chariot could represent justice, so it does 
not seem that questions about sexist or racist words can be consistently excluded. Still, even 
if  we do exclude them, there is a plausible basis for linguistic discussion, for one could 
argue that ‘incredible’ being used to mean ‘very good’ and ‘disinterested’ to mean
‘uninterested’ violate morphological rules of  English.
Linguistic change (c). I have outlined how language change presupposes genetic motivation, 
but more can be said with respect to individual instances when considering experiential 
motivation. To return to previous examples; if  carrion crows’ diets changed to consist only 
of  fungi or occurrences of  Tennis-Elbow disappeared from tennis, there would be 
motivation for change in the use of  that expression, namely it becoming obsolete. As well 
as language change in the form of  becoming obsolete, changes can of  course be additive to
reflect change in practices. The frequency of  electronic communication has led to a change 
in how we refer to messages, with e-mail often being called ‘mail’ and paper mail being 
referred to as ‘snail [i.e. slow] mail’
68
. 
Language Learning (b). I do not think either motivation or arbitrariness explain the need to 
learn languages. For AT, the explanation is unconvincing because as is argued by 
generativists, the question of  language learning concerns the extent to which language is 
                                                                                                                                              
alternative of depicting a concept so that receivers can apprehend the meaning in the form. The 
process is so challenging to the ingenuity, so comically unreliable, that we have made it into party 
games’ (Pinker 1995, p.84). Examples given in this section as well as others found in the literature 
suggest otherwise. 
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innate and it is hard to see how AT fits into this. If  we were to say that language was 
innate, it may be non-arbitrary in the sense of ATl, but might or might not be motivated in 
the sense of  ATm. It is difficult to see how this might explain the need to learn languages 
as motivated or not, speakers presumably would have to learn language, even on very 
‘minimal evidence’. On the other hand, to suggest that signs are arbitrary (in the ATl sense) 
because they are not innate would imply that everything from carpentry styles to gastric 
surgery was arbitrary, but this would make arbitrariness utterly trivial. I do not claim that 
motivation explains the need to learn languages and both positions do not appear relevant
to the issue.
Different languages (a). The most plausible claim made for AT is that it explains that fact that 
there are different languages. This claim is based on the assumption that if  there were a
natural connection between signifier and signified then there would be a single language. As 
there is more than one language, there must be no such connection and signs are therefore
arbitrary. The problem with this explanation is that it assumes that either there is a natural 
connection between signifier and signified (NN) or one adopts AT. Though NN is 
implausible, rejecting it does not require the adoption of  AT. It is not necessary that there 
be any particular sign or system of  signs, but the points I made about genetic motivation, 
language stability and change support the idea that the languages of  the world and their
signs could not have just been anything any more than human history could have been 
anything. Therefore, one can reject AT as an explanation for there being different 
languages without adopting NN. One might claim what is meant here is ATl because 
rejection of  NN does imply ATl. This is true, but ATl cannot explain why there are
different languages in any interesting sense. 
In terms of  motivation explaining (a), I wish to be modest. I do not think that 
motivation can explain the fact that there are different languages at all, but it can help us 
appreciate why there are different languages now and why languages may remain distinct 
and different. If  we consider genetic motivation, we can understand that there are different 
languages because there were different languages and the vital role language plays in the 
existence of  communities motivates their being distinct. We can consider ecological 
motivation in this respect too, as when a linguistic community creates a neologism in 
response to a change in their state of  affairs, they will tend to look to their own language
for the necessary resources, as is made clear with portmanteau words such as ‘brunch’ and 
‘smog’. 
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As a last note, one may be temped to resurrect ATl as representative of AT because there 
is a sense in which ATl accounts for some of  the above as the form/content relation could 
(in the logical sense) have been different and ATm seems wrong as language does appear 
motivated. Against this I would stress how trivial ATl is: the monetary system, The French 
Revolution and popular basket designs in China are all in the same way arbitrary. 
Sociologists do not explain societal change or the fact that there are different societies by
virtue of  the fact that a society could have been and be different and by the same token, we 
should not try to explain facts about language so.
It is worth asking why AT has had such longevity. I think there are three reasons. 
Insofar as AT has been contrasted with NN, the implausibility of  NN has contributed to 
the plausibility of  AT. As I noted, this contributes to why AT can be thought to explain (a).
Second, the undeniable and uninteresting truth of  ATl and confusion between it and ATm 
has protected the subject of  arbitrariness from rigorous analysis. Third and most 
important, arbitrariness has been insisted upon by thinkers influenced by the Formalist 
Attitude, whose working assumptions are resistant to consideration of  social factors and 
language use. As motivation is usually diachronic and social in nature, it is no surprise that 
those who see language as an abstract object should ignore motivation or see it as non-
pertinent. I have argued that both of  these are mistakes. Claims of  arbitrariness obscure 
the fact that language is used by speakers for purposes and that language use is intertwined 
with the life of  a community. AT is false because language is pervasively motivated, the 
extent of which has been underplayed by linguists. AT does not explain (a-d) in a
meaningful way and motivation can in various ways plausibly explain (a), (c) and (d). The 
idea that motivation explains language stability and change brings us back to the issue of
causality and explanation of  linguistic phenomena. Explanations from motivation are post-
hoc explanations and it is to this issue, with specific focus on language change, that I turn.
3.2 Language change, causality and post-hoc explanations
‘The only true object of  study in linguistics is the language, considered in itself and for its own sake.’
(Saussure 2006 [1922] p.317)
In 2.1 I looked at Lass’ well known On Explaining Language Change. There I both agreed and 
disagreed with Lass. I agreed with Lass that the D-N model was not adequate in principle 
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to explain language change and any attempt to employ it was bound to fail. I disagreed with
Lass’ pessimism about explaining language change, particularly in his disavowal of  the 
possibility of  understanding social causality. There were two main reasons for disagreeing 
with Lass. While Lass rejected (with good reason) the D-N model, he implicitly relied upon 
the truth of  deductivism in criticising non-D-N accounts of  language change. There was 
therefore a tension in his theory, as his pessimism relied on the truth of  a causal model he 
opposes. The other reason for disagreement with Lass was that his idea of  Insight made 
investigation of  language change otiose as it dropped all truth-claims. I now turn back to 
the issue of  language change as I want to give consideration of an appropriate account of  
language change and to some salient factors in language change. 
This is useful to do because linguists’ conception of  their own science is often
problematic (1.1-1.4) and language change is an area where these problems are clear
because the issue of  causality is perhaps at its sharpest. Why is it at its sharpest? Firstly, 
because predictive theories and ‘laws’ of  language change have failed. That is, theories that 
support nomic laws expressing a causal connection between the presence of  an explananda 
and a particular language event (explanandum), one that would both explain and predict 
future events (‘Grimm’s Law’ of  consonantal shift or Zipf ’s ‘law of  least effort’) have failed 
on their own terms to offer accurate predictions. For example, Labov admits to ‘the 
apparent impossibility of  saying which words have a better chance of  surviving and which 
do not’ implying that the operation of  language changes are ‘far too episodic and 
unpredictable to be compared to the systematic operation of  natural selection’ (Labov 
2001, pp.13-14). The question of  causality is also pertinent to language change because
literature on language change cites the social ontology of  language and social factors as 
being important to explaining change (Labov 1973, 2001, Croft 2000, Aitchison 2001,
Radden and Panther 2004). This is important because the relevance of  the social nature of  
language and linguistic activity has worried linguists, who fear that social considerations 
would make linguistics too complex and unconstrained to be fruitful. Language change 
then is an area within linguistics where the issues and problems of  social causality are 
obvious because of  the failure of  predictive theories and the perceived importance of  
social causation. 
Indeed, change poses a problem for any account of  language which views it as an 
abstract closed system of  rules. Itkonen puts the problem like this, ‘the constant possibility 
of  change in social behaviour points to the pervasive historicity of  social data […] a 
decision to adopt a fixed, ahistorical system of  descriptive concepts, leads immediately into 
122
conflict with social data’ (Itkonen 1978, pp.28-29). If  language change is caused by social 
factors, it follows that the syntactic, grammatical and semantic makeup of  a language can 
change as a result of  social factors and this threatens both the idea that we can describe 
and understand language in an abstract way and predict language change. By returning to 
this issue I will make clearer the deficiency of  viewing language in a way indicative of  the 
Formalist Attitude and advance my account of the importance of  social factors in the 
study of  language. 
My argument moves in three stages. I start from the assumption that language is 
not arbitrary (3.1) and agree that given the failure of  the kind of  predictive theories of  
language change, social factors are important. I argue that a corollary of  this is that 
language never changes for its own sake, but always for some social end. By ‘for its own sake’ 
I mean the idea that language changes for reasons that have little or nothing to do with 
communicative function, but rather according to a set of  rules and/or laws internal to 
language(s). This is consistent with the thesis of  organicism (1.2.1) and also with 
neogrammarian ideas of  ‘fixed laws’ of  language change (1.2.2). I call these changes 
internalist changes. As McMahon observes, generativist engagement with language change 
fits this mould, being ‘descriptive rather than explanatory. Early generative theory, with its 
emphasis on simplification, provided no adequate general account of actuation or 
transmission’ (McMahon 1995, p.45). I finish this part of  the argument by showing that a 
social end is necessarily present and so there can be no non-social linguistic acts, so the idea 
of  language changing due to internalist changes is false. 
I then contextualise the first section by showing how a contemporary account of  
language change holds that language does change ‘for its own sake’. I look at Jean 
Aitchison’s influential work, Language Change: Progress or Decay? (2001) and consider how her 
problematic assumptions about language leave her unable to explain change. Lastly, I look 
at an alternative to explaining language change without reference to internalist changes by
post-hoc explanations and give a brief  account of why we should believe in any post-hoc 
explanations of  linguistic change given that they are potentially unfalisifable and 
unconfirmable. This will bring us back to the issue of  causal powers and cp laws (2.2, 2.3).
Here I use Labov’s (1962) account of  language change in Martha’s Vineyard and argue that 
we should believe in post-hoc explanations because, a) one can distinguish between more and 
less coherent and post-hoc explanations, b) some post-hoc explanations are more consistent 
with empirical research and as such can be considered as confirmed and confirmable 
(though not in the D-N sense) and c) post-hoc explanations are the best explanation on offer 
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in the social sciences and we should defer to best explanations. The purpose here is not to 
convince the sceptic, but rather to provide good grounds and reasons for believing in post-
hoc explanations of  linguistic change that can offer us an alternative to internalist changes. 
3.2.1 Speech and social ends
I have argued that language can be seen as a power with a social ontology (2.3) and that 
language is not arbitrary in any interesting or useful way (3.1). In particular, I argued that 
language can only be thought of  as arbitrary from a logical point of  view and that logical
arbitrariness is of  little importance with respect to the issue that concerns us here, language 
change. The negative conclusion in that part leaves us with the open question of  the 
explanation of  language change and this has two consequences that help define the next 
step in our investigation. First and uncontroversially, it tells us that linguistic change is not
random; there is always some reason for linguistic change. This I take to be implied by the 
notion of  linguistic motivation. If  language is not arbitrary then motivated change is not just
ruled in, it is the only option available. An explanation of  any kind or particular instance of  
motivation is another matter and one can consistently hold that change is motivated, but 
these changes can be purely internal. This is the internalist position which I discuss 
presently.
Secondly, the pervasiveness of  motivation and its social basis suggests that the 
reasons why language changes are at least partly social: reasons agents have for speaking 
(and understanding) differently in order to achieve some social end (Searle 1969, Austin 
1975, Johnson 1990, Clark and Brennan in Resnick and Levine (eds.) 1991). This externalist 
position is what I argue for. If  language change is motivated and language is used for
communication, it is plausible that the language change will be motivated by the 
communicative need of  speakers, by what speakers want to do socially. I define
‘communicative need’ as any act of  speech aimed at achieving a social end. By ‘social end’ I 
mean a desired change in the relationship between the speaker and one or more individuals
or social structure. These kinds of  changes happen continuously and in countless banal 
ways: in acts of  purchase, marriage, employment, requests to put the kettle on, attempts to 
sue and so on. Being motivated by communicative need however is not sufficient for the 
success of  the desired social end. I can try to tell someone my name in order to begin a 
dialogue, but they might not hear me, ignore me or get hit by a bus. As I have defined it, 
‘communicative need’ is a social concept and explanations involving communicative need 
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will be social explanations. Not only is motivation the only option on offer to explain 
language change, but social explanation is the prime candidate for explanations of  language 
change.    
It is therefore plausible that all change is at least partly socially motivated and that 
in looking for explanations we consider social factors. More needs to be done to show that 
linguistic change is socially caused and in order to do this, I want to rule out the competing 
idea that change can be accounted for by language-internal motivations. A language-
internal motivation is a motivation whose explananda make no use of  the concept of  
communicative need or any social phenomena in the explanation for that change. Good
candidates would be ‘Grimm’s Law’
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(see 1.2.2) or the assumption underpinning the 
Minimalist Program that ‘the apparent richness and diversity of  linguistic phenomena is 
illusory and epiphenomenal, the result of  interaction of  fixed principles under slightly 
varying conditions’ (Chomsky 1995, p.8). In such cases, language would change ‘for its own 
sake’, with little or no interference from external conditions. The influence of  the 
Formalist Attitude is obvious in the divorcing language (a closed system of  rules) from 
manifestations of  language in social context. As we will see, such opinions are evident in 
current approaches to language change (2.1.2). 
To argue that internalist changes are incredible will only do part of the job of  
showing that social factors are important, as one cannot argue for something being X by 
showing that it is not Y. However, if  X and Y are the only apparent options, showing 
something to be not Y gives us reason to believe it is X. This is my aim in the next section 
and in 3.2.3, where I will offer positive reasons for believing X –i.e. to give an account of  
why we should believe social factors cause linguistic change. 
3.2.2 Internalist and externalist changes
For any change to happen within a speech community, there has to be a process by which
saying S (where S is any arbitrary utterance) changes from being marked (unintelligible, 
censured, or simply not used) to being unmarked (intelligible, not censured and widely 
used) or vice versa. There are two scenarios about a language change motivated by internal 
factors, both of  which are problematic enough to show that internalist changes are
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Nerlich (1990 pp.56-58) gives an account of nineteenth century views of language change where ‘laws’ 
of change are seen as independent of speakers and usage, whether these be ‘external’ laws of 
language-as-organism (Schleicher, Müller, Chaveè) or the ‘internal’ laws of language in the mind 
(Brèal, Darmesteter). 
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incredible. The first, in line with generativism, would see change happening within the I-
language of  a speaker which would alter their competence in some way. Even if  this 
change occurred without reference to social factors, it would not be accepted by the 
language community automatically as it would have to transmit. The change in performance
implied by the change in competence could take any number of  values, being seen as 
evidence of  the authority or nobility of  the speaker (which might make it widely adopted) 
or being deemed pompous or elitist (which might discourage its being adopted). As Croft 
points out ‘variants in a linguistic variable have social values associated with them. Speakers
select variants to use…on the basis of  their social values’ (Croft 2000, p.32). It is hard to 
see therefore how any one change in an individual’s I-language could avoid going though a 
social process of  transmission which would determine its influence on the language
community and thus the language. The explanation of such a change would need to 
include social factors. 
Labov has questioned this though as he claims there is a ‘narrow’ interface between 
language and society, which allows for a separation of  the internal and external and implies 
support for internalist changes as I have described them:
The evidence for the isolation of  abstract linguistic structures from social 
evaluation and differentiation comes from many sources. In the quantitative 
analyses of  variation, it is found that changes made by the addition or subtraction 
of  internal, linguistic factors are reflected in the values of  other internal, linguistic 
factors, while values of  the external, social factors remain identical (Labov 2001, 
p.28).
This is questionable for two reasons. First, it is not possible to rule out linguistic features 
gaining or losing social values. In the UK in the 1920’s, ‘squiffy’ was a common informal 
term for being inebriated, but if  one uses it in 2012 they would likely be thought to be 
being ironic or pompous and one does not have to be a trained linguist to think there are 
many other such cases. Secondly, even if  certain constructions, pronunciations or words 
have no statistically significant correlation to a social value, this does not mean they lack 
social value in certain contexts. English speakers in general may have no intuitions about 
the pronunciation of  ‘fungi’ [fənjī]/[fəŋgī] or the formation of  the plural of  ‘fungus’ 
(fungi/funguses) but this may not be the case among mycologists, who may discriminate.
Language use functions in context and the ability of  speakers to create ‘passing theories’ 
(Davidson 2006, see 3.3) suggests that Labov’s distinctions which allow for internalist 
changes are problematic.
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The second scenario of  an internalist change would be that a change more-or-less 
instantaneously occurs within a language community and so the speech of  the community 
is altered in some uniform way, which would avoid the problem with the first scenario. It
implies there are changes that do not pass through the speech community at all, but are 
instantaneously realised, though this is unattractive. There is no evidence to support this 
idea and plenty of  evidence that it is not the case (Milroy 1987, Jonassohn and Doerr 
1999). Indeed, even if  one were to posit strict rules of  speech in a given linguistic 
community we would still be, as Labov once put it, ‘left with the problems of  accounting 
for discrete differences in rule systems between successive cadres of  speakers who form a 
continuous linguistic tradition’ (Labov in Stockwell and Macaulay (eds.) 1972, p.102)
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.
It may be objected that how I have defined ‘language change’ begs the question 
against internalist changes and that I have simply assumed that changes transmit. Once this 
is assumed, purely internal language change becomes impossible. However, transmission is 
clearly essential to change. The idea of purely language internal change implies that
transmission does not occur in some cases and this implies a denial that a change can 
fluctuate, diachronically becoming less or more prominent within a linguistic community.
In arguing for internalist changes, one accepts that language change and language use have 
little to do with one another. This would make the methodology of  study into language 
change otiose and it is a working hypothesis that there is a relation between social processes 
and language change. I give a more positive account of  change in the next section, though
what is clear is that internalist changes look implausible. 
The notion that change is motivated by communicative need is not without 
tensions. Keller raises this problem: ‘To communicate implies (among other things) the 
wish to be understood. But if  wishing to be understood results in stasis and homogeneity, 
how does the phenomenon of change occur at all?’ (Keller 1994, p.95)
71
. There is a tension
because it appears that communicative need can halt rather than cause and explain change. 
Roughly, this is because talking in the same way is one way of  making communicative 
success likely, whereas talking in novel/unusual/marked ways is more likely to result in 
incomprehension. In light of  the fact that communicative need seems to prevent change,
one might point to language-internal motivations for change in order to explain it.
This worry is not warranted for two reasons. One reason is that the worry relies on 
a too-simplistic notion about what it means ‘to communicate’ as what one says depends 
very much on what one wants to communicate. What I communicate depends on a variety 
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This is an oft-made point, see Labov (2001, p.5).
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of  factors (questions I am asked, limitations imposed by good manners, my overt or covert 
aims) and so the open-ended nature of  what I could conceivably say given the context 
implies that I communicate different things at different times. Wanting to be understood 
does not guarantee any cast-iron stability or homogeneity in what I say and in what is said; 
it depends on what I want my interlocutor to understand, what I think they can understand 
and much else. Another reason the worry is not warranted is that the way in which I 
communicate things also depends on a variety of  factors. If  I am part of  a panel discussion 
on the merits of  capital punishment and I want to convince an audience that capital 
punishment is ineffective and inhumane, I may say or write things differently than if  I were 
writing a government-backed report upon the pros and cons of  capital punishment. In 
both contexts I may want to communicate similar points, but the way in which I do so will 
vary. If  for the sake of  argument we accept a distinction between what is said and the way 
it is said, we can see that what I want to communicate is only one factor among many that 
will influence what I will actually say and the way in which I say it
72
. 
The worry that the need to be understood makes language resistant to change does 
not threaten the notion of  communicative need being a motivating factor in change
because different situations require, encourage and allow for different things to be said.
Shakespeare and Milton wanted to be understood by their audiences and readers and it was
through the use of novel expressions and neologisms that one understands Hamlet, A 
Comedy of  Errors or Paradise Lost. The worry put forward by Keller is only a worry if  all we 
did when we spoke was to communicate in a semantically strict sense. This is not the case 
as there is more to speaking than simply communicating a clear and distinct proposition:
we suggest, hint, give ourselves away, bore and excite. What appears to be a tension is not. I 
have now outlined why I think that all language change is, at least in part, socially 
motivated. If this is correct, then any theory of  change will need to take the idea of  socio-
cultural causality seriously, as there is no way to avoid it playing a part in such theories. This 
is significant because it entails that in principle an internalist account is bound to fail to 
provide us with explanations of  language change, let alone predictions. 
While I think internalist theories of  language change are faulty, it is not clear to 
what extent this is representative of  modern theories of  language change (though Labov 
shows internalist inclinations). We have seen how this idea is consistent with nineteenth 
century ideas of language and linguistics (1.1) and also with respect to generativism. 
However, as generative linguistics has been little concerned with language change I wish to 
                                                
72
The distinction is meant for illustrative purposes and is not meant to imply commitment to any rigorous 
separation of semantics and pragmatics.  
128
look at a non-generativist contemporary account of  language change. I show how a theory
can ostensibly take socio-cultural causality seriously but still adopt a problematic 
acceptance of  internalist changes and language as a highly abstract object.
3.2.3 Problems with a contemporary theory of change
The notion that language is in a substantive sense autonomous from human beings 
underpins the idea that language can change for its own sake. If  language were not 
autonomous, then one would plausibly always have to account for social forces in 
explaining language change. An internalist position suggests an answer to the question 
‘what is a language?’, an answer that sees language as a closed object of  investigation 
governed by strict rules or laws. The mark of  the Formalist Attitude is obvious here. The 
internalist position is evident in modern theories of  language change and is problematic. 
This is because language change ‘for its own sake’ is false, but also because language is 
often seen in a narrow and highly abstract way. These issues are linked, as with many 
approaches to the study of  language problems with methodology can often be traced to 
problems with the construal of  the object of  knowledge. One such example is in the work 
of  Jean Aitchison in her well-known Language Change: Progress or Decay? (2001). Here, an 
implicit internalist stance on change conflicts with her more qualified view that it is 
speakers who change language, which suggests language change be accounted for by social 
factors. One example of  this tension:  
Language has a remarkable instinct for self-preservation. It contains inbuilt self-
regulating devices which restore broken patterns and prevent disintegration. More 
accurately of  course, it is the speakers of  the language who perform these 
adjustments in response to some innate need to structure the information they have 
to remember (Aitchison 2001, p.169).
One could claim that in seeing a tension I am taking the analogy and metaphor too 
seriously and that the quote provides a way of  thinking about language change rather than 
any serious claim about the nature of  language and language change. I do not think this is 
the case and there are other quotations that imply attachment to an internalist position in 
Aitchison’s theory. For example, Aitchison approvingly quotes Sapir’s claim that ‘Language 
moves down time in a current of  its own making. It has a drift…The Linguistic drift has 
direction’ (Sapir 1921, p.150) and expands on this point, claiming that ‘clines are 
unidirectional for the most part. Just as streams always flow downhill, not uphill, so 
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language squeezes words together, it does not normally pull them apart’ (Aitchison 2001, 
p.114). When discussing the causes of  language change, Aitchison argues that change is 
‘double-layered’: ‘On the top layer, there are social triggers. These set off  or accelerate 
deeper causes, hidden tendencies which may be lying dormant within the language’ 
(Aitchison 2001, p.153). The quotations picked out can be seen to support an internalist 
view of  language change and the view of  language that underpins the internalist position. 
‘Language’ is cast as an impersonal force and the comparison with natural objects and 
discussion of  ‘self-regulating devices’ have a distinctly internalist ring. 
I want to give further consideration to the idea that language change is ‘double-
layered’, and that social factors provide a ‘triggering’ mechanism for the ‘deeper’ layer. 
Aitchison claims, social factors are not the ‘‘real’ causes, but simply accelerating agents 
which utilized and encouraged trends already existing in the language’ (Aitchison 2001, 
p.151). In the section, ‘Doing What Comes Naturally’, Aitchison expounds some of  the 
‘real’ (i.e. internal) causes of  change. Examples are phonetic ‘weak spots’, which because of  
the structure of  the speech apparatus, lead to changes in pronunciation. Aitchison picks 
out what she argues is the natural tendency of  consonant dropping at the end of  words, 
which is because end consonants are ‘weakly articulated and difficult to perceive. Within 
the last millennium, the voiceless stops [p], [t], [k] have been lost at the end of  words in 
French, Chinese and Maori, among other languages’ (Aitchison 2001, p.155). Aitchison 
concludes:
Overall, then, it is normal for consonants to disappear at the end of  words over the ages. It 
has already happened in numerous languages over the centuries, and will undoubtedly 
happen in many more. It is as much a crime for words gradually to lose their endings as it is 
for rivers gradually to erode river beds (Aitchison 2001, p.157).  
Aitchison refers to things such as consonant dropping as ‘predictable developments’ and 
claims there are phonetic tendencies that are ‘guaranteed to cause change, others [changes] 
wait in the wings…until some chance circumstance allows them to sneak in and take hold’ 
(Aitchison 2001, p.161). Such claims emphasise her view of  social factors as ancillary
‘triggers’ and significantly, her support for guaranteed and predictable changes and her 
claim that consonant dropping is ‘normal’ throughout languages are clear examples of  
language ‘changing for its own sake’. Her claim that consonants have ‘disappeared over the 
ages’ and will ‘undoubtedly’ continue to do plausibly relies on an internal law or linguistic 
teleology that has no recourse to the social factors in explaining the occurrence of  the 
change. This strongly suggests some support for internalist changes.
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Aitchison’s claims about consonant dropping face a number of  problems. First, if  
consonant dropping is an inexorable natural tendency then it is mildly surprising that the 
languages of  the world still possess such phonetic ‘weak spots’. Humans have had language 
for tens of  thousands of  years which, given the rate at which Aitchison describes
consonant dropping happening, it is not implausible that it should already have happened
in all languages. Another question is why there should be such phonetic weak spots at all in 
languages if  it is an inexorable natural tendency of  the language to remove them. That is, 
why would language ‘begin’ with qualities that are against its natural tendencies? The 
position suggests that language is internally evolving to be more consistent with its natural
tendencies. This is, to say the least, not obvious. Aitchison does not offer answers to these 
issues, but one plausible explanation for there still being phonetic weak spots is that they 
can be, and are, associated with social values which make them resistant or vulnerable to 
being dropped
73
. Indeed it is not hard to find English speakers who see pronouncing end 
consonants as a mark of  ‘speaking well’. This explanation aside though, the issues raised 
here are enough to show that support for ‘guaranteed’ changes and changes that will 
‘undoubtedly’ continue is hasty and to be viewed with suspicion. Therefore claims about 
‘predictable developments’ in language change, even if  one is using ‘predictable’ in a loose 
sense, appear over-confident.   
A broader issue with Aitchison’s theory is that she appears to privilege the ‘internal
layer’ in her account which she deems is where the ‘real’ cause of changes are. Such 
privileging is evident even in theorists known for their (relative) emphasis on the 
importance of  social factors. For example, at the beginning of  the seminal Sociolinguistic
Patterns, Labov claims ‘the contribution of  internal, structural forces to the effective spread 
of  linguistic changes…must naturally be of  primary concern to any linguist’ (Labov 1972, 
p.2). One reason for thinking Aitchison privileges the internal layer is because she supports 
internalist changes that have nothing to do with social triggers and are a result of  
‘predestination rather than sin [i.e. speaking badly/lazily]’ (Aitchison 2001, p.154). As such,
the internal layer is causal in all changes whereas the social is not and so the former is more 
important. Another reason for thinking this is due to a consistent way of  discussing
language that casts the social as ‘superficial’, seeing ‘sociolinguistic factors – fashion, 
foreign influence, or social need…not to be the ‘real’ causes, but simply accelerating agents 
which utilised and encouraged trends already existing in the language’ (Aitchison 2001, 
p.151). Aitchison though does recognise such phraseology can appear problematic and 
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offers the more neutral ‘long-term’ (internal) and ‘immediate’ (social), so it would be unfair 
to press this particular point too far. However despite this qualification her clear
commitment to internalist changes combined with suggestions that language is a natural 
object and that social factors are ‘superficial’ suggest otherwise. The point here is that while 
internal considerations are plausibly part of  the causes of  change, this does not provide
support for the internal layer being more ‘real’ or important and as the discussion of  
Aitchison’s support for internalist changes has shown, such a position is problematic.
Aitchison’s theory suffers from defects because, against initial appearances, it is 
allied to the internalist position. Aitchison sees social causes of  change as ancillary to the 
natural tendencies of  language, which is unjustified. Also, she supports guaranteed changes 
which suggest belief  in laws and predictions which, as we saw in chapter 1 when 
considering organicism and the neogrammarians and in more detail in 2.1, have not 
materialised and are unavailable to the linguist.
3.2.4 Post-hoc explanations and satisfying belief
I have shown how internalist changes are problematic and how support for them is present 
in an influential account of  language change. It now remains to discuss the issue of  
explanation and why, if  the reasons for change are social in nature, we should believe in 
such explanations. Notably, Aitchison explains how we might have knowledge of  the 
causes of  language change in rather weak terms. When discussing the syntactic influence 
that dissimilar languages can have on one another, she claims ‘[i]t seems unlikely that these 
uncommon features arose coincidentally in the languages concerned, and most linguists 
assume that they spread from their neighbours due to cultural contact’ (Aitchison 2001,
p.140). When presented in this way, taking social causality seriously within the framework 
of  an explanation for change looks unattractive because Aitchison relies on coincidence
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as something upon which knowledge of  causal connections can be based and also suggests 
that its status as a given is sufficient for such knowledge. Despite these issues, her claim is 
implicitly for a post-hoc explanation and for a variety of  reasons, post-hoc explanations are 
seen as problematic. One reason is because they propose a non-asymmetric relationship 
between prediction and explanation and as with cp laws (2.2), post-hoc explanations do not 
offer predictions and are not directly testable or falsifiable (Mantzavinos (ed.) 2009). 
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philosophical questions about the nature of causation and our knowledge of it. Therefore the quote 
provided is a fair representation about what she has to say on the subject.
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April McMahon offers a different approach to language change from Aitchison. 
She recognises the problems of  strict prediction and explanation and claims that 
‘consequently explanations in both fields [actuation and transmission] can be probabilistic 
or statistical at best’ (McMahon 1995, p.45). Here the problem is of  a different nature from 
Aitchison. As I argued in 2.2, statistical explanations do not explain anything, they only 
state the probability of  X happening given condition(s) Y. As probabilistic or statistical 
‘explanations’ are only restatements of  the statistical probability it is not clear how they are
explanations. While McMahon assumes less than Aitchison, her approach appears 
unfruitful and in fact, I want to broadly agree with Aitchison in her adoption of  post-hoc 
explanations. Such agreement though needs to be justified by an account of  why we should 
believe in post-hoc explanations and I do this in the next section by looking at William 
Labov’s seminal study of  language change in Martha’s Vineyard (Labov 1972 [1962]) by 
which I aim to make post-hoc explanations plausible. 
Before giving an account of post-hoc explanations, I would like to spend time 
outlining what I think my account is not. My account is not a Dewey/Rorty response 
which would replace explanation with ‘warranted assertability’ (Rorty 2008); i.e. the idea
that post-hoc explanations do not imply belief  in causal connections between objects or 
events but rather that the explanation has met certain society-specific criteria that makes it 
‘warranted’. Neither am I giving a Humean answer to the question by seeing belief  in 
causal connections and explanations as a matter of  ‘custom’ or ‘habit’ which are ‘the great 
guide[s] of  human life’ (Hume 1975 [1777], p.44) but ones which we hold against 
rationality. My account is meant to make belief in causal explanations from post-hoc 
explanans plausible. My position has an advantage over Dewey/Rorty or Hume because 
‘assertability’ or ‘habit’ differ in an important way from belief  in causal relations as they 
cannot motivate or justify research programmes. Assertability and habit do not permit us to 
believe anything in particular about objects which assertability statements are about. In the 
case of  assertability, all a scientist can do is to tick off  her findings against a series of  
prescriptive criteria and state that her thesis is or is not assertable given those criteria. In 
the case of  habit, the scientist is in an even worse situation, as her investigations are the 
result of a non-rational predilection. In either case, the scientist does not believe any 
particular thing about the objects, only particular things about the statements about objects 
(if  they believe those objects exist at all). If  this is the case, there would be little motivation 
for conducting research into how social factors affect language change (cf. 2.1). What is 
clear though is that when scientists do science they are attempting to answer questions 
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about the nature of  the object of study and if  they were not then research would be a
rarefied form of  Keynesian economics, charlantry, or both. 
I have outlined what my position is not, now let me outline what it is. Post-hoc 
explanations can possess a number of  qualities that are important for explanations in
science generally and if  we accept these qualities in other scientific theories as important to 
satisfying belief, we should accept them in post-hoc explanations. These qualities are 
coherence and consistency and when coupled with the principle of  inference to the best 
explanation, they can make post-hoc explanations strong candidates for belief. While none 
of  these qualities are sufficient for belief, they allow for post-hoc explanations to be 
compared, replaced, redescribed and even to a modest degree tested. Post-hoc explanations 
possess an evaluate framework and I now give some detail as to what this framework 
consists in.
- Coherence
Itkonen (1983) sees coherence as synonymous with ‘intelligibility’. Less simply, it is seen by 
BonJour as ‘a matter of  how well a body of  belief  ‘hangs together’’ (BonJour 1985, p.93)
and consists of  a number of  qualities of  explanations and theories that come in degrees
75
. 
Highly coherent explanations are those whose explananda hold logical connections with 
one another and to the explanandum and I follow Bartelborth in seeing coherence as being 
linked to ‘explanations [which] can embed the explained in such a way in our background 
knowledge that it becomes more acceptable’ (Bartelborth 1999, p.213). For example, if  
something is claimed I deem extremely unlikely (say that my adult life has been spent inside 
an elaborate computer game
76
), any credulity on my part will rely on it being explained how 
such events could have occurred and how this explanation embeds with my background 
knowledge. Coherence is especially important to post-hoc explanations because without 
the surety that nomic statements offer, coherence (generally via normic statements) 
provides a way in which explanations can be judged. Post-hoc explanations can vary in 
their coherence and so can be compared and seen as better or worse in terms of  
coherence. 
- Consistency
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This is the premise of the episode ‘Better than Life’ from the sitcom Red Dwarf and is also the subject 
of a novel by the same name (Naylor 1991).
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Consistency comes in two flavours; one is ‘mere consistency’ and the other ‘consistency’. 
Mere consistency is weak as it identifies a set of  events, sense-data etc. that are logically 
possible and do not imply the negation of  any other member of  the set
77
. While all 
coherent explanations will be merely consistent, much that is intuitively nonsense will also 
be and so mere consistency is not useful as one can (merely) consistently claim that pigeons 
spread disease because they are evil. ‘Consistency’ is a more substantial notion implying
congruence with other empirical research, which is similar to ‘diachronic coherence’ in that 
it suggests that if  a thesis is well confirmed and well understood (the link between crime 
and poverty, say) one should be careful not to instantly abandon the thesis in the face of
conflicting evidence. Consistency allows for a degree of  confirmation and falsification of  
post-hoc explanations and theories which, while not analogous to confirmation and 
falsification in the natural sciences (2.2), is a way in which post-hoc explanations can be 
ranked. Explanations that are highly consistent can eliminate competing explanations in 
two ways: due to empirical research falsifying theses and by the relation of  the thesis to
other empirical work, which are two sides of  the same coin. 
- Inference to the best explanation
This staple of philosophy of  science endorsed by all stripes of  realist
78
relies upon an 
explanation being (perhaps among other things) coherent and consistent and being ranked 
among other possible explanations as the most coherent and consistent. If  post-hoc 
explanations can been more or less consistent and coherent then there are grounds upon 
which to claim that some explanations are better than others and so inference to the best 
explanation can be invoked as reason to consider post-hoc explanations as explanations
worthy of  belief. I assume that support for inference to the best explanation is alien to 
warranted assertability/habit positions on explanation as inference to the best explanation
implies belief  while being expressly fallibilist. 
Coherence and consistency are the kind of  things that make scientific explanations 
plausible and are fundamental to the believability of  accounts and explanations of  every 
sort: statements to police, a child’s story about a broken vase, a philosophical treatise, self-
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diagnosis of  a mental illness or ad hoc hypotheses used to shore up an anomalous theory 
(dark matter). As we will see, post-hoc explanations can be fruitfully understood within this 
framework.  
3.2.5 Applicability: Martha’s Vineyard
Now to the positive account of  post-hoc explanations and the seminal study of  Labov 
(1972 [1962]) of  phonetic change in Martha’s Vineyard; a study known to anyone familiar 
with modern linguistics. While much has changed since the 1960’s in the development of  
the ‘dynamic paradigm’, the Martha’s Vineyard study is still pertinent to questions of  
linguistic methodology, causality and explanation, especially with respect to the importance 
of  social factors. As Blake and Josey note in their reconsideration of the Labov study, ‘the 
inquiry into real-time diachronic change in language communities is…often explained by 
transformations in the set of social dynamics’ (Blake and Josey 2003, p.451).
Martha’s Vineyard sits a few miles from the coast of  New England and at the time 
of  Labov’s study had a permanent population of  around 6000 with the addition of  
approximately 42,000 summer visitors, who had been given a pejorative appellation 
‘summer people’ by the locals. The population distribution of  the island was not uniform; 
the ‘summer people’ had bought up property on the north-east shore (known as up-island),
whereas locals mainly lived on the western side of  the island (down-island), which was 
predominantly rural. Among the industries on the island, a small number of  the population 
(2.5 percent) were employed in the fishing industry in an area called Chilmark. Fishing on 
the island had a long history and Chilmark fishermen were seen in positive terms by other 
locals, who regarded them (in sharp contrast to the ‘summer people’) as brave, independent 
and skilful.
In his study, Labov focussed upon the diphthongs /aw/ (out, house, trout) and /ay/ 
(while, pie, might) and noticed that some locals had a stronger tendency than ‘summer people’ 
to pronounce the diphthongs from a more central start point, so [aw] -> [əu] and [ay]-
>[əi]. This was particularly prevalent in local males between the ages of  31-45 and within 
this group, especially prevalent in the fishermen of  Chilmark and other rural areas, those 
‘stubbornly opposed to the incursions of  the “summer people”’ (Blake and Josey 2003, 
pp.453-454). Labov was assisted by linguistic information gathered from the island from 
thirty years beforehand, where there was shown to be a greater presence of  these 
centralised diphthongs among the locals than was evident in his study. In the intervening 
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period, the only groups that had withstood change were the fishermen of  Chilmark and 
other groups of  local males between the ages of  31-45. The explanation given by Labov 
was that the fishermen of  Chilmark represented a standard of  ‘authenticity’ for other males 
in the area and one aspect of this authenticity was realised in the centralisation of
diphthongs in the phonological system of  the fishermen. From this, Labov proposed two 
things. Firstly, that the direction of  the change was from the fishermen to the male 
demographic (the local men were copying the fishermen) and second that this was 
motivated by a desire on the part of  the male demographic in question to be ‘authentic’, 
which made the men resistant to the changes that were happening in other parts of  the 
island (i.e. up-island). As Labov summates it, ‘one cannot understand the development of  
language change apart from the social life of  the community in which it occurs’ (Labov
1972 [1962], p.3).
Less informally, Labov’s explanation looks like this, where ‘CF’ is Chilmark 
Fishermen and ‘MD’ is the male demographic that Labov picks out as imitative of  CF
(though some of  CF are MD). ‘OI’ are the other islanders who have centralised the 
diphthong. 
E1
C1 a sequence [aw] spoken by OI
C2 a sequence [əu] spoken by CF 
C3 a sequence [əu] spoken by MD
C4 CF are seen as ‘authentic’ by MD
C4a the sequence [əu] spoken by CF is seen by MD as part of  what makes an islander
‘authentic’. 
NS1 speakers tend to want to be ‘authentic’. 
E a sequence [əu] spoken by CF and MD 
A few caveats are required. For simplicity, this explanation only considers the maintenance 
of  the [əu] diphthong in MD, not other changes that were observed by Labov (the [ay]>[əi] 
shift). Also as with all explanatory accounts, there is the possibility for expansion or 
contraction of antecedents. For example C4a is strictly not needed, though it makes clearer 
the relation between perceived authenticity and a realisation of  the [aw]/[əu] part of  the 
phonetic system. On the other hand, there are grounding or background assumptions
which might require their own explanation. For example, how it is that MD share a 
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conception of  authenticity and what does ‘authenticity’ consist in? As I argued with respect 
to cp laws, an explanation of  an event will contain an unspecified number of  assumptions 
which is needed to secure the coordination of  content of  the explanation. As Clark and 
Brennan put it, coordination of  content between parties cannot happen without ‘a vast 
amount of  shared information or common ground- that is, mutual knowledge, mutual 
beliefs and mutual assumptions’ (Clark and Brennan in Resnick and Levine (eds.) 1991, 
p.127). So while caution is advised, tacit assumptions and implicit background conditions 
cannot be avoided if  explanations are to be meaningful and not forbiddingly long. 
To contrast my gloss of  Labov’s explanation and show how post-hoc explanations 
can be usefully compared, I give another potential explanation of  the same event. 
E2
C1 a sequence [aw] spoken by OI
C2 a sequence [əu] spoken by CF 
C3 a sequence [əu] spoken by MD
C4 CF are seen as foreigners by MD
C4a the sequence [əu] spoken by CF is seen by MD as part of  what makes CF ‘foreign’. 
NS1 speakers tend to want to be ‘foreign’. 
E a sequence [əu] spoken by CF and MD
I want to compare E1 and E2 against the criteria set out above to see Labov’s explanation
can be considered superior to E2.    
Coherence. The coherence of  an explanation is the extent to which the explananda are 
relevant to the explanandum and the explananda are mutually supportive. It initially appears 
that both the ‘foreign’ and the ‘authentic’ explanations have similar coherence as one can 
see from the explanations that the normic statements and the conditions surrounding them 
seem equally relevant. However, the extent to which the respective normic statements are 
true of  the target of  the explanation are not the same. In attempting to find an 
explanation, Labov did not find a correlation between ‘foreignness’ and the pronunciation 
of  the [əu] diphthong, but to a set of positive qualities associated with the Chilmark 
fishermen (local, hardworking, strong) captured as ‘authentic’ and the resistance to the 
sound change among MD. The ‘foreign’ explanation then is less coherent because it does 
not tie up with an independently verified and relevant normic statement about the society 
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in question; it does not embed as successfully with background knowledge. 
This account is rudimentary and could be enriched by an accompanying exegesis of  
‘authenticity’, but the point is that we have grounds to consider the ‘foreign’ explanation as 
less good than the ‘authenticity’ explanation as E1 ‘hangs together’ better than E2. One 
might object that Labov did not bother to see if ‘foreign’ was a relevant category in the 
target community and so even if  there is a (statically significant, intelligible) relationship 
between perception of  ‘authenticity’ of  CF and pronunciation of  the [əu] diphthong, it is 
radically underdetermined. Though there are clear limitations to underdetermination. This
is because there is reason ex hypothesi to think that certain categories and concepts are not
appropriate to the explanation. Categories such as ‘Is a giant lizard’, ‘Speaks linear-B’ and 
‘Owns two bicycles’ are such categories because one has no good reason to think they apply in 
the first place as there is not an intelligible story one can tell about them. Another reason is 
that if  one finds a category to be relevant, then other categories are less likely to be 
relevant. In the example above, the relevance of  being an ‘authentic’ inhabitant of  Martha’s 
Vineyard would diminish the likelihood of  ‘foreign’ having the same impact. 
Consistency. Given the status of  Labov’s study as a seminal piece of  sociolinguistic research,
whose methods and broad findings about the relevance of  social factors to change have 
been seen to be fruitful and confirmed (Milroy 1987, Blake and Josey 2003), it is fairly clear 
how my gloss of Labov’s explanation is congruent with other coherent and consistent
research and without engaging in a lengthy peer-review, I can only claim that Labov’s study 
is consistent with other research
79
. As well its acknowledged influence, Labov’s study also 
relied on data collected in Martha’s Vineyard thirty years before, something which 
integrates it within the canon of  research and gives us reason to see it as highly consistent.  
The question of  falsification might be raised here, asking under what circumstances 
one would be justified in giving up the explanation. It may be argued that unless one can 
state this in advance, one has licence to engage in intellectually disingenuous shifting of  
criteria to fit one’s own theoretical inclinations. The answer to this is that one cannot give 
in advance the exact conditions under which a particular explanation would need to be
abandoned and this is not for reasons of  intellectual disingenuousness. As society is 
causally open, one would expect counter-instances to a hypothesis and if  this were never 
the case there would be no need for post-hoc explanations, cp laws or disposition 
ascriptions. Also, as research is generated from a theory or particular explanation, 
                                                
79
See entries under ‘Labov’ in (Trask (ed.) 1997, Chapman and Routledge (eds.) 2005).
139
explanations of  events often become refined, rather than refuted outright. I may explain 
the occurrence of  cat poo on my kitchen floor as a result of  my cat. Upon further 
investigation, my neighbour’s action of  taping up the cat flap while Fluffkin is in the house
may require me to refine my explanation. Though the initial explanation was not false, it 
has less explanatory power and as explanations are subject to refinement, so must the 
conditions where those explanations might be brought into question. Refinement also 
helps to put into question competing explanations in contention before I had additional
knowledge; for example the idea that my neighbour put the cat poo there or that Fluffkin is 
a very bad kitty indeed. For these reasons a requirement of  setting out falsification criteria 
in advance is too strong.
Only on a case-by-case basis can a particular explanation or theory come into 
question. The sociological cliché of  the link between crime and poverty has counter-
instances, namely the recent recession, where crime levels across Europe have fallen despite 
an increase in real and relative poverty
80
. This fall could potentially be accounted for by the 
state’s awareness of  the crime-poverty link and responses to it by having ‘tougher’ policing 
and putting more resources into policing and security measures. Such state involvement 
may produce a counter-instance to the crime-poverty link, but the action of  governments 
and individuals presuppose the truth of  it. 
Inference to the best explanation. Both the scalar nature of  coherence and consistency allows 
explanations to be ranked as more or less good. It is therefore appropriate to invoke 
inference to the best explanation because we have a substantive sense in which 
explanations can be more or less good. Labov’s explanation of  sound change in Martha’s 
Vineyard is both coherent and consistent and there are other plausible explanations that are 
less coherent or consistent with Labov’s explanation. 
One might object that even if  post-hoc explanations have such qualities, we still 
have a worrying lack of  surety about their truth because the best explanation out of  a set 
of  what may be very poor explanations is still a very poor explanation. My answer is that 
either the concept of  a ‘very poor’ explanation presupposes some criteria for what
constitutes a good explanation, in which case we can still accept the best, but with caution, 
or it begs the question. In the future, today’s research and explanations may appear less 
coherent and less consistent, but this is an occupational hazard of  explanation in science in 
general, rather than social explanation in particular. It is worth noting that a coherent 
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explanation that is highly consistent with other coherent research is given further support 
by dint of  the fact that the research it is consistent with may also be highly consistent with 
other research. The explanations of  today that underlabour for the explanations and 
theories of  the future and post-hoc explanations of  language change are not alone in this 
respect.
As support for internalist changes supports a view of  language that sees it as autonomous 
from social factors, my arguments concerning the motivated nature of language and my 
support for externalist changes suggest that language is not autonomous from social 
factors as motivation and change are intimately connected to the things speakers do with 
language. As I have emphasised, Actual Speech needs to be recognised as the engine of  
change as linguistic action is social action and it is through linguistic action that language 
reproduces and potentially changes itself.
Language continues to appear a less autonomous object than many linguists 
suppose, but so far we have not directly considered an important issue in the philosophy of  
language and linguistics about what it is to know a language. At the end of  chapter 2, I 
argued that possession of  language by agents can be fruitfully seen as a power. By 
foregrounding communication, this idea was consistent with the importance of  Actual 
Speech and implied that language was a social object existing in a causally open system, as 
opposed to a highly constrained and abstract object that is amenable to ‘scientific’ study, 
motivated by de facto stipulations of  theoretical boundaries or de jure assumptions or
arguments about the closure of  the linguistic system. However, I have not dealt with the 
question of  what it is that a speaker must know in order to speak a language, only that in 
knowing a particular language, one has a power to communicate in that language. The
question of  knowledge of  language is relevant for two reasons then. It will clarify what I 
think language is and provide another opportunity for reflection on what it is to study 
language; bearing again upon the question of what linguistics is. 
3.3 Knowledge of  language
The question of  what it is to know a language is an important matter for the philosophy of  
language and linguistics. The question overlaps with the question ‘what is a language?’ and 
an answer to one will imply something about the other. Whatever knowledge of  language 
is, it describes the extent to which language structure is autonomous from and interacts 
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with external factors. Here, ‘external factors’ can be anything from context, tacitly known 
pragmatic rules or other cognitive systems, capacities or knowledge. There is agreement 
that knowledge of  language is something without which communication would not be 
possible, so the question is both interesting and important.
This is where agreement can end though; an agreement sometimes based on no 
more than an acknowledgement that in English, ‘to know’ is a verb collocated with ‘a 
language’
81
. Positions about the nature of  knowledge of  language fall roughly into two 
camps. One camp is occupied by those who hold to the possibility of  a formal and precise 
description of  what a speaker knows when they know a language (‘competence’, following 
Chomsky) and the other by those who deny this and see knowledge of  language as a non-
discrete ability whose rules are pervasively affected by language use, so that a systematic 
account is difficult or impossible
82
. In his earlier work, Davidson held the latter and 
explained what an account of  knowledge of  language should consist in, in this way:
One natural condition to impose is that we must be able to define a predicate of  
expressions, based solely on their formal properties, that picks out the class of  meaningful 
expressions (sentences), on the assumption that various psychological variables are held 
constant. This predicate gives the grammar of  the language. Another, and more interesting, 
condition is that we must be able to specify, in a way that depends effectively and solely on 
formal considerations, what every sentence means. With the right psychological trappings, 
our theory should equip us to say, for any arbitrary sentence, what a speaker of  the 
language means by that sentence (or takes it to mean) (Davidson 2001 [1965], p.8). 
This is a paradigmatic example of  what I again call an ‘internalist’ position; internalist 
because, ideally, what a speaker knows when they know a language is a finite set of  
grammatical rules plus a semantic framework which is sufficient for interpretation of  any 
sentence in the language. Within linguistics, this position is reflected by generativism, 
evident in the following quotes:
A standard, and I think basically correct, approach to [knowledge of  language] is to assume 
that a person who knows a language has internalized a grammar, a system of  rules and 
principles that assigns structural descriptions to linguistic expressions (Chomsky 1981, p.9).
A fully adequate grammar must assign to each of  an infinite range of  sentences a structural 
description indicating how this sentence is understood by the ideal speaker-hearer. […] one 
of  the qualities that all languages have in common is their ‘creative’ aspect. Thus an 
                                                
81
See Harris (1981 pp.36-37).
82
This is associated with positions in the philosophy of language concerning the role of context in 
felicitous interpretation. It goes by a number of names including, ‘semantic scepticism’ (Stanley 
2007), ‘radical contextualism’ (Cappelen and Lepore 2005) and ‘occasion sensitivity’ (Travis 2008).
142
essential property of  language is that it provides the means for expressing indefinitely many 
thoughts and for reacting appropriately to an indefinite range of  new situations (Chomsky
1965, pp.5-6)
83
.
Holding the opposite view, we may consider Baker and Hacker:
Knowing a language is a matter of  possession of  a wide array of  skills associated with 
speaking and understanding, of  being able to use and respond cogently to the use of  
language. It is wholly unclear what is meant by ‘an account’ of  what it is that someone 
knows when he knows English…If  someone can speak a language then he can do a myriad 
of  things with it; he can make assertions, issue statements, express beliefs…an indefinitely 
long array of  acts and activities accessible to language-users (Baker and Hacker 1984, 
p.278)
This is an example of  an externalist position on knowledge of  language; externalist 
because what is emphasised is that knowing a language is an ability (or a power) to do 
certain kinds of  things. Linguistic activity is linked with activity-in-general in a way that 
implies any distinction between ‘knowledge of  language’ and ‘knowledge’ is fuzzy or even 
non-existent. Minimally for the externalist (for this is a spectrum rather than a single 
position), knowledge of  language is non-autonomous and non-discrete. This does not rule 
out the existence of  tacit or propositional knowledge of  the rules of  a language, but it does 
mean that the rules of  one’s language (‘rules’ here as understood by the internalist) are not 
sufficient for the understanding of  arbitrary sentences in that language or for explaining 
linguistic creativity. Within linguistics, externalism is reflected in cognitive linguistics. 
According to Evans and Green:
In rejecting the [generativist] distinction between competence and performance, cognitive 
linguists argue that knowledge of  language is derived from patterns of  language use, and 
further, that knowledge of  language is knowledge of  how language is used…the 
organisation of  our language system is intimately related to, and derives directly from, how 
language is actually used. It follows from this that language structure cannot be studied 
without taking into account the nature of  language use.’ (Evans and Green 2007, p.108).
In opposition to internalist proposals for the autonomy of  linguistic knowledge, an 
acceptance of  the importance of  usage for an account of  linguistic knowledge recognises
that the ‘context in which an utterance or usage event is situated is central to the cognitive 
explanation. This is particularly true of  word meaning (Evans and Green 2007, p.112). As 
                                                
83
Lepore notes the link between Chomsky and Davidson with respect to their view of knowledge of 
language, though stresses that unlike Chomsky, Davidson’s concerns about describing knowledge of 
language are ‘not influenced by psychological or neuropsychological concerns. The ‘constraints’ on 
semantic theories I have discussed are not about how an ability is put to use, acquired, stored or 
represented’ (Lepore 1982, pp.190-191).
143
such, knowledge of  language is not autonomous in the way the internalist suggests. 
The internalist/externalist distinction is also evident in a difference in what are 
considered the theoretical units of  linguistic study. Internalists make use of  the sentence, the 
largest meaningful unit in a theory which is seen as context-free and whose meaning is 
given by the concatenation of rules. In Wittgensteinian spirit, externalist linguists ascribe to 
the ‘usage based thesis’ and emphasise the utterance, which Croft defines as ‘a particular, 
actual occurrence of  the product of  human behaviour in communicative interaction…as it 
is pronounced, grammatically structured, and semantically and pragmatically interpreted in 
a context’ (Croft 2000, p.26). The ‘utterance’ has been described as ‘unit like’ and 
‘somewhat discrete’ (Evans and Green 2007, p.110) in recognition that knowledge of  
language concerns more than the internalist admits and so cannot be defined with the same 
level of  specificity as the ‘sentence’. 
I treat the two positions generally as it is beyond the scope of  this enquiry to 
examine the myriad ways in which internalism/externalism shapes specific issues in the 
philosophy of  linguistics and language; questions such as the relation between semantics 
and pragmatics or the viability of  a theory of interpretation. Rather, what I propose to do 
in this section is to show why, so far as I have outlined them, the externalist position is 
correct and the internalist position is false. My argument has two stages. First I argue that 
what is taken to be ‘knowledge of  language’ is not amenable to the formalised study that 
internalists desire because knowledge of  language and knowledge are pervasively linked. 
Next, I defuse a worry taken from early Davidson that if  internalism is false, then language 
learning is not possible. Lastly, I show how externalism about knowledge of  language fits 
with my view of  language as a power and my position on language change, arbitrariness 
and Actual Speech. This will provide unity to the themes I have covered in this chapter and 
in chapter 2 and will stress the importance of  understanding the social nature of  language 
and the importance of  social activity to language, paving the way for the concluding 
chapter.
3.3.1 Knowledge of  language and knowledge of  the world
Internalism and externalism about knowledge of  language imply a different relationship 
with respect to what one may call ‘knowledge of  the world’. As Harris describes what he 
calls a ‘segregational’ approach to language, ‘for this theorist, semiological knowledge and 
knowledge of  the world are two segregated domains. There is contact between the two but 
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nevertheless they…are to be studied independently’ (Harris 1996, x). This characterisation 
can be fairly applied to internalism and if  it were shown that ‘knowledge of  the world’ and 
‘semiological knowledge’ (which we can read as linguistic knowledge)
84
are not just in 
contact, but are pervasively interlinked, then the internalist view of  knowledge of  language 
would be put into question. One way of  doing this would be to consider sentences
85
whose 
meaning putatively relies upon knowledge that is, for the internalist, non-linguistic. If  it 
were shown that the meaning of  sentences relied on non-linguistic knowledge in a general 
and pervasive way, then the internalist assumption of  the separation between linguistic and 
non-linguistic knowledge and the autonomy of  the former would be brought into question. 
Let us say I am on a day out with my partner and we are getting hungry. Across the 
road my partner spies a Deli and suggests lunch in the park. She offers to go and buy lunch 
and asks what I would like. I respond: 
(1) Please get me a tub of  my favourite things. 
This sentence could mean any number of  things but let us suspend this question and simply 
say that my partner returns with dolmades and Kalamata olives. She does not return with 
pickled garlic and chorizo or any of  the many other things the Deli has to offer. And when 
she returns with the dolmades and Kalamata olives, I am satisfied at her purchases and it 
does not cross my mind that she did not understand my speaking of  (1). Indeed, I consider 
my speaking of  (1) to have been well understood. Communicatively, things have gone well. 
But how, from my speaking of  (1), did my partner know what to get from the Deli? 
One answer on offer is that she is familiar with the rules of  English and has internalised a 
grammar, a system of  rules and principles that assigns structural descriptions to linguistic 
expressions and that if  we had a true theory of  the grammar, we would know what she 
understands by (1), or indeed what she understands by any other arbitrary utterance in 
English. This is not a satisfying explanation because it is not clear how my partner’s 
knowledge of  English might ascribe a structural description to (1) which would allow a 
theorist in possession of  the linguistic facts to give the meaning of  (1), namely that I am 
requesting something like dolmades and Kalamata olives. Even if  my partner has semantic 
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intuitions about the words ‘my’, ‘favourite’ and ‘things’, there seems nothing in her 
grammar which produced a structural description of  (1) which would sit with the fact that 
she knew what to get from the Deli. 
Another explanation of  why my partner understands what she does by (1) is that 
she knows my favourite Deli items and the items I do not like. This knowledge allows her 
to interpret ‘a tub of  my favourite things’ in such a way that leads her to return with 
dolmades and Kalamata olives and this suggests that more than her linguistic knowledge 
has been involved in the interpretation of  (1) and this knowledge may be linked to any
other amount of  propositional knowledge regarding Aegean cuisine or the currency system 
of  the UK. In her felicitous interpretation of  (1), knowledge of  the world has played an 
essential part. It seems reasonable that by (1), my partner understood something like:
(1’) Please get me a tub of  dolmades and Kalamata olives. 
Here, the internalist might respond that the noun phrase consisting of  a possessive 
determiner, plus an adjective plus a non-specific noun, ‘my favourite things’ has been 
ascribed a structural description by means of  a transformative rule so that ‘my favourite 
things’ is given the reading ‘dolmades and Kalamata olives’, giving us (1’). This would not 
help the internalist in defending their view of  knowledge of  language because (1’) has not 
been given as the meaning of  (1) ‘in a way that depends effectively and solely on formal 
considerations’, but rather on a number of non-linguistic, external factors including my 
partner’s knowledge of  my likes and dislikes, offers at the Deli, the amount of  change in 
her wallet and so on. Even if  we are generous and allow that ‘dolmades and Kalamata 
olives’ is covertly represented in the syntax in a way akin to quantifier domain restriction or 
ellipsis
86
, its presence as a value of  some part of  the sentence is not due to linguistic 
knowledge, but to knowledge of  the world. 
The problem of  separating linguistic knowledge from knowledge of  the world is 
famously discussed in Davidson’s ‘A Nice Derangement of  Epitaphs’ (2006 [1986]) which 
represents a marked change to his earlier thought. Davidson is concerned by the fact that 
speakers use language in nonstandard ways, but are nevertheless understood. He considers 
malapropisms, one example of  which is Mrs Malaprop’s,
87
‘a nice derangement of  epitaphs’ 
which is understood to mean ‘a nice arrangement of  epithets’ and he provides other
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examples to make plausible that such phenomena are ubiquitous. To explain the felicitous 
interpretation of  non-standard utterances, Davidson contrasts what he calls ‘prior theory’, 
such as knowledge of  the grammatical rules of  a language and the ‘first’, or dictionary 
meaning of  words, with ‘passing theory’ which are momentary hypotheses speakers 
develop ‘on the hoof ’ in order to interpret particular utterances. Davidson sees the 
employment of  passing theories as ubiquitous and essential to interpretation, though this 
means that ‘we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of  a language, but we have 
erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the 
world generally’ (Davidson 2006 [1986] p.265). He famously declares that ‘there is no such 
thing as a language, not if  a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists 
have supposed’ (Davidson 2006 [1986], p.265). What is known as the ‘no language’ thesis 
has been the subject of  much debate
88
, and is generally seen as a rejection by Davidson of  
his own earlier (internalist) account of  linguistic knowledge and the corresponding 
aspirations of  a theory of  meaning (of  which the first quote in this section is 
representative). 
Davidson’s thesis in ‘Derangement’ is relevant here in two ways. It suggests that 
linguistic knowledge as understood by the internalist fails in its aim of  giving the meaning 
for an arbitrary sentence in a language (what would be partly constitutive of  the prior 
theory). Also, what allows for the interpretation of  a nonstandard utterance, or a quite 
standard utterance such as (1), is a passing theory, something about which one can outline 
no rules for in advance. Not only is the distinction between linguistic knowledge and 
knowledge of  the world not separate, but what role knowledge of  the world may play in 
the interpretation of  an arbitrary sentence cannot be known. It is not just as Stroud 
suggests that, ‘[c]ommunicating involves saying something, and so doing something, and 
knowledge of  the meanings of  words alone cannot tell you what to do, or what someone 
else is doing’ (Stroud in Davidson 1998, p.90) but it is that this ‘doing’ is itself  so varied 
that one cannot add an incomplete prior theory to an incomplete theory of  passing 
theories to produce a neat characterisation of  a speaker’s linguistic knowledge or 
competence. 
We can see this if  we return to (1). Here, it may be supposed that what is needed 
for a speaker/hearer to interpret (1) as (1’) is that two speakers (X, Y) share a language (L) 
and possess a theory of  the other speaker (tX, tY) and a theory of  the theory the other 
speaker has about them (totX, totY) so that X has L, tY and totX and Y has L, tX and totY. 
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We can even stipulate that theories have the same content and are different only with 
respect to their possessors. Now, the possession of  L and of  tX/tY and totY/totX cannot 
guarantee the successful interpretation of  (1) as (1’) as at any point events may occur which 
would require the implementation of  a passing theory. Mishearing and slurred speech aside, 
this is because speakers can be witty, sarcastic, quote, use metaphor and generally be
creative with language, as well as making mistakes such as spoonerisms and malapropisms. 
To illustrate, say we have a similar situation to the one described around (1), only that now, 
just before myself  and my partner stop for lunch we overhear this snippet of  dialogue:
A: Get me a tub of  my favourite things.
B: I’m not a mind reader. What do you mean ‘favourite things’? 
A: Oh you know, like dolmades and Kalamata olives.
Then, when we come to stop for lunch soon after, I am taken by the muse and utter (1),
referring as I understand it to the overheard conversation. My utterance of  (1) is 
interpreted as (1’), but my partner has used more than just prior theory; she has used what 
might only be described as her general intelligence and has formulated a passing theory to 
understand (1) as (1’). Here, possession of  L, a theory of  the speaker and a theory of  the 
theory the speaker has about you is not sufficient for the interpretation of  (1). This is not 
to privilege passing theories over prior theories, but to emphasise that knowledge of  
language and knowledge of  the world are pervasively interrelated. I agree with Pietroski’s 
point that while ‘passing theories are not themselves theories of  languages in any 
traditional sense, they do not spring into existence ab initio. What speakers have learned 
will be relevant- indeed, essential -to the passing theories they construct’ (Pietroski 1994, 
p.103), and this is true in two ways. Pietroski is referring primarily to language rules
89
as 
part of  prior theories that inform passing theories, though as we have seen with the first 
example of  the speaking of  (1), knowledge of  the world can be part of  our prior theories
also. What speakers have potentially learned about anything can come to play a part in the 
theories they construct, both of  prior and passing theories.    
Given my acceptance of  the interrelated nature of  linguistic knowledge and 
knowledge of  the world, it could be argued my understanding of  language as a power is 
brought into question. This is because the conclusion that ‘there is no such thing as a
language’ in ‘Derangement’ is the result of  an inability to separate knowledge of  language 
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from knowledge of  the world. If  I accept the conclusion, it is not clear how I can maintain 
languages exist and if  there are no languages, then language cannot be a power. The first 
point against this worry is a scholarly one. It is not Davidson’s post-Derangement position 
that languages do not exist, as he qualifies his ‘no language’ remark in terms of  ‘what many 
philosophers and linguists have supposed’
90
. Davidson sees no problem in accepting what 
he calls an ‘institutionalised linguistic background’,
as long as it is taken as saying that members of  a “speech community” share a host of  
overlapping, non-identical, habits of  speech, and have corresponding expectations about 
what others in the community will mean by what they say (such a set of  expectations is 
what is characterized by what I called a “prior theory”) (Davidson 1998, p.109).
    
This is perfectly consistent with my position on language as a power. In 2.3.3 I argued that 
languages existed on scales of  intelligibility which can be seen in the case of  
Portuguese/Spanish and I was explicit in seeing communication events as polygenic, 
involving other powers which it will act with. Strongly anthropocentric powers such as 
language are to be viewed in broad terms as the social realm is casually open. The ‘no 
language’ thesis appears to be directed at internalists and does not require the 
abandonment of  the idea that languages exist. 
Another reason why my understanding of  language as a power does not conflict 
with my position on knowledge of  language is that we still have a clear sense that different 
languages exist, as we refer to them in order to explain such things as the need for 
translators or the existence of  language schools and French GCSEs. Our intuitive
explanation of  such things rests on the idea that people speak different languages and this 
means they can do different things. The unavoidability of  describing such situations and 
examples without begging the question suggests this cannot be wrong.
One can accept a distinction between knowledge of  language and knowledge of  
the world without accepting the autonomy of  linguistic knowledge or the internalist 
account of  its involvement in felicitous interpretation of  sentences. What has to be given 
up is the idea that knowledge of  language plus certain physiological abilities is sufficient for 
felicitous interpretation of  sentences, suggesting that internalism should be abandoned. 
3.3.2 A worry about learnability 
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Though we may reject internalism, there are potential problems for externalist accounts
concerning the interdependence of  knowledge of  language and knowledge of  the world. I 
consider one of  these to pre-empt a likely criticism that could motivate slipping back into 
internalism, but also to sharpen what I think an externalist account of  linguistic knowledge 
should be.
The issue concerns the learnability of  languages. In his pre-Derangement work, 
Davidson argued that ‘a satisfactory theory must discover a finite basic vocabulary in verbal 
phenomena to be interpreted if  it is to prove useful to a creature with finite powers’ 
(Davidson 2001, p.xv) and was concerned his account of  knowledge of  language explained 
why languages were learnable. As speakers are mortal and do not possess an infinite 
memory, their ability to understand a potential infinity of  sentences must be based on a 
finite set of  rules, utilised in the interpretation of  arbitrary sentences in their language. For 
a language to be learnable (or more generally to be a human language)
91
it must contain a 
finite amount of  semantic primitives, described in the following way:
Let us call an expression a semantical primitive provided the rules which give the meaning 
for the sentences in which it does not appear do not suffice to determine the meaning of  
the sentences in which it does appear. Then we may express the condition under discussion 
by saying: a learnable language has a finite number of  semantical primitives (Davidson
2001 [1965], p.9).
Davidson goes on to discuss positions he argues generate infinite semantical primitives and 
are therefore unlearnable in principle. I do not deal with these as my concern is how this 
position relates to discussion of  knowledge of  language. If  knowledge of  the world 
impinges on knowledge of  language pervasively (as discussions of  (1), (1’) and passing 
theories suggest) then according to Davidson here, an account of  knowledge of  language 
that does not see it as autonomous from knowledge of  the world should be unlearnable 
because new rules can enter the language at any time and often do by means of  passing 
theories. It is then appropriate that one rejecting an internalist account of  linguistic 
knowledge responds either by showing that Davidson’s criteria for learnability are too 
strong or by showing how an externalist account can in fact meet such criteria. As I 
consider the chances for the latter as bleak, I will focus on the former.
Haack offers a criticism of  Davidson that I think can be generalised to show that 
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Chomsky holds a similar concern, though he predictably gives greater emphasis to the innately 
specified character of knowledge of language and so downplays the extent to which agents learn a 
language from experience as ‘we expect that languages are ‘learnable’ because there is little to learn’ 
(Chomsky 2000, p.124). 
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Davidson’s criteria for learnability are too strong. Haack notes, ‘if  we assume, which is 
plausible, that number words are part of  the English vocabulary, then it would seem that 
English has an infinite number of  words, and this seems to go against Davidson’s view’ 
(Haack 1978, p.234). Haack though is generous to the spirit of  Davidson’s view and 
suggests that the infinity of  numbers can be generated by the morphological rules of  the 
language and so this need not present a problem in terms of  generation of  infinite 
semantic primitives. However, this point raises the idea that items in a language are or at 
least can be infinite and this causes a problem for Davidson. Consider neologisms. 
Neologisms are a frequent and undeniable occurrence and while we may be able to account 
for some of  the features of  the word ‘internet’ (admittedly no longer a neologism) or 
‘intersectional’
92
by reference to features and rules of  English (consider ecological and 
genetic motivation in 3.2.4), knowing those rules and features cannot give us the meaning 
of  ‘internet’ in a way that the morphological rules concerning number-word formation 
might plausibly give the meaning of  ‘three hundred and fifty six’. More is needed, for 
example ostensive definition or experience with the object or concept concerned. Learning 
new words and concepts is neither an innate process (1.3.3) nor one obviously derivable 
from synchronic semantic primitives. If  we consider again Haack’s general point about an 
infinity of  words going against Davidson’s view about the learnability of  languages, we can 
see that while is this is not a problem for numbers, it is a problem for neologisms because 
additional semantic primitives can enter the language at any time. 
That languages change not only semantically, but phonologically, grammatically and 
syntactically, requires that an agent’s knowledge of  language loosely mirrors changes in the 
language if  an implausible gap is not to open up between the two. It is a diachronic fact 
that new rules can enter the language at any time (as well as be removed, altered) and there 
is no obvious upper limit to these changes, some of  which will add
93
semantic primitives to 
the language. Therefore we have reason to think Davidson’s account of  a learnable 
language must be too strong, for the semantic primitives of  a language can increase 
without obvious limit and all languages are by definition learnable or acquirable.  One may 
think I am missing the point as Davidson is concerned with accounts of  some aspect of  
language (quotation, indirect discourse) generating an infinite number of  semantic primitives 
by ascribing each token of  a feature of  a language the status of  a unitary predicate. It may 
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One may argue I have not sufficiently specified the nature of ‘addition’ and that some rule additions to 
a language are derivable from pre-existing rules within the language. While this might be the case in 
some instances, the idea that rule addition is not simply derivable from existing rules is commonly 
accepted, see (Holt (ed.) 2003). 
151
be argued that language change is not like this because change happens slowly enough for 
speakers to learn new semantic primitives and so does not generate semantic primitives in 
the relevant sense. I think the similarities are more impressive than the differences though,
as with additive changes there will be clear cases where ‘meanings are not given by the rules 
already mastered’ and where this is the case, according to Davidson, ‘[i]t is natural to say 
that such a language is unlearnable’ (Davidson, 2001 [1965], p.8). The fact speakers learn new 
vocabulary and grammatical rules then does appear to go against Davidson’s account of  a 
learnable language. 
This leads to with another reason we can consider Davidson’s criteria too strong is 
because the individual speaker seems to be in a position which is the same as if  they knew 
an ‘unlearnable’ language. As Haack points out,
Speakers of  English differ among themselves with respect to the number of  grammatical 
rules which they accept or behave in accordance with. Even if  there were an infinite 
number of  grammatical rules of  English, so long as different speakers shared some of  a 
finite number of  these, they could produce new sentences, communicate with one another 
… it is not required that a speaker know all the lexical items of  a language, so it is not 
required that a speaker know all the grammatical rules of  the language (Haack 1978, p.235).
Internalists appear to take for granted that speakers of  a language understand any arbitrary 
sentence in their language in virtue of  the rules that make up their knowledge of  the 
language. This is false. We ask the meaning of  words and sentences all the time and as 
English speakers, will probably die without complete knowledge of  English. Given that 
this is the case, there is little difference between speakers who are partly ignorant of  their 
language (all of  us) and a language that contains unlimited semantic primitives. There being 
little difference suggests that having a language with infinite semantic primitives does not 
make a language unlearnable because all speakers are in a position as if  they did know such 
a language and yet they still clearly learn languages. 
What this means for a view of  language which sees linguistic knowledge and 
knowledge of  the world as non-autonomous is that it is not in principle unlearnable 
because Davidson’s criteria are too strong and so the worry is defused. Language learning is 
not just a matter of  having an internally represented grammar, it is also a matter of  having 
the second-order ability to learn and develop interpretative strategies. Here language 
change is relevant because actuation implies communicative success. For acts of  actuation
to transmit additional semantic primitives through the language, a passing theory will be 
required whenever the new element is encountered by speakers for the first time. It is 
plausible then that a language with potentially infinite semantic primitives would still be 
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learnable. As ‘Derangement’ clearly shows, without something like ‘general intelligence’ 
compromising the strict distinction between linguistic knowledge and knowledge of  the 
world, novel utterances and novel ways of  understanding novel utterances would be a 
mystery, as would be many examples of  language change. 
3.3.3 Knowledge, speech and change
The discussion of  knowledge of  language is relevant to topics in this chapter and to 
broader issues within this thesis. The failure of the internalist account of  knowledge of  
language shows again how attempts to see language as an autonomous object capable of  
being strictly defined and studied, something associated with the Formalist Attitude, falters 
as the ‘linguistic’ and ‘non-linguistic’ have been shown to be intimately interrelated. This 
interrelation is also apparent in consideration of  arbitrariness and language change. An 
argument in 3.1 and 3.2 was that the interrelation of  social activity and speech is 
overlooked by linguists and philosophers, something I argued in chapter 2 can be partly 
explained by scepticism about social causation. In the case of  arbitrariness, where 
‘arbitrariness is the rule, not the exception’ (Lord 1974, p.20) it was seen that the opposite 
looks to be the case. Once arbitrariness is properly understood and the various ways in 
which language is motivated considered, the pervasive and interesting links with social 
activity become clearer. The same is the case with language change, where changes cannot 
avoid being mediated by a social process of transmission for a change to be completed. A 
position which holds that ‘language is not properly regarded as a system for 
communication’ (Chomsky 2002, p.76) can only be blind to the fact that what speakers use 
language to do influences change and it cannot be sensitive to the idea that Actual Speech, 
rather than abstract laws or universal parameters, is the engine of  change.
Despite the non-autonomy of  the linguistic and non-linguistic, I have argued above 
that particular languages exist (2.3). While knowledge of  language and knowledge of  the 
world are integrated and integrate, one cannot explain why I’ve disappointed Japanese 
tourists visiting the Royal Pavilion or why Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong required 
translators on the former’s 1972 state visit to China without presupposing that particular 
languages exist, the evidence for which is that some speakers (of  English) can do things 
that other speakers (of  Mandarin) cannot and vice versa. The consideration of  knowledge 
of  language, arbitrariness and change can be framed more broadly in terms of  an old but 
recurring debate around the relationship between competence and performance or langue 
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and parole. Interrelations between linguistic structure and language use and what this means 
for linguistics will be the central issue in the next and final chapter.  
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Chapter 4
Language, linguistics and their place within the sciences
This final chapter gathers arguments developed throughout the thesis in order to draw 
some conclusions about the nature of  language and linguistics. From the outset, it has been
stressed that the methodological standards of  natural science are related to how language is
conceived and this has influenced ideas about what linguistics is. Seeing linguistics as one 
of the natural sciences or especially associated with them can be motivated by a pre-
existing view on what language is, or one can begin with a view of what constitutes
‘scientific’ study and fit the object of  knowledge to this mould. In either case, this can and 
has led to a study of  language which is too abstract, insensitive to the social reality of  
language and which fails to police its own self-imposed borders of  enquiry. 
Having given my own, albeit partial, account of  language, it is appropriate to show 
what such an account means for linguistics. In this chapter I add more detail to the former 
in order to discuss the latter. In the first part, I offer a model of  how language functions as 
a social object and for a speaker and the relation that exists between the two. The purpose 
of  such a model is manifold. First, against accounts that have failed, to explain in a general 
way how language can change. Second, to show how my observations and arguments 
concerning language are consistent with this model. And lastly, to explain more fully what
language is. Informed by the discussion in the first part, I then move on to answer a 
question fundamental to linguistics: what kind of  a science is it? By ‘kind’ here, one can 
mean several things. One can identify a particular discipline in terms of  the traditional 
prism of  the natural and social sciences and argue, by comparison with paradigmatic 
disciplines under those rubrics (physics and sociology respectively) that a discipline is one 
or the other, or perhaps uniquely between the two (see 1.1). Also, in identifying the kind of  
science a particular discipline is, one can make broader claims about what laws prevail and 
the manner of  explanation and prediction the discipline offers. The way in which one 
answers the first question relies upon the answer to the second, as the distinction between 
the natural and social sciences is often based on metaphysical distinctions in the object of  
knowledge and the perceived explanatory and predictive power of  natural and social 
scientific theories
94
. The second part of  this chapter will take arguments discussed in 
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previous chapters about the object of  enquiry and the laws and explanations available to 
linguistics to their conclusion by arguing that linguistics is a social science. This chapter
contains nothing as ambitious as a general theory of  language or of  linguistics. Rather I 
seek to provide some underlabouring for linguistics and open the path for further 
investigation that does not commit to the Formalist Attitude. To this purpose, I will also 
seek to show how my observations fit with two current trends in linguistics; cognitive and 
integrationist linguistics.
4.1 Language, structure and agency
The desire to understand how structure and act, langue and parole, or competence and 
performance
95
interact is old and attempts to model and describe the relationship between 
language structure and agential use of  that structure has been a persistent question in
linguistics and the philosophy of  linguistics (Saussure 2006 [1922], Jameson 1974, Pateman 
1987, Thibault 1997). This is partly because a true model could not only tell us interesting 
things about the nature of  language, but such a model would be a methodological tool in 
linguistics for understanding language change, language stability and the importance of  
Actual Speech and social activity to language. The desire for understanding is also
motivated by a problem, which I will call the speech/structure problem (S/S for short). It 
is this: 
S/S problem: a linguistic act is inexplicable without a structure constraining and directing 
it to a high degree. On the other hand, it is implausible that language structure is 
instantaneously realised and ready-furnished to constrain and direct linguistic acts without 
there first being semi-linguistic acts that create that structure. This is a problem because it 
suggests each is temporally and logically prior to the other.
Barthes recognises exactly this problem when he states, ‘one cannot handle speech except 
by drawing on the language. But conversely, a language is possible only starting from 
speech’ (Barthes, 1968, p.16). The S/S problem is not only a ‘mists of  time’ question about 
how language began (though it is also that). Rather, the problem requires an answer if  we 
are to understand how language functions diachronically in a society and how linguistic acts 
and structure interact. That the issue concerns the diachronic is clear, as the concept of  
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interaction presupposes temporal progression and the S/S problem partly concerns matters 
of  temporal priority
96
. This is an important point to grasp because within the Formalist 
Attitude there has been a lack of  recognition of the diachronic, motivated by the desire to 
provide a sufficiently ‘scientific’ object of  knowledge where language structure is seen as 
stable across a homogenous linguistic community. There have been attempts to characterise 
the relationship between structure and act which have either failed to take into account 
certain aspects of  language or misrepresent the nature of  language. So to bring the issue 
into sharper focus, before proposing my model I will look at several accounts of  how 
linguistic acts and linguistic structure interact and why they are problematic. 
4.1.1 The models, their supporters and their problems
Formulations of  the langue/parole, competence/performance, type/token kind each possess
specificities and carry particular theoretical commitments in tow. In order to discuss the 
broader issue of  the relationship between linguistic structure (hereafter LS) and linguistic 
acts (hereafter LA), I want to offer a general definition of  each that can reasonably 
represent much of  what is  meant in langue/parole type distinctions.
LS: The sum total of  lexio-grammatical units and combination (grammatical, 
syntactic) rules necessary for any linguistic act and utilised in linguistic acts.
LA: Any act of  articulated sound using a combination of  rules and lexico-
grammatical units taken from LS and performed in a context.
Such a definition of  LS and LA implies an important relationship between LS and LA 
though it does not fully determine the nature of  that relationship. The aim here is to be as 
neutral as possible concerning the relationship and with this as a basis, I consider some 
models of  how LS and LA interact. 
In structuralist and post-structuralist thought and arguably within the philosophy 
of  language, the view of  the relationship between LA and LS has been influenced by a 
Durkheimian model of  society, where analogous to ‘society’, language is seen as a ‘social 
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This is not meant to suggest that the S/S problem is only a diachronic matter. Given that it is a logical 
problem, it is relevant to synchronic linguistics, as Saussure’s and arguably Thibault’s (see 4.2.3) 
interest in the question attests.    
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fact’
97
. Durkheim describes social facts as ‘a category of  facts which present very special 
characteristics: they consist of  manners of  acting, thinking, and feeling external to the 
individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of  which they exercise 
control over him [an agent]’ (Durkheim 1982 [1895], p.52). Here what is stressed is the 
power of  the social structure to shape the agent and the agent’s corresponding lack of  
power to shape the structure. For a Durkheimian account of  the relationship between LS 
and LA, language is a supra-individual structure whose reality is evidenced by its ability to 
constrain and enable human action. One commonly recognised example of  the influence 
of  Durkheim on linguistic thought is in Saussure’s description of language as a ‘social 
crystallisation’ (Saussure 2006 [1921], p.29)
98
. The relationship can be shown 
diagrammatically thus:
Fig 1.1: LS/LA relation under a Durkheim stereotype
This model describes Saussure’s langue/parole (LS and LA) distinction, evidenced by
Saussure’s contention that, ‘[w]hat [sign] can be chosen is already determined in advance. 
No individual is able, even if  he wished, to modify in any way a choice already established 
in the language. Nor can the linguistic community exercise its authority to change even a 
single word’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], p.104). In the Durkheimian model the emphasis is 
unequivocally on the constraint of  the social fact upon the agent, so what any speaker says 
when they speak will, irrespective of what they are trying to achieve, be rigidly constricted 
by linguistic structure
99
. What follows from this view is that speakers cannot add, subtract 
or change the linguistic structure. Considered in terms of the S/S problem, the motivation 
for adopting the Durkheimian model can be seen; insofar as linguistic structure constrains 
and enables speech, acts of  articulated sound that do not rely upon the linguistic structure 
are not linguistic acts. This gives a criterion upon which to recognise a linguistic act as 
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findings concerning Durkheim’s influence [on Saussure] have been accepted as established fact by the 
majority of authors of books related to the history of linguistics’ (Koerner 1973, p.48). See also 
Jameson (1974, pp.27-28) and more recently Thibault (1997, p.8).
99
This position expresses an internalist view of knowledge of language, see 3.3.
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distinct from articulated sound and it ensures the closure of  the LS domain, as linguistic 
structure contains the units and rules sufficient for speech. This has advantages and 
captures several features of  the LS/LA relationship that are arguably worth preserving. 
First, it gives LS reality above and beyond the linguistic acts of  individuals; it is a ‘full-
blooded’ social structure like a monetary system or a company hierarchy, irreducible to the 
performance of  consumers/employees/speakers. Second, it gives a clear sense of  how 
linguistic acts are related to and reliant upon linguistic structure by postulating a seamless
and unidirectional relationship between LS and LA. Nothing is given the status of LA 
unless it is constrained and exhausted by LS. Jameson makes just this point about
structuralism, where the langue/parole distinction ‘make[s] possible a methodological 
separation of  pure sounds (as, for example, the articulations made by a speaker of  a 
language utterly unknown to us) from meaningful sounds’ (Jameson 1974, pp.15-16).
Indeed, what goes for structuralism here goes for any position adopting the Durkheimian 
model.  
While having advantages, there are problems for the Durkheimian model that make 
it unattractive. The main problem is that it is too prescriptive; the LS/LA relationship, 
which is seamless and unidirectional, rules out acts of  articulated sound that we would 
intuitively accept as linguistic acts. We can see this if  we consider portmanteau words such 
as ‘Brunch’
100
, ‘Smirt’
101
and ‘Spork’
102
. In the cases of  ‘Brunch’ and ‘Spork’, these are now 
established within the English lexicon, but not so with ‘Smirt’. Whether it will become so is 
not the question, but that it might become so, as ‘Brunch’ and ‘Spork’ have, raises a 
problem for the Durkheimian model. A portmanteau word not included within LS must, if  
it is to be included, be used as a meaningful word. This suggests that at a point before 
being part of  LS, it is already meaningful, though this is what the Durkheimian model, 
postulating a seamless and unidirectional relationship between LA and LS, refuses. One 
might object that such portmanteau words are not really meaningful as they are directly 
parasitic on words that are meaningful in the ordinary sense, but this is not correct for two 
reasons. First, words such as ‘screwdriver’ and ‘breakfast’ appear just as parasitic as ‘Spork’ 
but are taken to be meaningful in their own right and second, the objection does not 
appreciate that portmanteaus are not simple additive semantic formulas but often describe 
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‘socializing in a romantic way whilst smoking outside a place such as a bar, restaurant etc, where 
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  A trademark used for a plastic eating utensil having a spoonlike bowl and tines. Source: 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Spork, accessed: 5/12/2011. 
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a new and distinctive object or idea. A spork is not the semantic equivalent of  ‘a spoon and 
a fork’, but is a single item that has salient features of  both (though not all features). For 
the Durkheimian model, LA are seen as inconsequential in forming LS and as such, the 
model falls upon one horn of  S/S problem in failing to deal with the idea that there are LA 
that precede LS. 
This is not only an issue with portmanteau words, but with any additive language
change
103
and the prescriptive nature of  the Durkheimian model leaves linguistic change
inexplicable. As well as this, it does not recognise our intuition that it is agents that use
language to achieve social ends and words such as portmanteaus come into existence as a 
result of  agental response to new or changing social situations. For Saussure, langue is a 
‘product passively registered by the individual. It never requires premeditation’ (Saussure
2006 [1922] p.30) and as such it is what Harris describes as ‘a purely mechanistic 
psychological explanation of  social conformity’ (Harris 2001, p.229), an explanation which 
casts the agent as playing a necessary, though highly constricted role. This issue has been 
discussed before in 3.2 and in 1.4, where I argued that both Derrida and Saussure do not 
recognise the importance of  Actual Speech and the social aims tied to speech. It can now 
be seen that this is plausibly partly as the result of  the adoption of  the Durkheimian 
model.
It may be objected that the use of  and reliance on a Durkheimian model is the 
result of  a methodological choice and that the study of  parole, being too varied and 
heterogeneous, would be impractical. As such, it could be claimed that the Durkheimian 
model with its emphasis on langue is just a practical and pragmatic tool for linguistics. In 
discussing the langue/parole separation, Thibault makes much this point,
[L]inguists and semioticians…have tended to assume that Saussure’s distinction between an 
‘internal’ linguistics of  langue and an ‘external’ linguistics of  parole amounts to a description 
of  the concrete reality of  language. In actual fact, the distinction between langue and parole 
belongs to a theory of  linguistics. It is not inherent in the concrete reality of  language…[this 
has] given rise to a confusion between methodology, on the one hand, and ontology, on the 
other (Thibault 1997, p.6).    
Accepting the usefulness of  the distinction between methodology and ontology, the 
corollary of  which is the pragmatic distinction between langue and parole, and ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ linguistics causes problems. By accepting Saussure’s distinction one supports the 
assumption of  a static model of  language and of speakers as being in a passive relation to 
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LS; the Durkheimian model. This seems unhelpful as it leaves an important area of  
linguistic study, language change, inexplicable. The claim that such a model is useful for 
linguistics then appears false. This suggests that a model of  the LS/LA relationship which 
does not create a dichotomy between ontology and methodology might be more useful and
allow for language change. Such a model should be able to take into better account such 
important phenomena, as well as our intuition that it is speakers who use language, change 
it and develop interpretative strategies to understand it. I have more to say about Thibault 
in 4.2.4.
In contrast to the structuralist, it might appear that generativism implicitly adopts a 
different perspective concerning the relation between LS and LA. Labov outlines the broad 
differences between approaches that give us reason to think this:
There are two opposing answers to the question, ‘What is language?’ The idealist 
conception is that language is a property of  the individual, a species-specific and genetically 
inherited capacity to form rules of  a particular type, relatively isolated from other activities 
of  the human intelligence. The materialistic conception is that language is a property of  
the speech community, an instrument of  social communication that evolves gradually and 
continuously throughout human history, in response to a variety of  human needs and 
activities (Labov 1987, p.2).
The thought is that generativists (idealists) reject the existence of social facts which 
structuralists accept and instead focus on individual competence (I-language). For the 
generativist as opposed to the materialist then, the relation between LA and LS looks
reversed, leading to what one might call a Weberian model. This appellation is appropriate
because of the emphasis Weber placed on individual action and what he saw as the 
epiphenomenal status of  ‘collective’ or ‘organic’ supra-individual structures. Weber saw it 
as,
‘convenient or even indispensable to treat social collectivities, such as states, associations, 
business corporations, foundations as if  they were individual persons…But for the 
subjective interpretation of  action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated 
as solely the resultants and modes of  organization of the particular acts of individual 
persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of  subjectively 
understandable action’ (Weber 1968 [1922] pp.14-15).
In terms of  the LS/LA relation, the Weberian model would look like this:
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Fig.1.2 LS/LA Relation under a Weberian Stereotype
For the Weberian model, it is the individual speaker who in virtue of  LA, creates and 
sustains LS. If, qua structuralism, LS is viewed as a social object, a Weberian model rejects 
the reality of  LS as nothing more than a façon de parler that can be reduced to the total 
collective action of  speakers (LA). This deflationary account of  LS is not truly 
representative of  generativism. Because of  the generativist dichotomy between
competence and performance, LS would be appropriately seen as a biological endowment
of  which the I-language is the realised steady state, rather than a ‘social crystallisation’ or E-
language. While the I-language is the object of  study, it is considered static and universal. 
This is remarkably similar to structuralism, whose object as Johnson points out ‘is a 
“shared” system, that is a system that is of  interest only insofar as it can be treated as 
identical from individual to individual’ (Johnson 2000, p.408). In respect of  the relationship 
between LS/LA then, both structuralists (materialists) and generativists (idealists) are in 
accord.
While the role of  LA in the relation has long been a point of  dispute in 
linguistics
104
, there have been few advocates of a Weberian-style relation. Whereas in the 
social sciences, anti-realism and empiricism has been characterised by a denial of  the reality 
of  social structures (Weber 1986 [1922] Winch 1959), with only agential action being
significant (voluntarism), this has only rarely been the case in linguistics
105
. This is plausibly
because the reality of  LS can be defined in non-supra-individual ways (a biological 
endowment) and because the removal of  the role of LS leaves speech unexplained. 
Whereas it is plausible that economic activity is explicable without a full-blooded account 
of  the banking system, or an account of  England’s 2005 Ashes victory with reference only
to the actions of  individual players, the same is not true of  language. Despite the relative
scarcity of  Weberian accounts of  the LS/LA relation, interest in the role of  the individual 
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century 
were notable for their refusal to countenance the reality of LS. For example see L. Bloomfield in Katz 
(ed.) (1985). As Johnson observes, ‘For the most part, linguists make statements about languages 
rather than about speakers’ (Johnson 2000, p.408).
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speaker has increased in recent years and in ‘The Individual Voice in Language’ (2000) 
Barbara Johnson offers something approaching a Weberian perspective, showing scepticism
about the existence of  grammars insofar as they are post-hoc generalisations of  speech 
acts. For example she argues that,
[k]nowledge of  language is fundamentally private and individual…This is the result of  the 
fact that people are not born knowing how to talk. Although we say that many American 
children “learn English,” in fact no two learn exactly the same thing. One person’s language 
is different from another’s because each individual has a different set of  linguistic 
memories and each may make different generalizations on the basis of  what he or she 
hears (Johnson 2000, p.411). 
In light of  this Johnson recommends that language be thought of  ‘as linguistic action 
rather than linguistic competence’ (Johnson 2000, p.411) and that language rules 
(grammars) be postulated ‘without claiming that the “rules” one thereby formulates were 
actually causal in the process of  text-building’ (Johnson 2000, p.413). While Johnson does 
not offer a model of the LS/LA relationship, her position suggests something akin to a 
Weberian model. There are advantages here which should be considered as they emphasise
the flaws of  the Durkheimian model and suggest what a more plausible model of  the 
relationship between LS and LA should consist in. One advantage of a Weberian model is 
that it allows for language change. Whereas the Durkheimian model postulates a seamless 
relationship between LS and LA, this is not the case with the Weberian model as it is 
meaningful speech (LA) that informs LS. LA is not given in advance as ‘discourse is not 
created or interpreted via the application of  a priori rules’ (Johnson 2000, p.413) and as the 
relationship is not seamless, language change is possible. The Weberian model also captures 
the intuitive idea that without speakers speaking, whatever passes for LS would not exist. 
While a Weberian model sees LS as a façon de parler reducible to LA, without LA no 
generalisations (LS) would be postulated so whereas the Durkheimian model sees LS as not 
reliant upon LA for the maintenance and existence of  LS, the Weberian model captures 
such reliance. 
The Weberian model however finds itself  on the other horn of  the S/S problem 
from the Durkheimian model as there is the issue of  accounting for the existence of  LA if  
LS is epiphenomenal. For example, Johnson’s claim about the ‘fundamentally private’
nature of  language appears to rely on too-narrow an understanding of  what constitutes a 
public language, the standard of ‘public’ being the sharing of  exactly the same lexicon, 
grammatical rules etc.; the kind of  account evident in support for the Durkheimian model. 
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Against such an understanding, one might use ‘private’ as a contrastive term, but this is
ultimately implausible. Seeing language as private because no two speakers ‘learn exactly the 
same thing’ suggests that someone who formulates the past-tense of  the verb ‘to spell’ as 
‘spelt’ would not be speaking the same language as one who used ‘spelled’. This is not a 
plausible account of  what a public language is as there being a choice between ‘spelt’ and 
‘spelled’ relies upon language being public. If  a speaker who says ‘spelt’ thinks ‘spelled’ is 
incorrect, the fact they can consult an English grammar book and come away convinced of  
their mistake again emphasises this. If  this were not the case then the idea there are choices
or options within languages would make little sense. While Johnson may be reacting against 
one implausible account of  language (the Durkheimian), her own position is, for different 
reasons, implausible.
Having discussed the Weberian and Durkheimian models, their proponents and the 
problems besetting each, I want to argue for a conception of  the LA/LS relationship that 
captures the insights of  each model while avoiding their respective problems and both
horns of  the S/S problem. The function of  this model is not just to avoid problems, but to
bring together insights from this thesis: that Actual Speech is an important consideration in 
explaining how change is possible (1.4/3.2), that language is a power (2.3) and that 
language is not arbitrary (3.3). My model will not imply my other observations, but it will 
be shown that it is happily consistent with them and a plausible extension of  them.
4.1.2 A transformational model of  linguistic activity   
Following Roy Bhaskar, I propose a ‘transformational model’ to describe the relationship 
between LS and LA. In The Possibility of  Naturalism (1979) Bhaskar approaches the issue of  
the society/agent relation and outlines the drawbacks of  Durkheimian/Weberian accounts,
which he argues diminish the role of  agent and society respectively by either reifying agents 
(Durkheim) or adopting voluntarism (Weber) and denying the existence of  society. Against 
this Bhaskar argues for a transformational model of  social activity. It is not important to 
repeat his arguments in detail as my arguments here make similar criticisms, though of  
course directed toward linguistics. However it is worth noting an observation Bhaskar 
makes with respect to the agent/society relation as it is similar to the S/S problem:
It is still true to say that society would not exist without human activity, so reification 
remains an error. And it is still true to say that such activity would not occur unless agents 
engaging in it had a conception of  what they were doing (Bhaskar 1979, p.42). 
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This suggests (and Bhaskar argues) that society and agent are mutually irreducible 
necessary conditions of  each other and the absence of  this insight leads to reification or 
voluntarism. If  we apply this to language and the LS/LA relation, we can see an analogy to
the S/S problem, as a privileging of  either LA or LS leads to a problematic denial of  the 
role of  speakers or a problematic denial of  the existence of  LS. A transformational model 
deals with the S/S problem directly and opposed to the Durkheimian or Weberian models, 
recognises that linguistic structure pre-exists any act of  speech (one horn of  the S/S 
problem) but equally recognises that linguistic structure exists in virtue of  speech and 
linguistic structure is reproduced by speech (the other horn of  the S/S problem). In terms 
of  S/S problem, the transformational model tries to have its philosophical cake and eat it. 
It looks like this:
Fig 1.3: LS/LA relation under a transformational model
The diagram shows the LS/LA relation as dynamic and non-synchronic. The inclusion of  
the time arrow quantifying over LS and LA recognises the diachronic functioning of  
language, though seeing it as a ‘diachronic model’ is not accurate insofar as this implies an 
acceptance of  a synchronic/diachronic dichotomy. The double up/down arrows represent
the duality of  praxis and structure, describing the ways in which speech and structure 
interrelate and are mutually supportive:
Reproduction: Linguistic acts sustain or reproduce language structure, as spending reproduces 
the monetary system. Without linguistic acts, we would have little reason to think language 
structure existed. Here again we can see the importance of  directedness (2.3.2).
Transformation: As well as reproducing, linguistic acts potentially transform language 
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structure. As I outlined in 3.1 and 3.2, linguistic action is social action and language is used
by agents to achieve things, which does not imply that language remains the same (3.2.2). If  
I want to describe a new invention, impress a peer with wit or any number of  things, I have
motivation for being linguistically creative, which has the potential to change language 
structure. 
Instrumentation: Language structure allows to some degree the instrumentation of  speech, 
for if  we had not learned or acquired language rules then it would be difficult to explain 
speech (3.3) or to put it conservatively, to explain the obvious ways in which speech is rule-
influenced.
Conditioning: Structure though is not instantaneously realised in the speaker as speakers are 
constantly being conditioned
106
by their linguistic environments, whether this be by learning 
pre-existing but previously unknown rules in the language or by learning about changes in
the language.    
Under the transformational model (hereafter TM), LS and LA are a mutually irreducible 
necessary condition for each other. Without recognising that the relationship between LS 
and LA is not seamless (transformation/conditioning) as it is for the Durkheimian model, 
change becomes inexplicable. On the other hand and what was a problem for the Weberian 
model, without recognising the need for constraint and a degree of  continuity 
(instrumentation/reproduction), speech becomes inexplicable. The TM then is a less 
problematic model than the Durkheimian or Weberian models, though retains the 
advantages of  each. Like the Weberian model the TM is able to account for language
change because while LS informs LA, the relationship is not seamless. LA is necessary for 
the existence, maintenance and transformation of LS and this requires it not be reducible 
to it. This point is important with respect to my proposal of  Actual Speech made in 1.4
where I argued this was suppressed in Saussure and Derrida in order to maintain a clearly 
defined purview for linguistics. I defined it like this:
Actual Speech: A spoken linguistic act A which, belonging to a language L 
reproduces and potentially changes language L.
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An interesting overlap between the transformational model and language change is evident. 
‘Transformation’ and ‘conditioning’ are analogous to ‘actuation’ and ‘transmission’ in theories of 
language change.
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This definition fits into a wider conception of  the relationship between LA and LS. Under
the TM Actual Speech captures the sense of LA as the model recognises the analog nature 
of  communication as opposed to a presupposition of  synchronic stasis or a homogenous 
speech community. It is important to recognise though that linguistic acts are acts of  
agents trying to achieve something with language and Actual Speech is not simply the 
correct use of  grammatical rules and lexical items. Actual Speech is activity and it is in 
trying to achieve something with language that acts of  speech are acts. As well as this, the 
TM does not cast language as a closed system or an object amenable to study by a 
discipline requiring ‘hard and fast frontiers’. On the contrary, there is recognition that 
language functions in an open system and things such as messy speakers and their messy 
neologisms, solecisms and revived archaisms are ineluctable facts of language. In many 
respects then, the TM stands against the assumptions of  the Formalist Attitude. 
It may be argued that the TM has a significant disadvantage over other models,
because in not representing LS as static, it cannot give a clear and bounded description of  
LS and thus exposit its contents. While static models have drawbacks, it may be argued,
assuming stasis is a useful and necessary methodological assumption. Consider again 
Thibault’s quotation above concerning the methodological justification for the distinction 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ linguistics and my objection to it. There I pointed out that 
in spite of  claims about the usefulness of  such a distinction, it does not allow one to 
explain language change or to decide if  ‘smirt’ (to smoke and flirt) is or is not part of  the 
English language. Indeed, if  one accepts the assumption of  stasis is useful, one is admitting 
that models do not aim at a linguistic description of  LS, just a useful one in some respect or 
other. However, a model which sees the relation as dynamic (reproductive and 
transformative) rather than static need not be concerned by the possibility and actuality of
liminal and less-than-clear-cut cases as it does not see the LS/LA relation as seamless and 
so expects them. This is not the case with the assumption of  stasis though and liminal and 
less-than-clear-cut cases provide a problem. 
4.1.3 Thibault’s transformational model
Using a transformational model to describe the LS/LA relation based on Bhaskar’s analysis
has been attempted before. In Re-Reading Saussure: The Dynamics of  Signs in Social Life (1997), 
Paul J. Thibault suggests a LS/LA relation similar to mine and examining his position will
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help to place mine within a wider context of  linguistic thought but more importantly, will 
show how my model is preferable. 
My approach and Thibault’s have a number of  similarities. Thibault is concerned to 
avoid the reifying consequences of  the Durkheimian approach and to account for the role 
of  speakers as more than mere passive recipients of  LS. In this spirit, Thibault claims of  
langue/parole that, ‘[t]he relationship between the two perspectives is not a dichotomy. The 
dichotomous reading can only put the relation between langue and parole and between 
society and individual, in a straitjacket’ (Thibault 1997, p.344) and he points to a
Durkheimian reading of  Saussure (Thibault 1997, p.8) as responsible for this ‘straitjacket’. 
To remedy this, Thibault accepts aspects of Bhaskar’s transformational model and applies 
it to the LS/LA relation in order to express a relationship that, like my model, emphasises 
that ‘signs are not fixed and closed; they are open and dynamic processes’ (Thibault 1997, 
p.254). However, despite recognition of  the drawbacks of  a Durkheimian account of  the 
LS/LA relation and the adoption of  a position influenced by the transformational model, 
there are problems with Thibault’s position which stem from an adherence to structuralism
and a desire to rehabilitate Saussure’s linguistics. Thibault equivocates at various points, 
appearing committed to the utility of  a static model and denying the reality of  langue and 
parole, which are both inconsistent with his acceptance of  a transformational model. For 
example, he endorses a position, ascribed to Saussure, which remains problematic:
[T]he properties possessed by langue, which is a transindividual social-semiological system, 
and the properties possessed by individual language users in acts of  parole are, ontologically 
speaking, very different (Thibault 1997, p.67).  
Thibault here tries to justify the separation of  langue/parole that Saussure imposes on 
linguistics by distinguishing between properties of  langue and properties possessed by
speakers in acts of  parole. While not immediately clear what constitutes ‘very different’ in 
this context, there is a potential problem in stressing ontological differences between langue
and parole as one of  the things the transformational model emphasises is that LS (langue) 
and LA (parole) are ontologically linked in being a necessary condition for each other. As 
they are mutually irreducible, one cannot describe one without reference to the other and
this is as much an ontological point as a methodological one. What speakers need to be in 
possession of  for acts of  parole is something converging with langue and therefore it is not 
clear they have a ‘very different’ ontology and in one salient sense, they do not.
Also, Thibault’s stance that the ontology of  langue and parole are ‘very different’ 
appears in contradiction with claims that langue and parole are theoretical abstractions of  
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langage. At several points, Thibault appears sceptical of  the reality of langue and parole: ‘A 
synchronic state of  langue is an analytical abstraction from the concrete reality of  langage. In 
this sense, it is an idealization’ (Thibault 1997, p.12). If  langue is an abstraction then by 
implication parole must be and Thibault’s claim that langue and parole are ‘not inherent in the 
concrete reality of  language’ (Thibault 1997, p.6) suggests that neither abstract term is real. 
This is a problem because Thibault’s acceptance of  the transformational model appears to 
ignore that it is developed in order to avoid the conclusion that either the individual agent or 
society is irreal or reified; by analogy LS (langue) and LA (parole). However, in seeing 
langue/parole as abstractions from langage that are not part of  its ‘concrete reality’, Thibault 
does just this. This also makes his claims about langue and parole being ontologically ‘very 
different’ obscure as it is unclear if  an analytical abstraction has ontological properties.
Another problem for Thibault is that he fails to consistently recognise the 
importance of  the diachronic and the analog nature of  communication due to his
acceptance of  the methodological necessity of  Saussure’s separation of langue and parole and 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ linguistics, which I criticised in 4.2.1. On this point Thibault
supports Saussure’s position, which he sees as this:
The primary task of  the linguist is to study the internal principles of  organization, so 
defined. ‘External’ linguistics, which is seen by Saussure as ‘secondary’ to the more 
‘essential’ internal linguistics, is concerned, on the other hand, with individual and social 
uses of  language (Thibault 1997, p.6). 
The separation of  internal/external linguistics and the privileging of  the latter suggests a 
separation of the competence/performance kind where language use is cast as the mere 
instantiation of  language structure. Such a distinction was brought into question in 3.3,
where I argued that what was seen by internalists as ‘knowledge of language’ was not 
sufficient for understanding linguistic acts. The point is that even if  this separation is 
motivated by methodological concerns belonging ‘to a theory of  linguistics…not inherent in 
the concrete reality of  language’ (Thibault 1997, p.6), it still assumes that this kind of  
separation and privileging allows for fruitful study. However, it is not clear that an account 
which relegates the uses of  language to secondary status, opting for the more ‘essential’ 
study of the internal principles of  organization, will be fruitful in understanding language. 
Therefore, as recognition of  the interconnectedness and mutual irreducibility of  LS and
LA is essential to TM, there is a tension in Thibault accepting TM and defending Saussure.
All this makes the aim of  Thibault’s support for the transformational model 
ultimately unclear. It is unclear if  he sees langue and parole as real or as analytical abstractions 
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and the acceptance of  Saussure’s separation of  ‘internal’ and ‘external’, even on 
methodological grounds, assumes a relation between langue and parole such that study of  
langue is prioritised and separated from the uses language is put to. Thibault’s desire to 
defend Saussure leaves his position closer to the Durkheimian model than his theoretical 
intentions inferred from the adoption of  a transformational model would suggest. With 
these problems present, my model by comparison is more consistent with the tenor of  
Bhaskar’s analysis. I do not see LS (langue) and LA (parole) as abstractions and there is no 
assumption of  a static model or for a methodological/ontological distinction of  the kind
Thibault and Saussure suggest. As such there are not the accompanying problems. 
I have now developed in some detail my answer to the question ‘what is a 
language?’, an answer which began in 2.3 and continued throughout chapter 3 by critical 
engagement and positive argument. I have shown how some answers to the question,
influenced by the Formalist Attitude, are beset with problems and I have offered an 
account which avoids problems by being sensitive to the social nature of  language and the 
fact that language is used by agents for social purposes in a causally open and causally 
unclosable environment. In offering a transformational model of  linguistic activity, I have 
shown how arguments made in the thesis integrate and are consistent with the 
transformational model. 
4.2 What kind of  a science is linguistics?
The thesis began by showing how the question of  the scientific status of  linguistics has 
been and is a concern for linguists. It also showed how the natural sciences have provided a 
model for linguistic study and even where linguistics is not seen as one of  the natural 
sciences, its association with them justified the idea that linguistics has something to teach 
the social sciences about being scientific. This is not wishful thinking on the part of  
linguists, but is a view shared by prominent social scientists. As Levi-Strauss once claimed,
linguistic publications ‘must also welcome psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists 
eager to learn from modern linguistics the road which leads to the empirical knowledge of  
social phenomena’ (Levi-Strauss 1993, p.31). In these concerns and criticisms this thesis 
finds itself  in some agreement with other critical studies of  the claims of  linguistics such as
Itkonen’s Grammatical Theory and Metascience (1978), Harris’ The Language Myth (1981)
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and 
to a lesser extent Pateman’s Language in Mind, Language in Society (1987). All these have been 
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critical about how linguistics has been influenced by formal approaches and positivism. 
Especially for Harris in his development of  integrationist linguistics (which I look at soon), 
there has been an emphasis on the problematic abstractions of ‘autonomous’ linguistics 
and on the idea that linguistics is happily established with the family of  the sciences.
In this final section I outline some of  the implications of my arguments for 
linguistics as a science. I then conclude by contextualising my thesis within the current field 
of  linguistics by looking at two schools of linguistics that are broadly compatible with my 
position.  
4.2.1 Scientific status and theoretic boundaries
What kind of  science is linguistics? Linguistics is not a natural science and attempts to 
associate itself  with them have been seen to fail. Nor is linguistics’ claim to being the 
paradigm of  scientific rigor among the social sciences warranted insofar as this rests on it 
having a special association with the natural sciences. This does not mean that other social 
scientists might not learn from linguistics, but it also means that linguistics cannot be 
closed to learning from social science. I claim that linguistics should be seen as a social 
science for the following reasons, which mirror criteria I set out in 1.1:
- The ‘laws’ governing language are not those of  the natural sciences. There are no ‘general 
laws which account for all particular linguistic phenomena’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], 
p.20). Whereas the laws of  nature are immutable and necessary, this is not the case 
with language and more broadly the objects of  social science, whose rules or 
powers are normative, contingent and subject to change, as has been shown in 
discussion of  language change (2.1/3.2). In a theory of  grammar
108
for example, 
the statement ‘English has two articles: ‘a/an’ and ‘the’’ cannot be a law in the 
natural scientific sense, because it is mutable and unfalsifiable; if  someone says 
‘Seo
109
apple is gone’, one has simply failed to speak (demotic) English and it is 
unclear this can be doubted.  
-The relation between prediction and explanation. The natural sciences explain events with 
reference to proposed laws and one test of  these laws is the extent to which they 
can be used to offer accurate predictions. In contrast to this expectation, the 
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Anglo-Saxon feminine definite article.
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explanations offered in the case of  language change are post-hoc and do not refer 
to laws (2.2/2.3) but to normic statements, which are not open to the same degree 
of  confirmation as laws of  the natural sciences (3.3). As was argued in discussion 
of  arbitrariness (3.1), language is pervasively motivated and there are many kinds of  
motivation (ecological, structural, iconic etc.) which are likely to simultaneously 
influence motivation in any one case. Again in such cases, explanation can only be 
post-hoc. Itkonen makes this point in a similar vein; ‘even though I understand 
people’s actions in a way in which I cannot hope to understand physical events, I 
know what people have done or will do with much less certainty than I know which 
events occurred or will occur’ (Itkonen 1978, p.196).
- Linguistics is not predictive. Linguistics is not predictive, which is widely accepted for 
the social sciences (2.2) generally. Language functions in an open and uncloseable 
system and this is made abundantly clear by failures to predict language change 
(1.1/2.1/3.2). The indisputable predictive success of  the natural sciences 
emphasises this difference. As was argued in 3.3, knowledge of  language cannot 
fruitfully be seen as apart from knowledge of  the world when considering 
interpretation and this suggests that grammars cannot generate or predict the 
meaning of  arbitrary sentences in a language in the way internalists wish
110
.    
- Linguistics’ object of  knowledge is social and exists in an open system. Language exists in 
virtue of  people and it is by agents’ Actual Speech, which always aims at doing
something, that language is reproduced and changes (4.1). Language is also an 
object of  common knowledge or mutual belief  and is a strongly anthropocentric
object (2.3). As well as this, language functions in a causally open system and unlike 
the paradigmatic natural sciences which can create a degree of  closure in the 
context of  laboratory experiments, language functions, like the objects of  
knowledge of  other social sciences, in an unclosable system. This is clear if  we 
consider the importance of  language to other social institutions and its role in all 
aspects of  social life.
I make a number of  claims about the social sciences above, among them that they do not 
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Travis (2008). 
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offer predictions, their objects of  knowledge exist in causally open and unclosable systems
and that such differences are constitutive of distinction between the social and natural 
sciences. I have discussed these issues in 2.2 and 3.2 and they are widely regarded as 
uncontroversial in the philosophy of  social science (Sorokin 1938, Bhaskar 1979, 
Braybrooke 1987), so I do not defend them further. Given the above reasons, linguistics 
appears more like a social than a natural science. For anyone concerned this condemns 
linguistics to being a ‘non-science’ Braybrooke offers these, I think wise, words:
The charges that social science fails as science lose a good deal of  their plausibility anyway 
if  we cease to treat science as an all-or-nothing matter. We need not exclude every enquiry 
that fails to be as rigorous as classical mechanics. We can instead look upon science as a 
matter of  degree (Braybrooke 1987, p.43).
Another way of approaching the question of the kind of  study linguistics is, is to ask what 
linguistics is for. Throughout its modern history, there has been a promotion of  the study 
of  language for its own sake (Saussure 2006 [1922], Hockett 1958, Evans and Green 2007). 
Harris has also claimed that ‘languages seemed to the historical grammarian to live lives of  
their own’ (Harris 1981, p.50) and as we have seen, this view is evident in contemporary 
thought on language (3.2). If  language did have ‘a life of  its own’ in anything more than a 
metaphorical sense then the motivation for the study of  language would arguably be 
analogous to the study of  the objects of  natural science: to exercise humankind’s natural 
curiosity and discover the nature of the object of  enquiry, giving us a broader picture of  
the external world. This gives a fairly clear sense of  what study of  language ‘for its own 
sake’ is. This though is based on the supposition that language is an autonomous object, 
and as this is not the case, so language study for its own sake is not viable. In the well 
known Short History of  Linguistics, Robins recognises this and another motivation for 
linguistics,
Despite [a] general acceptance of  the gift of  articulate speech, most cultures in the world 
have engendered among certain of  their members some realisation of  the scope of the
power of  language. This linguistic self-consciousness may be first stimulated…by a 
particular orientation of  man’s inherent and disinterested curiosity about himself  and the 
world around him (Robins 1997, p.1).
Here Robins suggests the study of  language is motivated and justified because of  the 
importance of  language to the social life of human beings, something that textbooks on 
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linguistics typically recognise, whatever their philosophical and methodological leanings
111
. 
Language is important because it is a pervasive and ceaseless part of  our social activity:
political debates, relationships, rituals and how we find our way about the world and do 
things in the world. It is plausible therefore that linguistics is part of  the investigation of  
what it is to be human, an investigation that belongs most obviously to the social sciences. 
Language is of  interest because of  what humans do and its ‘scope and power’ is a scope and 
power to do things. As was argued in chapter 3, when humans use language they always do 
something, even when they fail to do what they intend. As studying something ‘for its own 
sake’, often presupposes the ‘it’ is something separable from human activity, something 
studied ‘for its own sake’ will tend to only nominally recognise this human-orientated 
motivation for studying language. If  one is to take this motivation seriously, investigation 
of  language should not only study language per se (‘not if a language is anything like what 
many philosophers and linguists have supposed’), but be open to the study of  
communication and be willing to expand its theoretical purview, something the 
representatives of  Formalist Attitude have consistently refused to do. 
It is not the purpose of  this thesis to describe communication and what the study 
of  communication is and as there are many controversies about the role and nature of  
communication, such engagement would not be possible here
112
. Therefore I limit myself  
to a few indicative remarks about what a study of  communication, rather than of  language 
per se, might entail. What is clear is that communication is not synonymous with linguistic
communication (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Fiske 1990, Harris 1996) and communicational 
systems interact and rely upon each other in order to make communication successful. A 
wink may suggest that I am being sarcastic when I ‘compliment’ a piece of  pop-art, 
someone’s personal history may make it clear to those who know them that their yes does 
not mean ‘yes’ and their no does not mean ‘no’. Even if  one supposes (as Saussure did)
that linguistic systems are primary vis-à-vis other communication systems, it does not 
follow that language is neatly independent of  other communication systems in meaning-
making or that the study of  language can or should be conducted as an autonomous 
discipline. Language is important to humans because it is a communicative system, a system 
which is utilised by agents in making themselves understood and if  this is a reason for 
studying language, then it is also a reason to not separate the study of  language from the
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As Fiske has claimed, communication is something that ‘few can define satisfactorily. Communication 
is talking to one another, it is television, it is spreading information, it is our hair style, it is our literary 
criticism: it is endless’ (Fiske, 1990, p.1). 
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study of  communication or be hostile to changes in the theoretical purview of  linguistics.
Language does not have a life of  its own and should not be studied for its own sake. 
My position agrees in a number of  ways with proposals forwarded by Jones (2003) 
concerning a realist approach to linguistics. For example, Jones suggests that a ‘realist 
linguistics, it seems to me, would place language squarely within the domain of  social 
phenomena and therefore amenable only to social scientific explanation (Jones in 
Cruickshank (ed.) 2003, p.103). This thesis has argued that linguistics should be considered 
a social science and has attempted to vindicate social scientific explanation from the 
skepticism of  some linguists. Jones also argues that the natural processes ‘of  body and 
brain on which it [language] undoubtedly depends are not innately specified but are 
themselves formed in the development and exercise of  the social practice of  linguistic 
interaction itself ’ (Jones in Cruickshank (ed.) 2003, p.104). While I am happy with the idea 
there are innate properties humans posses which allow them to use language, my proposal 
of  Actual Speech and support for the transformational model puts the linguistic act at the 
centre of  linguistic enquiry and so is in keeping with the tenor of  Jones’ point.  Finally, 
Jones attacks the ‘fallaciously motivated disjunctions and dualisms of  form and meaning, 
and of  (‘external’) communication and (‘internal’) language’ (Jones in Cruickshank (ed.) 
2003, p.104). My position coincides with that of  Jones’ here too, as both in criticising the 
internalist view of  knowledge of  language and the problematically restrictive theoretical 
purviews of  Chomsky and Saussure, I reject any dichotomy between external and internal 
linguistics. In view of  these agreements then, my view of  linguistics could be described as a 
realist one. 
To give some sense of where I think my conclusions point to, I will look at two 
approaches to linguistics that share some of  my concerns and are in respects consistent 
with and supportive of  some of my arguments. Before this though, I look at some 
remaining issues. Despite problems with the Formalist Attitude and the insistence on a 
clearly delimited object of  knowledge, there are intuitions and concerns that make the 
apparent security of  boundaries offered by the Formalist Attitude attractive. I look at some 
of  these in order to defuse concerns and clarify my position. 
4.2.2 The universality and independence of  language 
As has been frequently noted, language is something without which other social structures 
could not exist. Searle has claimed, ‘in order to have institutional facts at all, a society must 
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have at least a primitive form of  language…the institution of  language is logically prior to 
other institutions’ (Searle 1995, p.60). This is due to the symbolic nature of  social 
structures, which are brought about by acts of  agents, typically partly linguistic, that give
objects or actions significance beyond their ‘brute’ reality: filling in a housing benefit form, 
making a statement under oath, appointing someone to committee chair or buying a fish 
supper presuppose or directly involve language, often both
113
. Language is not only deemed 
necessary for the existence of  other social structures, but throughout rationalist and
Enlightenment thought language possession has been cited as the distinctive trait which 
defines humanity. Chomsky: ‘one fundamental contribution of  what we have been calling 
‘Cartesian linguistics’ is the observation that human language, in its normal use, is free from 
the control of  independently identifiable external stimuli or internal states…in contrast, for 
example, to the pseudo language of  animals’ (Chomsky 1966, p.29)
114
. Language is not only 
seen as inexorably intertwined with our human existence, but as partly constitutive of  that
human existence. 
In chapter 1, I pointed out that one reason linguistics was considered a natural 
science was that its object of  knowledge, language, appeared to be natural in being
immutable and universal among humans, as is the swim-bladder for fish or skeletal 
pneumaticity among birds. Another linked reason, and one evident in discussion of  the 
Durkheimian model and the Formalist Attitude generally, is that ‘those who want to count 
linguistics among the natural sciences can refer to the fact that language evolves 
independently of  human will’ (Keller 1994, p.61). As language appears out of  the control 
of  speakers, it is plausible that it has speaker-independent laws in a similar way to physical 
or biological laws. One aim of  this thesis has been to question the idea that language is
‘natural’ in the sense of  being universal and independent of  speakers. My position that 
language is a power to use a particular language rather than language as I-language or 
‘language in general’, and my arguments about ways in which languages are motivated and 
change, suggest that language is neither natural or independent in a way that would
associate it with the objects of  natural scientific enquiry. 
There are also other reasons to think that language is not a natural object. While 
‘society’ is the non-natural object par excellence, it displays similarities with language that put 
into question the naturalness and independence of  language. Like language, society appears 
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Austin often notes this distinction; ‘to congratulate is necessarily to say certain words…to make 
certain more or less indescribable movements with the vocal organs’ (Austin 1975, p.114).  
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For example see also Della-Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man (1996 [1486]) and Descartes’ 
Meditations (1968 [1637]).  
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to be immutable and universal, for where we find language we also find societies and vice
versa. Like language, society varies in organisation and presupposes the existence of  
people. Like language, society relies upon the constant activity of  individuals to reproduce
and potentially change it (4.2). Despite these similarities, there are few claims for society to 
be treated as a natural object and therefore studied as a natural science, so one has good 
reason to doubt that language is natural. While one may argue social phenomena are
reducible to physical phenomena and so social science reducible to natural science, this is a 
different claim. For a reductionist view of  the social sciences wishes to eliminate those 
sciences, leaving their objects of  knowledge as epiphenomena of  a general theory of  
physics (Fodor 1981), whereas seeing language as natural defends its claim to be an 
autonomous science, which as Saussure put it, ‘has a place ready for it in advance’ (Saussure
2006 [1922], p.30). Given that society and language both appear similarly ‘natural’, those 
wishing to see language as an object of  natural scientific study first have to explain why, 
against appearances, society should not also be also be deemed natural. One may of  course
bite the bullet and claim that the distinction is not useful, though this would require an
account of  how the study of  society sits alongside that of  the natural sciences and as this 
would effectively collapse the distinction between natural and non-natural, it is not clear 
what would be implied by the claim that language is natural. 
What we have seen in chapter 1 concerning the theoretical purview of  linguistics, in 
chapter 2 in discussion of  social causality and in chapter 3 concerning knowledge of  
language and the integration between the social and the linguistic, is that the nature of  
language and a theoretical purview responsive to that nature is not closable and delimitable 
in the way that the Formalist Attitude has maintained. Again this suggests we drop the 
claim that language is a ‘natural object’ with the accompanying claim that it be studied as 
one of  the natural sciences. Instead and as I argued in 2.3, language should be classified as 
a social object as it relies upon the existence of  human beings. What this means for 
linguistics is that there can be no once-and-for-all closure of  its boundaries and that
attempts to do so are misguided and likely to fail. As has been pointed out, linguistics does 
not come furnished with ‘clear and unobjectionable data. Such is our [linguists’] fate, in 
common with psychologists, economists, paleontologists, and a host of  others’ (Halle and 
Higginbotham 1986, p.292). Like the social sciences, linguistics does not have a field of  
enquiry it can mark out in advance or is not open to change. One might consider this to be
nothing new, for one cannot rule out changes in the field of  enquiry and in what is 
accepted as data in any of  the sciences. Even the most predictively successful sciences and 
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those that achieve a degree of  causal closure in experimental contexts cannot secure their 
theoretical boundaries against future developments. This is true, but with the social 
sciences change happens in two ways, making boundary changes more likely. In common
with physics and cosmology, discoveries and controversies in the social sciences may lead 
to changes in theoretical purview. So there is a clear sense in which the (arguable) discovery 
of  the unconscious in psychology and the discovery of the Planck constant in quantum 
mechanics are analogous.
There is a difference in the social sciences though in that they can change as a result 
of human invention
115
. The advent of  globalisation has made it difficult for specialists in 
national or regional economies to explain the state of  those economies by reference to
activity within regional/national economies, whereas this would have been more plausible 
at the beginning of  the industrial revolution. In a globalised world a grasp of  the global 
economy and global economics is needed to understand individual economies, as the 
expansion of  free markets and the economic interdependence that comes with it has 
shifted the theoretical purview of  the study of  national economies.  If  we consider 
linguistics, we can consider the case of  writing; an invention that has influenced language in 
helping to formalise pronunciation, facilitated the maintenance of  larger lexicons and given 
languages a degree of  access to their linguistic past beyond that of  a non-literate society.
However, a generativist might respond in this way to defend the boundaries of  
linguistics: ‘Granted that language is in some respects social and that the purview of  
language study cannot be comprehensively closed due to the fact that linguistic activity is
social activity. However, possession of  language presupposes mental structures and 
whatever the social nature of  language, language can holistically only be understood by 
focussed study on its various properties. Therefore, investigation of  these mental structures
and/or grammatical rules that underpin linguistic activity is a valid way to approach and 
understand language.’ Such a defence is of  course not only open to the generativist, but
potentially any position wishing to restrict its domain. The first thing to point out against 
the interlocutor is that in many of  the positions considered throughout this thesis, there 
has been a failure to explain phenomena a position seeks to explain given the theoretical 
confinement imposed upon it. As was seen with Chomsky in 1.3, Lass in 2.1 and 
internalism in 3.2, insistence on maintaining a highly abstract approach led to problems in 
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I mean this term broadly to include such things as globalisation and chivalry. While globalisation is not 
an invention in the sense that the cathode ray oscilloscope was an invention, considerable planning 
and political pressure has been brought to bear to expand and sustain globalisation and the neo-liberal 
economic philosophy underpinning it.   
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providing answers to questions within the scope of  enquiry. With this in mind, one can 
respond to the interlocutor by accepting that things can possibly be fruitfully studied 
piecemeal, but with the caveat that this cannot offer a defence against any particular
abstractions, which are judged (at least) on their own criteria for success. Indeed, what 
could speak more against the viability of  a theoretical purview than failing on its own 
terms?
The second point is related specifically to the claims of  the interlocutor as a 
generativist. A problem can be seen if  we apply the generativist’s argument to sociology; if  
we are to study language (which has at least a social element) in terms of  brain structures, 
then why not society? Having society as well as language is something that separates 
humans from rocks and clouds, so is plausibly as applicable to Chomsky’s transcendental 
argument that motivates the study of brain structures in investigating language. By these 
lights we could have a ‘generativist sociology’ that would take as its object the human mind, 
specifically the cognitive module(s) that makes society possible. One might postulate,
analogously to the LAD, a social acquisition device (SAD) and analogously to a universal 
grammar, a universal society (US), the steady state of  which forms into an individual’s I-
society. The US would be a cognitive structure to which social formations could be reduced 
in terms of  their counterfactual dependence on the structure and the similarity of  all 
‘surface social relations’ to a few ‘deep social relations’. 
This is obviously not representative of  sociological investigation and there are 
plausible reasons why. One reason is that societies often have features (a system of  voting 
or a caste system) that while shared with other societies, are difficult to explain by reference 
to structures that all societies share. Indeed, the UK and New Zealand are both 
democracies, but one would not know where to start in explaining by means of enquiry 
into brain structures why the UK has a first-past-the-post system and New Zealand an 
idiosyncratic blend of  proportional representation and the alternative vote. While angels or 
Martians might see any differences between human societies as superficial and deem them 
effectively identical
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, their differences matter a great deal to the human beings in those 
societies and an explanation of  their features and differences cannot be satisfied by 
pointing to putative brain structures that might be common to all humans. If  they could be 
explained by a generativist sociology then history, economics and sociology would be, if  
not otiose, then much diminished in explanatory power and perhaps not worth pursuing.  
For these reasons, such a defence of  theoretical delimitations fails. However, the 
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conclusion that linguistics should have no ‘hard and fast frontiers’ needs to be clarified for 
what it means for the practice of  linguistics. As well as this, there is the worry that the 
removal of the requirement that a discipline have hard and fast frontiers could, by means 
of  a slippery slope argument, lead to a destructive theoretical free-for-all.
4.2.3 Abstraction and avoiding a ‘Theory of  Everything’
In chapter 2, I defused a worry held by Chomsky, Lass and others that to allow
considerations such as Actual Speech, communication and what Lass called ‘messy’ 
speakers within the purview of  linguistics would be to undermine the scientific legitimacy 
of  the subject. I showed how the typically too abstract understandings of  language of  the 
Formalist Attitude are associated with a deductivist position that, as we saw with Lass and 
Chomsky, is unworkable in their respective theories of  language, conceptual acquisition
(1.3) and language change (2.1). As has been argued by philosophers and linguists on 
several occasions (Itkonen 1983, Pateman 1987, Collier 1994), a D-N account of  language
phenomena only looks plausible under the auspices of  a strongly idealised and delimited 
domain of  enquiry typical of  the Formalist Attitude. I showed how considerations of  non-
deductive accounts of  causality are more robust and intellectually respectable than some of  
their opponents believe (2.2) and how suspicion of  such phenomena is unwarranted. 
There is a legitimate worry though in the form of  a slippery slope argument 
concerning disciplinary boundaries. If  one allows that certain phenomena (speakers, the 
diachronic, context etc.), to be included within the purview of  a discipline because such 
phenomena can be seen to have an influence on phenomena within the purview of  that 
discipline, then there is no obvious point at which one can draw a line between what 
concerns and what does not concern a discipline. If  one accepts the plausible idea that 
everything bears some causal relation to everything else, then one might argue there is no 
justifiable delimitation of  a field of  enquiry, resulting in what Chomsky has referred to as a 
‘theory of  everything’ (Chomsky 2000, Rescher 2006). But what is problematic about a 
theory of  everything (hereafter ToE)? In the context of  linguistics, Chomsky argues the 
following:
The Study of  Communication in the actual world of  experience is the study of  the 
interpreter, but this is not a topic for empirical enquiry, for the usual reasons; there 
is no such thing as a theory of  everything….[communication] is far too complex
and obscure to merit attention (Chomsky 2000, pp.69-70). 
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A problem is that a ToE (here a theory of  communication) would be so complex as to be 
ungraspable by a single human mind. While we might aim for a ToE, we would by dint of  
practical necessity have a series of  specialisms and specialists, narrowing their theoretical 
purview due to epistemological limits (though they may narrow it for other reasons too). 
Therefore, one problem with a ToE is that it is doomed to failure from the outset due to 
human limitations and this is why Chomsky thinks ‘there is no such thing’. Even within the 
context of  highly specified enquiries, (cosmology, fluid dynamics) no individual specialist
understands the entire scope of  their field of  enquiry and this makes clear the ineluctable 
necessity for degrees of  specialisation, which implies some level of  abstraction within study.
If  being practically impossible were not problem enough, another problem is that a 
ToE would tend towards triviality. A ToE is motivated by the idea that every phenomenon
is in a causal chain with every other and this motivates the abandonment of  theoretical 
boundaries. The worry is that there is difficulty in offering illuminating causal explanations 
of events and properties because the answer to ‘why is X the case’ where ‘X’ is anything
whatsoever, is ‘X is the case because of  everything’. An example: while one might perceive
a link between the economic history of  the United Kingdom and the chemical properties 
of  coal (consider the importance of  the combustible qualities of  coal to the industrial 
revolution), it is difficult to see how the study of  chemistry could impinge on the study of  
economics because of  this fact. A ToE implies they are related and as such, an account of  
the industrial revolution should include an account of  the combustible qualities of  coal, the 
gravitational pull of  the earth, Dickens’ favourite hat and so on. Its findings, being 
undifferentiated in terms of  importance, would be trivial. 
For these reasons I share Chomsky’s suspicion of  a ToE. However, what is 
important in terms of  the current discussion is what a rejection of  a ToE can do to defend
any particular purview, for I argue it can do little. The slippery slope worry cannot be a 
sufficient or necessary part of  a defence of  a particular purview as it applies equally to 
Newtonian physics and pre-atomic chemistry as it does to the generativist, structuralist, 
functional, integrationist or cognitive linguist. The worry applies to any defence of  a 
theoretical purview and so is not useful in defending any specific one and Chomsky is 
mistaken in using it to defend his enquiries. Of  course, rejection of  a ToE implies that 
enquiries must be delimited in some degree, but it does nothing to justify any particular 
delimitation or abstraction. Given the fact a ToE is practical impossibility anyway, it cannot 
pose any threat.
It is incorrect then that expanding a theoretical purview or leaving it expressly open
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puts one on a slippery slope leading to a ToE. What we saw with Saussure’s stance on 
writing, Chomsky on ‘external’ considerations or Lass on ‘messy’ speakers, was a worry that 
purview expansion leads to vagueness or a confusion about what is ‘natural’ to language. 
However, if  we consider that the scope of  studies have changed (compare Newton’s and 
Einstein’s physics or the early nineteenth century view that linguistics was a sub-branch of  
philology), it is clear that this has not led to profligate theoretical expansion. So from an 
historical perspective too, such worries appear unfounded. Indeed, against those who 
worry that theoretical expansion leads to a ToE, the boot may be on the other foot. As 
Fodor points out, if one adopts a prescriptive approach to disciplinary boundaries, ‘he 
might just as well attend to the construction of  grammars that predict only intuitions about 
sentences with more than seven vowels, or sentences whose twelfth word is 
‘grandmother’….Once you start to stipulate, it’s Liberty Hall’ (Fodor in Katz (ed.) 1985, 
p.158). Not only is stipulation not a prophylactic against changes to disciplinary boundaries,
stipulation can licence precisely what those who worry about change or expansion in 
boundaries wish to avoid. What is required to defend theoretical boundaries is an
assessment of  particular boundaries.
The ToE worry is defused, but there is still a legitimate question about the 
justification of  purview setting simpliciter. I advocate that linguistics should be expressly 
open in respect of  its theoretical boundaries and this may appear to support 
methodological anarchism as espoused in Feyerabend’s Against Method (1982). Therefore I 
want to offer some criticism of  methodological anarchism and then give an outline of  how 
theoretical purviews can be justified. Feyerabend’s position is well known, so only a brief  
outline is required. In Against Method, Feyerabend argues against methodological monism, 
‘the idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules’ 
(Feyerabend 1982, p.295). According to Feyerabend, methodological monism fails to 
account for the character of  scientific advancement and if  adopted, would lead to scientific 
stagnation. The proposed remedy is the adoption of ‘methodological anarchism’, a position 
suspicious of  any delimitation of disciplinary boundaries, summed up in this way: ‘There is 
only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of  human 
development. It is the principle: anything goes’ (Feyerabend 1982, p.28).  
It might appear that disavowal of  any delimitation would lead methodological 
anarchism toward a ToE which, as I have argued, is a practical impossibility. But this need 
not faze the methodological anarchist, who could respond in this way: ‘Granted some 
delimitation is inevitable, but what I am interested in is that delimitations should not get in 
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the way of  scientific advancement.’ This is persuasive and similar to the position I 
advocate. What is different from my position though is that the methodological anarchist is 
blind to the necessity of  a scientific tradition and provides no way of judging when a 
‘scientific advancement’ might have taken place. As Bhaskar has argued, ‘any anarchistic 
move which helps progress on one criterion will impede it on some other’ (Bhaskar 1989, 
p.34). In the context of  scientific enquiry, a question about an object O requires that it be 
defined in such a way as one can be fairly sure that one is answering a question about O, 
even if  O turns out not to be what was thought. For example, phenomena ascribed to
‘phlogiston’ were in fact explained by magnetic fields and the Higgs boson might turn out 
to be within a lower gigalectron volt range than previously thought. This presupposes not 
only recognition of  fallibility, but a tradition of  seeing an object in a particular way and 
trying to answer questions about it. In being blind to tradition and providing no criterion 
for scientific progress, the claim of  methodological anarchism to defend such progress is 
meaningless. 
I have dealt with the issues of  a ToE and methodological anarchism and it is now
appropriate to ask that if  linguistics should have no principled delimitation or ‘hard and 
fast frontiers’, when would it be appropriate to change theoretical purview?  I do not think 
it possible to give criteria that would cover all possible boundary disputes, as the world is 
such that we are sometimes compelled to ask new questions that require new approaches. 
However, I propose several rules of  thumb which I think useful. These rules of  thumb are 
meant to be modest, both because any broader investigation is not possible given the scope 
of  this thesis and as scientific practice and methods change, it is not clear that anything 
firmer than rules of  thumb are possible. I propose three rules of  thumb for justifying 
change in purview: 
Current domain problems. If  theoretical problems are present within a domain or 
discoveries occur which cause problems, then there is reason to change the theoretical 
boundaries of  the domain. As Ishmael notes in Moby Dick (Melville 1992 [1851] 
pp.145-157), the inclusion of  cetaceans with the study of  ichthyology is a problem for 
the study of  fish because cetaceans display mammalian characteristics. Either one 
expands the study of  fish to include cetaceans (which by-the-by Ishmael recommends) 
or cetaceans are excluded from ichthyology, the current orthodoxy. The point is not 
that in taking cetaceans out of  ichthyology we have a more truthful zoological 
taxonomy, but that the example shows how such issues can motivate change. 
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New domain solutions. If  expanding the current domain to establish a new domain which
includes phenomena which allow for the explanation and/or prediction of  events 
which the current domain could not explain or predict, then there is justification for
the new domain. For example, inclusion of  the unconscious and suppressed
experiences within a theory of  psychology may be justified if  it helps explain the action 
of  agents, the principal goal of  psychology.
Comparison of  new domain and current domain problems. If  a new domain contains fewer
problems than in a current domain then there is motivation to adopt the new domain 
over the current domain. This may appear synonymous with (i), though what is stressed 
here is that the new domain need not be problem-free and there may be questions that
still require answers (consider the standard model versus steady-state theory). However, 
the new domain can still prove the more fruitful than its predecessor. This is analogous 
to the principle of  inference to the best explanation also discussed in 3.2, though here 
the concern is with the wider issue of  theoretical domains. 
If  there are problems with the current domain but no solutions from a proposed new 
domain, then we still have reason to remain with the current domain because the new 
domain solves nothing. However if  there are problems with the current domain and fewer 
problems with the new domain then we would have reason to adopt the new domain, 
though our purview would not necessarily offer any immediate solutions to problems. Of  
course, deciding what counts as a domain-problem is itself  theory-relative and thus a more 
complex matter than I present it here (Kuhn 1970), though further engagement is beyond 
the scope of  this thesis. I have now considered worries about my argument that linguistics 
has more in common with the social than the natural sciences and that it should reject any 
requirement to have ‘hard and fast frontiers’. Finally, I look at two current movements in 
linguistics that overlap in some concerns and conclusions of  this thesis and for which this
thesis can offer a degree of  philosophical underlabouring.
4.2.4 Conclusion: Cognitive and integrationist approaches
Within contemporary study of  language there are two relatively new approaches that share 
my concern that linguistics has tended toward fruitless abstraction and has not taken 
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sufficient account of  the social, contextual and agent-orientated nature of  language. These 
are cognitive and integrationist linguistics. By historically and philosophically 
contextualising and criticising the Formalist Attitude in some of  its manifestations, this 
thesis can be seen as a contribution to debates about the scientific status of  linguistics that 
the concerns of  such approaches raise. I wish to give an outline of  each approach not in 
order to provide critical comment as to their respective fruitfulness and viability, but to 
point towards some shared emphases and agreements and show how this thesis may 
plausibly provide some underlabouring for them.  
First to cognitive linguistics, whose foundations were set out in the work of  linguist 
George Lakoff  and philosopher Mark Johnson, particularly in their Metaphors we live by 
(1981), Philosophy in the Flesh (1999) and Johnson’s The Body in the Mind (1990). In many 
respects, cognitive linguists is consistent with the tradition of orthodox linguistics in that it 
claims to study language for its own sake, focussing on investigating and expositing the 
systematicity and structure of  language systems (Evans and Green 2007, p.5). Its 
intellectual history has grown out of  differences with generativist linguistics, which evolved 
into a number of commitments that inform and underpin its theoretical endeavours. These 
are known as the ‘Generalisation commitment’ and the ‘Cognitive commitment’. In 
contrast to generativist support for the modular nature of  mind and the postulation of
specific language modules (syntax, conceptual, phonological), the Generalisation 
commitment implies a rejection of  the existence of  such modules. Rather than seeing 
individual modules as possessing individual functions (to categorise, conceptualise, parse), 
cognitive linguists see such functions or abilities as possessed by the cognitive system in 
general. So for example, what makes up the ‘language system’ or the linguistic ability of  the 
speaker is, according to cognitive linguists, based on fundamental organising principles 
common to the cognitive system globally. As Lakoff  sees it, the generalisation commitment 
‘is a commitment to linguistics as a scientific endeavour, a commitment to seek general 
principles’ (Lakoff 1990, p.46). 
The cognitive commitment follows from the generalisation commitment and 
‘represents the view that principles of  linguistic structure that hold should reflect what is 
known about human cognition from other disciplines, particularly the other cognitive 
sciences’ (Evans and Green 2007, p.40). Given the generalisation commitment posits that 
cognitive capacities are general and non-modular in nature, converging cognitive linguistic 
research with research from other fields is a plausible way of  seeking to empirically justify 
the generalisation commitment. In a statement of  the intent of  cognitive linguistics which
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implicitly recognises both commitments, Fauconnier writes,
In contrast to this sharply autonomous view of  language structure, cognitive linguistics has 
resurrected an older tradition. In that tradition, language is in the service of  constructing 
and communicating meaning, and it is for the linguist and cognitive scientist a window into 
the mind. Seeing through that window, however, is not obvious. Deep features of  our 
thinking, cognitive processes, and social communication need to be brought in, correlated, 
and associated with their linguistic manifestations (Fauconnier in Janssen and Redeker
(eds.) 1999, p.95).
Cognitive linguistics shares with this thesis a concern that the desire for linguistics to be an 
autonomous discipline has led to problematic abstractions and as such cognitive linguistics
is less focussed on maintaining strict disciplinary boundaries, as the cognitive commitment 
implies. Cognitive linguistics is committed to working and bifurcating with the cognitive 
and social sciences. Indeed in discussing work on linguistic motivation (Radden and 
Panther 2004) and language change (Croft 2000), this thesis has touched on cognitive 
linguistic work, so it is clear that there are areas of  agreement and that my analysis and 
criticism of  the Formalist Attitude supports the broader scope of  cognitive linguistics and 
the greater attention given to linguistic utterances and the role of  communication in social 
life.  
Another approach that shares concerns and emphases with this thesis, though one
quite different from cognitive linguistics, is integrationism, developed by Roy Harris in The 
Language Myth (1981), The Language Machine (1987) and Signs, Language and Communication 
(1996). Integrationist linguistics involves the ‘investigation of  the renewal of  language as a 
continually creative process’ recognising that ‘Human beings inhabit a communicational 
space which is not neatly compartmentalised into language and non-language’ (Harris 1981, 
pp.164-165). Harris has offered these axioms of the integrationist approach:
1. What constitutes a sign is not given independently of  the situation in which it 
occurs or of  its material manifestation in that situation.
2. The value of a sign (i.e. its signification) is a function of  the integrational 
proficiency which its identification and interpretation presuppose (Harris 2009, 
p.70).  
The term ‘integrational proficiency’ is anything that influences the communicative process, 
be this context, mood or different kinds of  knowledge possessed by speakers. This means 
that ‘communication events cannot be decontextualised. Episodes of  communication are 
episodes in the lives of  particular people at particular times and places. Signs are products 
of  such episodes’ (Harris 2009, p.70). Central to integrationism is the ‘principle of  
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cotemporality’. The principle of  cotemporality stresses that ‘linguistic acts are assumed to 
be immediately relevant to the current situation, unless there is reason to suppose 
otherwise’ (Harris 1981, p.157) and linguistic and non-linguistic acts are continually 
integrated with one another, having equal importance in lived experience and in 
interpreting action. Without recognition of  this principle, making sense of  linguistic
activity (making a political speech, writing a mountaineering guidebook) is difficult because
there is no fruitful separation between the linguistic and non-linguistic
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, so the ‘linguistic’
cannot be understood without an account of  how it is integrated with other facets of  
human life (personal/national history, gesture, ethics). Integrationism can be plausibly seen 
as an attempt at a ‘study of  the interpreter’ that Chomsky has been keen to dismiss (4.3.3) 
and integrationist excursions into subjects such as psychoanalysis (Harris 2009) and 
economics (Jones 2011) indicate the heterogeneity of  the approach.
Integrationism is suspicious of  attempts to study language within the framework of  
either the social or natural sciences and integrationists sometimes deny that study of  
language should aim at ‘scientificity’ (Harris 2009, Jones 2007) or at discovery and 
exposition of  the systematicity and structure of  language systems. As Harris has described 
the situation for Saussure (though this might be applied to modern linguistics also):
[T]he study of  language threatened to fragment between disciplines which had little in 
common: phonetics, psychology, philology, neuropsychology, social anthropology, etc. The 
fragmentation pursued in the interests of  science and its incessant quest for ‘harder’ facts, 
left a disturbing impression that somehow language has slipped though the net of  
understanding (Harris 1988, pp.126-127).
Integrationism shares concerns with this thesis and is in certain respects consistent with it. 
The emphasis on the linguistic activity of  agents and their ability to transform language is 
in keeping with my proposal of  the transformational model (4.2) and recognition in the 
principle of  cotemporality that language functions in an open system where there is no 
easy separation of the ‘linguistic’ and ‘non-linguistic’ is consistent with my account of  
linguistic knowledge in 3.3. Perhaps more so than cognitive linguistics, integrationism is 
aware of  linguistic history and often critical of  the scientific aspirations of  linguistics and 
the philosophical background of  linguistic theories. In this respect in particular, this thesis 
can provide a degree of  philosophical support and underlabouring. 
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This stance has something in common with Davidson’s criticisms and stance in ‘A Derangement of 
Epitaphs’ and Goldstein (2004) notes links between integrationism and Davidson’s ‘Wittgenstein 
turn’. 
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The primary purpose of  this thesis has been to argue against claims that linguistics is a
natural science or is especially affiliated with the natural sciences: a position I have called
the Formalist Attitude. Chapter one provided historical background by tracing the 
development of  linguistics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in terms of
conceptions of  language and the practice of  linguistics. I then showed how the Formalist 
Attitude is present and problematic in modern linguistics in the form of  generativism and 
less conspicuously, but still problematically, in Derrida’s consideration of  linguistics.
In chapter two I turned to problems of considering social factors in linguistics and 
the suspicion linguists have of  causation and explanation of  social phenomena. I looked at 
Lass’ On Explaining Language Change and argued that despite an awareness of  the problems 
of a highly formalised conception of  linguistics, he nevertheless remained unjustifiably 
sceptical about any non-deductive account of  language change which included reference to 
social factors. I then assessed the viability of  ceteris paribus laws as a way of  accounting for 
causation and explanation in the social sciences and argued that while ceteris paribus laws are
more robust than some critics claim, they are vulnerable to the charge of  vacuity. In 
response to this I argued that ceteris paribus laws were best treated as power ascriptions and I
gave an account of  how language can be usefully and justifiably viewed as a power, which 
provided an answer to the question, ‘what is a language?’.
Chapter 3 considered a number of  issues in linguistics and philosophy of  language
congruent with the overall concerns of  the thesis. These were arbitrariness, language 
change and knowledge of  language. In each case, it was shown that approaches to these 
issues which saw language as an autonomous object encountered problems and that 
consideration of  social or external factors shed light on the issues and helped to solve
problems.  
In chapter 4 I began by inquiring into the relationship between the speaker and 
language structure. I argued for a transformational model that avoided the problems of  the 
Durkheimian and Weberian models and recognised the mutual irreducibility and 
interconnectedness of  structure and agency. Lastly, I brought together observations of  this
thesis and concluded that linguistics, in opposition to the Formalist Attitude, should be 
viewed as a social rather than a natural science and should be less concerned to secure a
strict delimitation of  its theoretical purview and object of knowledge.
Thought about language over the last fifty years has to some degree recognised the 
social importance of  language and the importance of  the social to language. Such 
recognition, while welcome, does not automatically translate into our attempts to describe, 
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explain and theorise about language. For such recognition to be fruitful, its consequences 
for the way in which language is described, explained and theorised about need to be 
scrutinised. This thesis has made a contribution by showing how interconnected the
theoretical assumptions of  linguists are with their view of  language and also the extent to 
which factors outside the linguist’s chosen theoretical domain are too often problematically 
refused, ignored or sidelined. In doing this and offering some remedy to such problems, 
this thesis can help to inform future work in the philosophy of  linguistics and linguistics 
itself. 
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